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Abstract 
 
 
Accounts of the management of the recent economic crisis in Spain have been 
dominated by an emphasis on external constraints. However, this approach 
leaves unanswered important questions about the role of domestic political 
factors. Using systematic qualitative primary research and employing elite 
interviewing and process tracing, this dissertation aims to fill this gap for the period 
of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) administration. The question it 
seeks to answer is: what role did domestic political factors play in the PSOE 
government´s management of the crisis in Spain and in its immediate origins? 
 
The dissertation shows that domestic politics played a crucial role in the 
management of the crisis, most importantly by determining the shape of the 
measures undertaken. In its three distinct stages – downplaying/inaction, 
reaction/stimulus and austerity/reform – the PSOE´s response was certainly 
constrained by external factors, most notably EMU membership and the actions of 
sovereign-bond investors, the ECB and Germany. Yet while these external 
constraints forced the government to act, domestic political factors fundamentally 
shaped the content of key measures: the fiscal stimulus, the labour, financial and 
pension reforms, the refusal to accept a bailout or the reform of the Constitution. 
Seven factors were particularly influential: i) electoral and political cost, ii) party 
and partisanship, iii) organised interests, iv) domestic institutions, v) ideological 
preferences, vi) ineffective decision-making, and vii) judgement and personal 
characteristics of decision-makers. 
 
In conclusion, domestic politics played a more important role in the management 
of the crisis than is allowed for by dominant approaches focusing on external 
constraints and weak domestic policy autonomy. The findings provide empirical 
evidence to support research agendas that identify significant state discretion in 
the face of international economic integration and an important role for domestic 
political factors such as institutions, material interests, partisanship and ideology in 
shaping economic outcomes. 
  
	 iii	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Sofía and Scott Alexander, 
 
Sapere aude… and be happy 
  
	 iv	
Preface  
 
This dissertation is the result of an intellectual voyage. It commenced with an 
interest in exploring the role of domestic political factors during the recent 
economic and sovereign debt crises in Spain in the face of pervasive claims about 
the powerlessness of domestic politics against the forces unleashed by global and 
European economic integration. It ended with a realization that, at least in the 
case of Spain, superficial observations often obscure more complex dynamics and 
that the role of domestic politics had actually been substantial. Such an intellectual 
project would not have been possible without the support of many people. Robert 
Putnam awoke my interest in academic research as a student in his research 
seminar on social capital while at Harvard, where Roberto Mangabeira Unger first 
also instilled in me an aspiration for intellectual heterodoxy. Dani Rodrik´s work 
was the intellectual inspiration for my research topic and he generously supported 
my PhD application and offered some valuable advice in its early stages. Once at 
Cambridge, Chris Hill and Pieter van Houten offered pertinent criticism of my initial 
work. My supervisor, Helen Thompson, steered the dissertation to its completion 
and often kept me from going down the wrong path; it is to her that I owe my 
greatest academic debt. I am also grateful to my examiners, Chris Bickerton and 
Federico Steinberg, for their valuable criticisms. Thanks are also owed to Javier 
Solana and Ángel Saz for their support and to Ferrán Martínez i Coma for his 
generous feedback. My research would have been impossible without the 
contribution of many former colleagues in the Spanish government; among them 
Andrés Ortega has been a valued friend and mentor. Sebastian Sobecki is 
probably more to blame than anyone else for my perilous decision to embark on a 
PhD and has been a constant source of inspiration and a valued friend for many 
years. Wolfson College provided a privileged setting for my work and for my 
children to live their early years and I am very grateful to its entire staff. Finally, my 
greatest debt and appreciation is, as always, to my family, without whose support I 
would have never persevered: to my parents Wilma and Ángel, who got me on 
track; to my sisters Sonia and Patricia, who have always been there for me; to my 
wife Casilda, who joined me in this voyage; and, most especially, to my children, 
Sofia and Scott Alexander, who kept me going when the going got tough and 
whose mere existence is my greatest fortune. I dedicate this dissertation to them. 
	 v	
Finally, as required by regulations governing the submission of dissertations at the 
University of Cambridge, I declare that: 
• This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the 
outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and 
specified in the text. 
• It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being 
concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the 
University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as 
declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no 
substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being 
concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at 
the University of Cambridge or any other University of similar institution except 
as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. 
• It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree 
Committee. 
   	 	
	 vi	
Table of contents 
Abstract  ii 
Preface  iv 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
1.2. Literature review 
      1.2.1. External perspectives on the origins and management of the crisis 
      1.2.2. Domestic perspectives on the origins and management of the crisis 
      1.2.3. Summary: limitations of the existing literature 
1.3. Research question and theoretical framework 
1.3.1 Research question 
1.3.2 Theoretical framework 
1.4. Methodology and chapter structure 
1 
1 
4 
4 
23 
36 
40 
40 
42 
56 
Chapter 2 Inaction (March 2004 - August 2007) 
2.1. Introduction 
2.2. Management of economic imbalances 
       2.2.1. Credit boom, current account deficit and high private debt 
       2.2.2. The housing bubble 
       2.2.3. A dysfunctional labour market 
       2.2.4. Change of growth model 
2.3. Conclusion 
60 
60 
61 
61 
67 
72 
78 
84 
Chapter 3 From downplay to reaction (August 2007 - May 2010) 
3.1. Introduction 
3.2. Downplay (mid 2007 - October 2008) 
3.3. Reaction: financial sector support and stimulus (October 2008 - mid 2009) 
       3.3.1. Financial sector support 
       3.3.2. Stimulus: the Plan E 
3.4. Early reforms (mid 2009 - May 2010) 
      3.4.1. The Sustainable Economy Law 
      3.4.2. The first reform of the financial sector 
3.5. Conclusion 
87 
87 
88 
98 
99 
102 
108 
110 
114 
125 
Chapter 4 The euro zone crisis (I): austerity and reform (May 2010 - April 2011) 
4.1. Introduction 
4.2. The May 2010 U-turn 
4.3. The reform of the labour market 
4.4. The threat of a bailout 
4.5. Reform in a worsening euro zone crisis 
       4.5.1. The second and third reforms of the financial sector 
       4.5.2. The 2011 budget 
       4.5.3. The reform of the pension system 
4.6. Conclusion 
128 
128 
131 
141 
151 
160 
160 
163 
164 
167 
Chapter 5 The euro zone crisis (II): the reform of the Constitution (May - Dec. 2011) 
5.1. Introduction: the return of the crisis 
5.2. The reform of the Constitution 
5.3. Epilogue: the G20 Cannes summit 
5.4. Conclusion 
169 
169 
172 
185 
187 
Chapter 6 Conclusion 
6.1. Introduction 
6.2. Summary of findings 
6.3. Theoretical implications 
6.4. Limitations of the research 
6.5. Recommendations for future research 
6.6. Conclusion 
193 
193 
194 
207 
219 
220 
221 
References  222 
	 1	
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to enrich our understanding of the factors, in 
particular the domestic political factors, that shaped the management of the 
financial, economic, sovereign-debt and euro crises in Spain by the centre-left 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) government, from their immediate 
origins to the end of the PSOE´s time in office in late 2011. Understanding the 
management of the Spanish crisis is important. As the second largest economy of 
the euro periphery, Spain´s economic woes were not only of national relevance 
but also had a systemic bearing on the rest of the euro zone and beyond. While 
the economic origins and causes of the crisis have been the subject of an ample 
body of literature, its management is still an understudied topic. As we shall see, 
the academic literature on the subject has been mainly descriptive rather than 
explanatory. Furthermore, it has tended to emphasise external constraints, 
especially those related to Spain´s membership of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). In the words of Armingeon and Baccaro (2012: 162), the crisis in the 
European periphery, including Spain, shows that ‘domestic institutions and politics 
matter very little for [sic] explaining policy responses to the sovereign debt crisis’. 
Yet, as we shall see, this approach leaves important questions unanswered. 
Surprisingly, the role of domestic political factors in the government´s 
management of the crisis and whether they may have had a larger impact than the 
literature allows has hardly been explored. A thorough and systematic analysis 
exploring through primary research the management of the crisis, focusing on the 
role played by domestic political factors, remains, to the best of my knowledge, to 
be made. The objective of this dissertation, and the contribution to the literature it 
aims to make, is to conduct such an exercise for the years of the crisis managed 
by the PSOE government through a reconstruction of its main episodes. 
 
Before proceeding some early clarifications are called for. Firstly, this dissertation 
covers a period defined by various successive crises: the global financial crisis 
that began in 2007, the credit crunch in the autumn of 2008, the double-dip 
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recession that followed and the sovereign debt crisis that affected the euro zone, 
which commenced in earnest in mid-2010 with the eruption of the Greek fiscal 
crisis and the contagion of fiscal sustainability doubts to other peripheral EMU 
member states, including Spain, and which led to doubts on the future of the euro 
itself in the second part of 2011. For practical purposes the dissertation will use 
the term ‘crisis’, or variants such as ‘crises, ‘economic crisis’, ‘crisis in Spain’ or 
‘economic crisis’, to encompass these distinct episodes, unless the discussion 
pertains specifically to one of them. 
 
Secondly, the period covered by the research requires some justification. Any 
period chosen to delimit the analysis of the economic crisis could be considered 
arbitrary. Looking at the data, Spain only came out of recession in the last quarter 
of 2013. Yet it could be argued that the most intense part of the crisis ended on 26 
July 2012 with Mario Draghi´s (2012) ‘whatever it takes’ press conference that led 
to an easing of the pressures on Spain´s sovereign debt. Alternatively, one could 
argue that the Spanish crisis receded after the bailout of the Spanish financial 
system in June 2012. Finally, an argument could also be advanced that the 
underlying crisis is still ongoing since, even if growth has returned, many of the 
structural issues that led to the crisis, as well as a mounting debt, still cast a 
shadow over the country. Limiting the research to the period of the crisis managed 
by the PSOE government, from mid 2007 to the end of 2011, considering also the 
immediate origins of the crisis, can be justified on at least two grounds. Firstly, the 
key policies that defined the management of the crisis were put in place during 
this early period. The conservative government of the Partido Popular (PP), which 
followed the PSOE government, continued and in many respects intensified these 
policies, but their nature (the emphasis on austerity, budget deficit reduction and 
structural reforms, or what at least were presented as such) remained. It was 
therefore in this first period that the course was set. And secondly, the contrast 
between external constraints and domestic preferences in the management of the 
crisis is certainly more apparent during the Socialist administration, for many of 
these policies were contrary not only to the manifesto which brought the party to 
office but actually to the policies and ideology that had defined the PSOE for the 
last three decades since the transition to democracy. Accounts privileging the role 
of external constraints are heavily reliant on the adoption of austerity measures 
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(Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; Hopkins, 2015), which first took place during this 
period, and therefore to provide evidence to the contrary – to suggest that 
domestic factors were actually vital in explaining why and how these policies were 
adopted – would represent the most valuable contribution to this research agenda. 
 
Thirdly, it should be clear that the ultimate interest of the dissertation is the 
management of the crisis rather than its origins, although to address the former it 
will be necessary also to consider the crisis´ immediate origins. By ‘management’ 
of the crisis I mean i) the decisions and actions taken by policy-makers, mainly the 
central government but also other key institutions such as the central bank and ii) 
the reasons that explain why and how these decisions were taken. 
 
Finally, the meaning of the terms ‘domestic political factors’ and ‘external 
constraints’ have to be clarified. The dissertation will regard as ‘domestic politics’ 
any factor that has its origin in the domestic political realm. This includes political 
parties, domestic political institutions, organised interests and political economy 
coordinating mechanisms, electoral and public opinion dynamics, political leaders 
and their personal characteristics, and the decision-making structures and 
processes within government. The dissertation will concern itself mainly with the 
role played by the central government, and not that of regional and local 
governments, although their actions will be considered when necessary. 
 
‘External constraints’ are understood to be factors originating outside Spain, 
whether economic, political or institutional. These factors will have conditioned the 
response in different ways: some will have acted as substantial causes (for 
example, EMU membership), while others might have been channels or 
mechanisms through which this external pressure was exercised (for example the 
sovereign bond spread). Finally, this category will also include different types of 
agent, most importantly other sovereign states, but also European Union (EU) 
institutions, mainly the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European 
Commission; international investors, such as international sovereign bond holders; 
international financial institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF); and other international organizations like the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
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1.2. Literature review 
 
The literature on the management of the Spanish crisis, as opposed to its causes, 
is not particularly extensive and is often of a descriptive rather than explanatory 
nature, as the critical analysis that follows will show. That the crisis is a recent 
phenomenon can in part explain the limited research in the topic. The difficulty in 
gathering first-hand accounts from key decision-makers, many of whom are still 
politically active and reluctant to talk on the subject, adds to the difficulty in 
obtaining a suitable account of the management of the crisis. This dissertation 
aims partially to fill that gap. 
 
A relatively limited literature has, however, attempted to provide some insight into 
this question. The following review surveys first the literature that has focused on 
external constraints as the key explanatory variables in the management of the 
crisis, and, highlighting their limitations, proceeds to review those sources that 
have explored the role of domestic factors, first economic and then political. In 
each case I shall first consider some of the accounts of the origins of the crisis, as 
approaches to explaining its management are often the projection of different 
frameworks within which its origin is explained. Yet a thorough analysis of the vast 
literature on the factors that contributed to these crises, at both international and 
Spanish levels, falls outside the scope of this dissertation and this review will only 
cover the literature on the origins of the crisis that directly pertains to its 
management. Furthermore, this literature review is focused on the empirical 
literature on the management of the crisis in Spain, or the European southern 
periphery where it is directly relevant. The theoretical literature on the influence of 
domestic politics in economic outcomes, in so far as it is pertinent to the 
dissertation, is discussed in the ‘Research Question and Theoretical Framework’ 
section later in the chapter.  
 
 
1.2.1. External perspectives on the origins and management of the crisis 
 
Analyses of the Spanish crisis have often privileged external constraints as the 
key explanatory variables for both its origin and management. The following 
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section provides a critical review of such attempts in relation, firstly to the origin of 
the crisis and secondly to its management. 
 
 
External perspectives on the origins of the crisis 
 
A number of external factors undoubtedly contributed to causing Spain´s 
economic woes. The process of economic and financial globalisation, and in 
particular the role of global macroeconomic imbalances, is a first key factor that 
fuelled the disequilibria that led to the Spanish economic crisis (Stiglitz, 2010; 
Wolf, 2010; Eichengreen, 2012). According to this interpretation (Wolf, 2010), 
economic reforms in emerging economies generated high growth and a glut of 
savings which, thanks to global free movement of capital and the difficulties of 
states in regulating these global financial flows (Stiglitz, 2010), found their way to 
developed markets where they fuelled asset price bubbles. In Europe this was 
further compounded by a problem of balance of payments between north and 
south, where the high levels of savings in EMU’s core, especially Germany, 
combined with the ECB´s low interest rates, financed the credit boom, high 
indebtedness, current account deficits and asset price bubbles in the European 
periphery, which were at the heart of the Spanish crisis (Eichengreen, 2012). With 
low returns at home due to low interest rates and intense competition, foreign 
banks, especially German (Bastasín, 2012: 304), recycled this savings glut into 
readily accessible funds for investment-hungry Spain. The financing of Spain´s 
housing and infrastructure bubble, as well as the substantial increase in domestic 
consumption far and above the country´s saving rate, necessitated the external 
credit that these external flows provided. 
 
Global financial markets play a key role in this explanation (Johnson and Kwak, 
2010; Stiglitz, 2010; Wolf, 2010; Ontiveros 2011; Moghadam, 2014). Firstly, they 
facilitated the development of the global macroeconomic imbalances described 
above (Wolf, 2010; Stiglitz, 2010). Secondly, they were undisciplined and 
ineffective in pricing risk uniformly across the euro area and failing to capture the 
variance of country risks within it (Moghadam, 2014). And thirdly, they quickly 
translated the US subprime crisis into a global credit crunch that severely affected 
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a deeply, externally indebted Spain and precipitated the recession (Ontiveros, 
2011). This interpretation points to the process of financial deregulation in the US 
that led to the subprime mortgage crisis and the role played in it by the country´s 
financial sector (Johnson and Kwak, 2010) as another external indirect cause of 
the Spanish crisis. 
 
Yet it is Spain´s membership of EMU that is the most common external constraint 
referred to in the literature to explain the origin of the crisis in Spain. One set of 
interpretations (Feldstein, 1997, 2012; Thompson, 2007; Issing, 2008; Marzinotto 
et al., 2010; Pisani-Ferry, 2011, 2012; Eichengreen, 2012; Galí, 2012; James, 
2012; Lane, 2012; Dyson, 2013; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2013; Moghadam, 
2014; Sinn, 2014; Baldwin et al., 2015), sometimes commenting on the European 
periphery as a whole rather than particularly on Spain, but with obvious direct 
relevance for the Spanish case, has focused on how inherent flaws in EMU´s 
institutional design and corresponding lack of effective EMU-wide instruments led 
to the crisis. According to a large body of literature (Feldstein, 1997, 2012; Issing, 
2008; Sinn, 2014), these flaws are the unavoidable outcome of the misconceived 
economic project that the euro represents. The most recurrent argument in this 
direction has pointed to the economic heterogeneity between peripheral EMU 
members, including Spain, and core European states (Feldstein, 1997, 2012; 
Eichengreen, 2012; Sinn, 2014), often in tandem with the theory of optimum 
currency area which points to different aggregate supply and demand 
disturbances to regions sharing a common currency as the main challenge to a 
monetary union (Mundell, 1961). Labour mobility and fiscal institutions to enable 
transfers to worse-off regions are seen as the key adjustment mechanisms 
(Kenen, 1969). Yet the fact that both of these were and still are very limited in 
Europe, the former for cultural and linguistic issues and the latter for political 
reasons, partially explains the problems that afflicted the economies of the 
European periphery, including Spain, in the run-up to the crisis. In the absence of 
equilibrating mechanisms the divergence in productivity rates and thus 
competitiveness between Spain (and other peripheral EU states) and ‘core EMU’, 
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mainly Germany, was unavoidably to lead to an unsustainable current account 
deficit in Spain (Marzinotto et al., 2010), as was indeed the case.1  
 
A lack of understanding of the deep interconnection that EMU created between 
banking and sovereign financing was also at the heart of the vulnerability of the 
euro area (Bastasín, 2012; Lane, 2012). In the view of Lane (2012: 68): 
 
The origin and propagation of the European sovereign debt crisis can be 
attributed to the flawed original design of the euro. In particular, there was 
an incomplete understanding of the fragility of a monetary union under 
crisis conditions, especially in the absence of banking union and other 
European-level buffer mechanisms. 
 
The lack of appropriate mechanisms to deal with this interconnection was, 
however, in the view of Pisani-Ferry (2012: 1), not so much the result of a failed 
diagnosis but the inevitable outcome of the attempt to combine an ‘impossible 
trinity of strict no-monetary financing, bank-sovereign interdependence and no co-
responsibility for public debt’. 
 
The lack of political commitment, rather than the inescapable outcome of 
economic heterogeneity or a poor understanding of the interconnection of 
sovereign and baking financing, has also been considered (James, 2012) to be 
the real source of the design flaws in EMU that affected Spain. While the technical 
policies that could be implemented through a technocratic ECB did advance 
(monetary union, introduction of the euro, etc.), those that required political 
engagement, such as fiscal and banking union, debt mutualisation or a larger EU 
budget did not, and it is their absence that allowed the disequilibria to develop in 
peripheral EMU states. Baldwin et al. (2015:14) have argued in the same 
direction, suggesting that EMU´s design flaws were caused by the fact that there 
was no ‘shared vision on the standards of political and institutional cohesion that 
would be required to make the project viable’. 
 
 
																																																								1	Although	for	a	sceptical	view	on	this,	claiming	competitiveness	losses	in	the	EU	Southern	periphery	have	been	overstated,	see	Wyplosz	2011.	
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EMU´s institutional flaws have also been linked to a prevailing neo-liberal ideology 
among EU policymakers and especially the German economic elite at the time of 
their design (McNamara, 1998). This would explain the focus of the Maastricht 
criteria on nominal convergence, and especially on public debt and inflation 
targets, and the absence of EMU-wide mechanisms that could have enabled fiscal 
transfers. 
 
Hall (2014) has however offered an alternative explanation for Germany´s 
behaviour. Following on his seminal work on varieties of capitalism (VoC) (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001), he has attempted to explain the origins of the crisis in terms 
of the diversity in domestic political economy institutions among the euro zone 
states rather than on the prevailing ideology of its economic elites. According to 
this view, ‘the roots of the crisis are linked to institutional asymmetries between 
political economies’ (Hall, 2014: 1223). In other words the different models of 
capitalism led inevitably to different economic strategies that in turn led to the 
current account imbalances that were a key cause of the euro zone crisis. It was 
Germany´s model of capitalism, which by necessity requires low inflation to 
remain competitive, that was, according to this interpretation, at the heart of the 
Maastricht Treaty criteria that allowed these disequilibria to develop without being 
properly addressed at EU level.  
 
Hopkins (2013, 2015) has also challenged the notion that EMU´s design, and 
Spain´s inability to adapt to the new context of the monetary union, led to the crisis 
in Spain. In particular, he has challenged the assumption that the causes of the 
crisis were characterised by Spain´s refusal to undertake the necessary reforms 
and has placed the responsibility on Germany´s inability, or unwillingness, to 
control its financial flows into the periphery in the years prior to the crisis. 
 
Whether the inevitable outcome of an unfeasible project, of a lack of political will, 
of the influence of neoliberal ideology or of Germany´s political preferences, these 
institutional limitations are crucial to understanding the difficulties that led to the 
Spanish crisis. The poor governance and decision-making mechanisms allowed 
imbalances to develop (Thompson, 2007) and EMU´s institutional flaws impeded 
the development of EU-wide mechanisms that could have helped redress the 
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imbalances that led to the crisis. A fiscal union and larger EU budget could have 
helped Spain remedy some of the chronic underdevelopments that are at the 
heart of the economic problems that led to the crisis, especially poor investment in 
human capital, research and development and other factors of production (Pisani-
Ferry, 2011: 153-159). Similarly, the Maastricht criteria that granted access to 
EMU and the Stability and Growth Pact that in theory served to monitor member 
states’ economic and financial soundness to remain within it were seriously flawed 
(Moghadam, 2014), as they focused almost exclusively on fiscal discipline but 
failed to monitor the private sector imbalances that led to the crisis in Spain, 
especially current account deficits and private debt.  
 
Finally, EMU is also said to have facilitated the onset of the crisis by delaying 
structural reforms and leading to deteriorating institutions in Spain. According to 
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013: 151-153), EMU led to this outcome in three 
ways. Firstly, the credit boom it facilitated eased budget constraints, allowing 
countries like Spain to borrow their way to growth and delay structural reform. 
Secondly, the housing bubble it enabled generated a significant increase in fiscal 
revenue, thus also easing the pressure for reform. And thirdly, euro zone 
membership and its associated credit boom masked the incompetent actions of 
political elites in local and regional governments, who fostered real-estate activity 
for their own benefit, often by corrupt practices, through poorly governed and 
politicized cajas. In their own words: 
 
Both public and private accountability was diminished during the boom 
because the consequences of bad decisions are largely imperceptible, at 
least in the short run, when rising asset prices hide all mistakes 
(Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2013: 163). 
 
 
For all the relevance of the factors highlighted above, accounts based purely on 
external constraints cannot by themselves explain why Spain found itself in such a 
difficult situation when the crisis struck. Two main objections stand out. Firstly, 
while globalisation and global macroeconomic imbalances certainly increased 
Spain´s disequilibria, they do not obviously explain, in so far as these were forces 
affecting all developed economies, why they led to the particular problems that 
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Spain encountered. They do not explain, for example, why Spain suffered a 
housing bubble while other southern European countries like Italy did not. 
Furthermore, blaming globalisation for the country´s perils often reflects political 
interest rather than reality. Fernández-Albertos et al. (2013) have conclusively 
shown that blame for the crisis in Spain was directly correlated to partisanship, 
with potential voters of the opposition PP most likely to blame the crisis on the 
government, but PSOE supporters less so in so far as globalisation was often put 
forward by the government as an explanation of the crisis. There was an obvious 
incentive, as a strategy to deflect responsibility for the crisis, at least among its 
own voters, for the government to blame the country´s problems on external 
factors, such as the pressure of global financial markets, if, as Fernández-Albertos 
et al. (ibid.: 804) show: 
 
The incumbent party endorsement of globalisation as a cause of the crisis 
affects the party’s supporters’ views of the crisis, (…) and helps exonerate 
the government and blame other European governments more. 
 
Secondly, the economic heterogeneity within EMU of course in part explains why 
Spain´s predicament in it was always going to be complicated. But what it cannot 
explain is why then Spain sought acceptance in the monetary union knowing the 
perils it could bring about, and why the EU allowed its entry. Furthermore, EMU´s 
institutional flaws cannot account for the fact that for the first ten years the 
institutional design did work, as was evidenced by the convergence in sovereign 
debt spreads between Spain and Germany. This does not mean that institutional 
design was not a problem, but it obviously cannot explain the early success of the 
euro project in Spain and the strengthening of Spain´s economic fundamentals. 
Or, to put it another way, some other factors or triggering mechanisms must have 
been at play in order for this same institutional design to lead to a deterioration of 
Spain´s economic fundamentals at a later stage. Finally, and most relevantly for 
this dissertation, economic heterogeneity and institutional flaws cannot explain 
why Spanish policy-makers did not act to redress some of the most obvious 
imbalances, even when they had become obvious, such as the ballooning current 
account deficit or the housing bubble. 
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External perspectives on the management of the crisis 
 
Analyses of the management of the Spanish crisis have often found various 
external constraints to be the key explanatory variables in the government´s 
response. These accounts have put forward different explanations for the nature 
and workings of these external constraints, which are often found in the same 
literature discussed in the previous section, as they are closely intertwined with 
analyses of the origins of the crisis.  
 
Global financial markets, and in particular international bond investors financing 
Spanish sovereign debt, played a determinant role in conditioning the 
government´s response to the crisis (Pisani-Ferry and Posen, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010; 
Ontiveros, 2011; Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013a, 
2013b). According to this perspective, the difficulties in financing the sovereign 
debt, the risk of a liquidity crisis and the need to regain the favour of bond 
investors forced the reforms and austerity that characterised the response to the 
crisis (Ontiveros, 2011; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013a, 2013b). The drastic austerity 
measures announced in May 2010, which represented a dramatic change of 
course in the government´s economic and social policy, and which were taken in 
fear of an unsustainable spike in the cost of Spanish debt due to contagion from 
the Greek sovereign crisis, are often presented (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012: 
178) as the most dramatic example of the power of the bond markets to condition 
the Spanish government´s response to the crisis. The sovereign bond spread has 
acted as the constraining mechanism on policy and international sovereign bond 
investors have, at each stage of the process, rendered national politics and 
institutions irrelevant by conditioning and limiting the ability of the Spanish 
government to act by the threat of forcing Spain into a bailout. In this respect 
Pisani-Ferry and Posen (2009: 9) have pointed to the end of convergence in risk 
premiums between EMU members, which had characterised the euro zone since 
its inception. This literature is of course intimately connected with analyses 
(Stiglitz, 2010) that have explained the lack of policy autonomy of Spain and other 
EMU peripheral states during their response to the crisis with reference to their 
inability to reign over capital in an age of freedom of financial flows. 
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Yet, as with analysis of the origins of the crisis, EMU membership has been found 
to be the most important factor conditioning the management of the crisis. A large 
body of literature (Fernández-Villaverde and Ohanian, 2010; Guerot, 2010; 
Marzinotto et al., 2010; De Grauwe, 2011; Delpla and Von Weizsäcker, 2011; 
Pisani-Ferry, 2011, 2012; Sinn 2011; Armigeon and Baccaro, 2012; Feldstein, 
2012; Heise, 2012; James, 2012; Lane, 2012; Bastasín, 2012; Dyson, 2013; 
Krugman, 2013; Baldwin et al., 2015; De Grauwe and Ji, 2015) has focused on 
the inherent flaws in EMU´s institutional design and lack of effective EMU-wide 
instruments to explain the management of the crisis. According to this line of 
analysis there were at least five design flaws in EMU that constrained the Spanish 
government’s management of the crisis. 
 
The first was the inability of the ECB under its statutes to act as a lender of last 
resort to EMU states (Marzinotto et al., 2010; De Grauwe, 2011; Pisani-Ferry, 
2011, 2012), since Article 123 of the Treaty of Lisbon forbids the ECB the direct 
purchase of debt instruments from member states. This partially explains why 
contagion from the Greek crisis led to Spain´s vulnerability to the financial markets 
(Fernández-Villaverde and Ohanian, 2010). On this interpretation (Bastasín, 2012) 
the reluctance of the ECB to buy sovereign debt of the most vulnerable states in 
the early stages of the crisis and its resistance to doing so decisively until August 
2011 for those states that were not under an EU bailout program, such as Spain 
and Italy, seriously affected Spain by dramatically increasing its sovereign bond 
spread. Bastasín (2012: 269) has provided a detailed account of this aspect of the 
crisis and has explained how, for example, when in March 2011 the ECB decided 
to stop buying government bonds of Greece, Portugal and Ireland in order to put 
pressure on their national governments to adopt more decisive action to deal with 
the euro crisis, the value of the bonds of those countries that were deemed to 
have a similar risk profile, such as Spain and Italy, fell. As a result, banks started 
selling them in fear of a further decline in value, which led to an increase in the 
Spanish bond spread. In sum, the constraining effect that the dramatic increase in 
its bond spread represented for Spain was the outcome of her membership of a 
monetary union without a lender of last resort that could act in defence of any 
member´s financial needs. Comparing the evolution of sovereign debt-financing 
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dynamics and the bond spreads of Spain and the United Kingdom De Grauwe 
(2011: 2) has concluded that:  
 
This difference in the evaluation of the sovereign default risks is related to 
the fact that Spain belongs to a monetary union, while the UK is not part of 
a monetary union, and therefore has control over the currency in which it 
issues its debt. 
 
The absence of common bond instruments such as a Eurobond was a second 
institutional design flaw in the euro governance structure (Guerot, 2010; Delpla 
and Von Weizsäcker, 2011) that hampered the Spanish government´s ability to 
contain the effects of the crisis, as such instruments would have guaranteed to a 
certain degree the financing of the Spanish debt. Thirdly, and intimately related to 
the above, was the lack of a true fiscal union or at least a sufficiently large EU 
budget to enable the necessary fiscal transfers to mitigate the impact of the crisis 
in the worst affected regions of EMU, including Spain (De Grauwe, 2011; Pisani-
Ferry, 2011; Krugman 2013). In the absence of such fiscal support the Spanish 
Socialist government had no choice but to undertake the austerity policies it did. 
Fourthly, EMU´s institutional architecture lacked other key mechanisms at both 
fiscal and banking levels that would have been necessary properly to confront the 
crisis (Gros and Mayer, 2010; Marzinotto et al., 2010; Molina and Steinberg, 
2012). A common banking regulator, if not a banking union, a crisis resolution 
mechanism for troubled financial institutions and a sovereign rescue fund for 
states facing financing difficulty were the minimal institutional mechanisms with 
which EMU should have been equipped (Molina and Steinberg, 2012).  
 
And fifthly, governance and decision-making mechanisms at the heart of EMU 
were also deemed insufficient (Marzinotto et al., 2010; Heise, 2012; Lace, 2012; 
Dyson, 2013; Baldwin et al., 2015; De Grauwe and Ji, 2015; El-Erian 2016). Heise 
(2012: 42) has pointed to EMU´s defective governance, arguing that the poor 
management of the crisis: 
 
Is not merely the result of mismanagement by individual governments, but 
the systematic outcome of an ineffective and even counterproductive 
European economic governance system. 
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Dyson (2013) has focused on the absence of crisis prevention mechanisms at EU 
level and the inability of states to deploy supranational executive decision 
mechanisms in times of emergency. Baldwin et al. (2015: 14) have argued that the 
absence of crisis management and shock-absorbing mechanisms led to contagion 
from the periphery to the core of the euro zone and prolonged the crisis. 
Marzinotto et al. (2010), Lace (2012) and De Grauwe and Ji (2015) have argued in 
the same vein, pointing in particular to how the lack of crisis management 
mechanisms forced the ECB to supplant the role of national governments, given 
the inability of the latter to act with sufficient speed and determination, an 
argument also explored more recently by El-Erian (2016).  
 
Beyond these design flaws, membership of the euro zone also denied the Spanish 
government domestic economic policy instruments with which to deal effectively 
with a crisis, at least on a temporary basis, and which it had deployed in the past 
in similar circumstances, most importantly the ability to lower interest rates and to 
devalue the currency. This forced the government to undertake an internal 
devaluation, which explains many of the measures taken, especially those related 
to austerity and structural reforms. Researchers at the Bank of Spain (Ortega and 
Peñalosa, 2012: 5) have no doubt about the impact of Spain´s euro zone 
membership in this respect: 
 
Spanish EMU membership is a crucial aspect for consideration, as it 
contributes both to explaining the build-up of imbalances in the expansion 
and to conditioning the nature of the adjustment in the crisis, given that the 
range of economic policy instruments is significantly narrower in EMU. The 
macroeconomic and financial imbalances accumulated in the high-growth 
phase (the real estate boom, excess debt and the loss in competitiveness), 
which are all closely interlinked, were factors of vulnerability. 
 
The deterioration of Spanish institutions that EMU allowed, as identified by 
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013), was another relevant EMU-related factor. 
Although their analysis pertains more directly to the origins of the crisis, it also has 
obvious implications for the way it was managed, as these deficient institutions 
significantly constrained the ability to manage the crisis more effectively once it 
arrived. For example, and as we shall see, the political governance of the cajas or 
the significant but opaque influence that Spain´s corporatist economic structure 
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allowed organised interests to exercise over the government were factors that 
significantly shaped the management of the crisis. 
 
All the above arguments relying on EMU-originated constraints certainly have 
some unquestionable validity. However, their centrality to explaining the 
management of the crisis in Spain has been questioned by several authors. An 
alternative view has been put forward, most notably by Hopkins (2013, 2015) and 
in more general terms by Hall (2015) and Bastasín (2012), according to which the 
external constraints that limited the Spanish government’s scope for action during 
the management of the crisis had less to do with EMU´s institutional mechanisms 
and more to do with the attitudes of Germany and other EU creditor states. 
According to Hopkins (2013, 2015) the key external constraint on the 
management of the crisis for the Spanish government was not EMU´s institutional 
flaws but Germany´s framing of the euro crisis as one originating in the fiscal 
profligacy, historical institutional weakness and absence of reform in the southern 
European periphery (Hopkins, 2015: 28). Such a framing allowed Germany and its 
allies in the European Council, assisted by the EU institutions, to insist on an 
internal devaluation articulated through austerity measures and structural reforms 
in EMU´s peripheral economies, including of course Spain, to address these 
alleged fiscal imbalances (Hopkins, 2015: 21). Two key features of Spain´s 
response to the crisis are paradigmatic of this process (Hopkins, 2015: 20-21): the 
pension reform (pairing back on welfare) and the labour reform (reducing 
dismissal compensation and weakening collective bargaining). 
 
On this interpretation it is Germany and the other EU creditor states that were 
behind the opposition to the adoption of EMU-wide mechanisms such as debt 
mutualisation, Eurobonds or direct bank recapitalisation from EU funds, or at least 
the signalling of the predisposition to adopt them, that would have eased the 
pressure on the Spanish government and made the crisis more manageable. The 
German government used the increases in the cost of finance and the threat of a 
liquidity crisis to force the Spanish government to adopt their preferred policy 
choices, with the troika and the financial markets as the mechanisms by which to 
exercise pressure on Spain and impose its priorities (Kirkegaard, 2011). Insisting 
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on this view President2 José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2013) himself has pointed 
to the unwillingness of Germany to assume its leadership role and adopt a more 
pro-European stand as the main reason for a relatively contained fiscal crisis in 
Greece triggering a euro-zone wide crisis. 
 
Furthermore, two features of the management of the crisis at EU level 
substantiate, in the view of De Grauwe and Ji (2015: 27), claims that the response 
was framed in such a way as to reflect Germany´s interpretation of the origins of 
the crisis and proposed solutions. Firstly, it has led to an asymmetric adjustment 
to the current account imbalances forcing the deficit states into a deflationary 
austerity without a compensating policy of stimulus in surplus states. And 
secondly, its focus has been on supply policies and structural reforms. Spain has 
been on the receiving end of both of these strategies, which, according to the 
authors, have had at best an insignificant and at worst a negative effect on long-
term economic growth.  
 
Various explanations have been put forward of why Germany and its allies in the 
European Council framed the crisis in such a way (Guerot, 2010; Gros and Alcidi, 
2011; Guerot and Leonard, 2011; Hall, 2012, 2014; Hopkins, 2013, 2015; 
Bastasín, 2012; Molina and Steinberg, 2012; Scicluna, 2014; Newman, 2015). 
One view (Hopkins, 2013: 17) has emphasised the domestic political advantages 
to Germany and other northern European member states of placing the 
responsibility, and therefore need for action, on the southern European periphery, 
claiming that: 
 
Blaming the failings of the debtor nations deflects attention away from the 
reckless and inept management of the North’s financial surplus by its 
financial institutions. A focus on the failings of the financial sector would 
increase the pressure on northern European creditors to consider debt 
restructuring (…) and stronger regulation of the European financial system, 
a thorny political issue that European leaders seem reluctant to address. 
 
																																																								2	In	the	Spanish	constitutional	system	the	head	of	the	executive	is	formally	called	‘President	of	the	Government’	and	not	‘Prime	Minister’.	Furthermore,	the	term	‘Minister’	is	used	to	denote	the	highest-ranking	political	head	of	a	Ministry	or	Department,	the	British	equivalent	to	a	Secretary	of	State.	
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In other words, placing the burden for the resolution of the crisis on Spain´s need 
to adopt austerity measures and structural reforms took pressure away from 
undertaking other measures which would have been politically difficult and costly 
to the German government, such as EU-wide fiscal transfers, recapitalising its 
banking sector or liberalising its service sector (Gros and Alcidi, 2011; Newman, 
2015). This analysis is intimately connected with accounts that explore how 
Germany´s domestic politics (Guerot, 2010; Guerot and Leonard, 2011) and 
judiciary (Scicluna, 2014) conditioned its response. Guerot (2010) and Guerot and 
Leonard (2011) have analysed the various factors that have led to a loss of 
enthusiasm for the European project in the country that was once its staunchest 
supporter. These factors range from a loss of trust in the rigour of institutions such 
as the ECB and the European Commission to the perceived fiscal profligacy of 
states in EMU´s periphery. Furthermore, Germany´s Constitutional Court, with its 
staunch vigilance of any sovereignty-ceding measure (Scicluna, 2014) has also 
been a constant source of restraint on efforts to address the crisis through EMU-
wide instruments or mechanisms. 
 
Molina and Steinberg (2012: 59) have similarly argued that Germany´s 
‘authoritarian austerity’ responds to a crisis management model driven by its own 
interests and based on an incomplete diagnosis of the crisis. Germany´s ability to 
impose its proposed policy solutions is possible thanks to its ‘power position’ 
within the EU (Molina and Steinberg, 2012: 62), in an analysis reminiscent of 
Strange´s (1998) structural power framework. The agreement by the European 
Council to create a path to constitutionalise austerity in all EMU member states 
represented the ‘final capture of the European agenda’ (Molina and Steinberg, 
2012: 66) by Germany in favour of this interpretation privileging austerity and fiscal 
discipline. 
 
Bastasín (2012: 269) has focused on the role of the banks in trying to explain 
Germany´s attitude. In illustration of his case he has provided a detailed account 
of the way in which the banking and sovereign debt problems were mutually 
reinforcing, which created a vicious circle in the euro zone. In this regard he has 
pointed to the key role played by the financial sector as the channel for the 
debtor/creditor imbalances, arguing that ‘the mechanics for transmitting contagion 
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of the sovereign debt crisis was actually buried within the balance sheets of their 
banks’ (ibid.: 269). According to this interpretation of the crisis the fact that 
Germany´s banks had a substantial amount of Spanish debt on their books was 
vital to understanding the pressure exercised by Germany on Spain to adopt 
austerity measures and even a bailout that would guarantee repayment to its 
banks (ibid.: 273). 
 
Hall (2014) has offered an alternative explanation of Germany´s behaviour with 
reference to its domestic political economy institutions. Following on his seminal 
work on VoC (Hall and Soskice, 2001), he has attempted to explain not only the 
origins of the crisis, as seen in the previous section, but also the responses to it in 
terms of the institutional diversity among the euro zone states. According to this 
view the different models of capitalism and policies of economic governance led 
inevitably to different approaches to resolving the crisis (Hall, 2014: 1233). 
Germany´s political and economic clout allowed it to impose the approach that 
ensued from its particular variety of capitalism. As such, Germany´s particular 
political economy model conditioned the response to the crisis in three ways. 
Firstly, Germany, in line with its economic model, responded to the crisis by 
focusing on supporting its exports. This required containing costs and inflation, 
which prohibited any substantial expansionary policy that would have increased 
domestic demand in Germany for other EU states’ products and could have 
helped counter the recession in Spain. Secondly, Germany´s model of capitalism 
and the pressure of its electorate and of an inflation-conscious economic elite, led 
to a resistance to adopt measures at EU level that could have allowed a more 
effective management of the crisis but which would have resulted in a de facto 
fiscal union, such as debt mutualisation, Eurobonds or a common guarantee of 
bank deposits. As we have seen, the absence of these instruments has been at 
the heart of Spain´s difficulties in managing the crisis. And thirdly, Germany´s 
ordoliberal approach to market economics and strict fiscal discipline led it to 
demand from Spain the supply-side reforms and austerity policies that it 
privileges, and which have come to define Spain´s response to the crisis.  
 
In sum, institutional diversity, in terms of the different VoC, has shaped, from this 
perspective, not only Germany’s internal response to its crisis but also what it 
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demanded of others and in so doing has shaped the way the Spanish government 
was forced to manage the crisis. In Hall´s own words (2014: 1236): 
 
In Germany, many analysts and policy-makers have been deeply 
influenced by the doctrines of a Freiburg school of economics that is 
focused on monetary stability, sceptical about the value of activist 
economic management, and inclined towards rule-based approaches to 
economic policy (…). This perspective is conducive to a diagnosis that 
locates the causes of the crisis in the failure of governments to abide by the 
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact and sees the solution as a matter of 
strengthening such budgetary rules rather than reflating in order to restart 
growth (…) German experience tends to confirm such views because 
prescriptions of this sort are well-suited to the management of a 
coordinated market economy focused on export-led growth, where 
budgetary restraint underpins wage coordination and many problems are 
resolved via negotiation among producer groups for which the government 
simply provides rules or ‘framework policies’ within which such negotiations 
can take place. 
 
Vermeiren (2013) has also relied on the different models of capitalism to offer an 
explanation of why Germany acquired so much power in EMU. For Vermeiren the 
answer can be found (ibid.: 729) in EMU´s impact on the macroeconomic 
autonomy of its members and in how two key dimensions of its governance 
regime, namely exchange rate policymaking and the management of balance of 
payments, greatly benefited CMEs, particularly Germany, to the detriment of 
mixed market economies (MMEs). In favour of this interpretation Vermeiren points 
(ibid.: 757) to the role of the ECB and how, through both its monetary policy and 
its de facto control of exchange rate policy, it led to an euro exchange rate regime 
with an appreciation bias that greatly favoured CMEs, especially Germany. He 
also claims that the management of the euro zone´s balance of payments has split 
it between the CMEs as surplus states and MMEs and LMEs as deficit ones, 
giving the former the ability to deflect the adjustment on to the latter.   
 
Moving away from institutional considerations, geopolitics has been suggested as 
an alternative factor that can explain Germany´s management of the crisis (Simón 
and Rogers, 2010; Agnew, 2015). According to this view the euro crisis is at heart 
the reflection of a geopolitical crisis, a core versus periphery struggle, with 
Germany projecting its economic model onto the rest of the euro zone and thus 
conditioning their response. The crisis is thus, in Agnew’s (2015: 1-2) view: 
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An on-going geopolitical crisis based in the practical conflict between the 
political demands of a historically German institutionalized conception of 
political economy (Ordnungspolitik or “ordering policies”) that has come to 
dominate euro zone monetary policy, on the one hand, and the fact that the 
crisis is in its origins a political-economic crisis of the territorial form (the 
national economy) that the German experience of political economy takes, 
on the other. 
 
Beyond explanations that have attempted to locate the origin of the external 
constraints to the management of the Spanish crisis in economic and financial 
factors, EMU’s institutional flaws, debtor/creditor dynamics, Germany´s attitudes 
or geopolitical considerations, other authors (McNamara, 1998; Bohn and Jong, 
2011; Blyth, 2013; Hopkins, 2013, 2015) have pointed to the role of ideology. In 
particular, and following the work of McNamara (1998), who argued that a 
neoliberal monetarist consensus had become hegemonic among political leaders 
and central bank officials in Europe at the time of the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the creation of EMU and had shaped these, some analyses (Bohn and 
Jong, 2011; Hopkins, 2013, 2015) have pointed to the influence of this alleged 
ideological bias on how institutional factors conditioned the management of the 
crisis. These dominant views emphasised (Hopkins, 2013: 18) financial markets’ 
efficiency, low inflation, fiscal probity and weak regulation and reflected in part the 
broad Washington consensus and in part the preferences of the dominant actors 
in the European Union and Germany in particular. This ideological straightjacket 
led to two important constraints on the management of the crisis.  
 
Firstly, it legitimised Germany´s attitudes. As Hopkins (2013: 18) has put it:  
 
Given these assumptions, the crisis in southern Europe could not possibly 
be the consequence of financial markets’ inherent instability or the dangers 
of excessive monetary rigidity. Instead, the problems lay in the reckless 
behaviour of southern European politicians.  
 
The solution to these problems was therefore structural reforms and austerity 
measures in the European periphery. Blyth (2013: 230) has provided a detailed 
account, from a constructivist perspective, of how austerity came to be the 
dominant paradigm in the management of the crisis in the southern periphery, 
suggesting that the rationale for austerity was both ideological and material. On 
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his analysis ideology was important because the pre-eminence of a neoliberal 
ideology among the German and EU economic elites that sowed mistrust of the 
role of government made it possible to characterise what was in origin a banking 
and private debt crisis as a sovereign debt crisis, the solution to which must 
therefore be public expenditure cuts (Blyth, 2013: 6). This diagnosis was not only 
self- interested, as it allowed market participants that were pushing this ideology to 
walk free of their responsibility, but actually tremendously detrimental as, in Blyth’s 
view, historical evidence shows that austerity is ineffective and leads to lower 
growth and increased inequality. Some analysts (Lopez and Rodríguez, 2014: 24) 
have taken an even more ideological view on this same line of thought, arguing 
that the orthodox structural reforms and public expenditure cuts that were 
implemented by the PSOE government in Spain after 2010 are clear evidence of 
the dominance of the ‘political oversight of the financial agents’ over economic and 
social policy at a global level. 
 
Secondly, the architecture of the monetary union which resulted from this 
ideological bias had built within it mechanisms which prevented a more effective 
resolution of the crisis (Blyth, 2013), such as a central bank that could not act as a 
lender of last resort or the budget and debt limits enshrined in the Maastricht 
Treaty. Although by the time of the crisis these limits had been severely 
compromised, they did serve as a benchmark with which to exert pressure on 
states such as Spain and prevented a more aggressive expansionary economic 
policy during the crisis (Hopkins, 2015). 
 
However compelling aspects of the literature reviewed above may be, 
explanations that rely on the impact of global economic and financial markets, 
EMU constraints, Germany´s dominant role or the pre-eminence of a neoliberal 
ideology are insufficient to explain key aspects of the management of the crisis in 
Spain for at least three main reasons. Firstly, interpretations that suggest that 
external constraints trumped national politics cannot properly account for the 
many occasions on which the Socialist government flatly rejected pressures from 
Germany and its European allies during the management of the crisis. A clear 
example of this was the ability of the PSOE government to avoid a bailout of Spain 
at a time in which countries like Greece, Portugal and Ireland had to accept it. As 
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President Rodríguez Zapatero (2013) himself has acknowledged, it was other 
factors that explain, at least in part, his refusal to give in to such pressures, such 
as the domestic political cost or the national prestige at stake and corresponding 
wish to keep Spain as one of the trusted members of the euro zone, capable of 
dealing by itself with any difficulty. 
 
The second fundamental limitation of these explanations is that they cannot 
account for the different way in which the crisis was managed in different states in 
the southern European periphery. For example, as just explained, unlike other 
states facing a similar predicament, Spain did not opt for a bailout. This was so 
even at times when the risk premium on Spanish sovereign debt reached 
unsustainable levels and Spanish companies, affected by this sovereign risk, 
found it impossible to access the foreign credit markets, leading to a grave 
recession which had serious political costs for both parties. Italy, of course, was 
not subject to a bailout either, but the drastic measures required to avoid the 
bailout did not lead in Spain to a sudden change in government, as they did in 
Italy in the autumn of 2011 with the replacement of Berlusconi´s government by 
Mr Monti´s technocratic administration. Spain´s dramatic decision to amend its 
Constitution to incorporate a ‘golden fiscal rule’ that would give assurances of 
future austerity to Germany and its allies in the European Council is another 
instance in which Spain´s management of the crisis manifestly differed from that of 
European colleagues.  
 
Finally, the Spanish case presents a number of Spanish-specific characteristics 
that would make it inadvisable to attempt to fit it within a supposedly generalisable 
‘EU-periphery’ response framework. Firstly, it was the only large peripheral EMU 
economy to be governed by a centre-left government during the crisis. Secondly, 
Spain´s decentralized political structure significantly shapes the politics of the 
country and makes it a different case from those of other peripheral EMU member 
states. And thirdly, Spain´s particular history, a dictatorship until as recently as 
1977, and where access to the EU was seen as an anchor to democracy and 
economic prosperity, obviously provides for a distinctive context for analysis of the 
country´s behaviour towards its euro zone membership. It is illustrative in this 
respect to note that no anti-euro party has achieved in Spain the level of support 
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obtained in other states facing similar predicaments, like Greece or Italy, or, in a 
different context, in other peripheral states like the UK. Not even Podemos, the 
populist left-wing party most critical of Spain´s relations with the EU, has ever 
openly advocated leaving the euro. Some of these factors were of course present 
in other EU peripheral states, but Spain’s is the only case where all of them 
manifested themselves at the same time.  
 
 
1.2.2. Domestic perspectives on the origins and management of the crisis 
 
Given the limitations of explanations based on external constraints, it seems 
necessary to consider analyses that have incorporated domestic factors, whether 
economic or political, in the analysis of the crisis. The following section conducts 
such an exercise, considering first the literature that has privileged economic 
factors and, highlighting its limitations, going on to introduce the literature that, in 
line with the objectives of this dissertation, has focused on the role of domestic 
political factors in both the origins of the crisis and its management. 
 
 
Domestic economic perspectives on the origins and management of the crisis 
 
Most of the literature on the Spanish crisis that has focused on domestic factors 
has concerned itself with exploring in detail the domestic economic structural flaws 
that caused the crisis (Alfonso et al., 2005; Estrada, 2009; Suárez, 2010; Carballo-
Cruz, 2011; Bentolila et al., 2012a, 2012b; Conde-Ruiz and Ruiz, 2012; Ferreiro 
and Serrano, 2012; Galí, 2012; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2013; Solé-Ollé and 
Valdecans-Marsal, 2013; Jimeno and Santos, 2014; Daly and Zarco, 2015; Ruiz et 
al., 2015; Otero-Iglesias et al., 2016). Suárez (2010) and Jimeno and Santos 
(2014) have provided a detailed overview of many of these accumulated 
imbalances, especially of the housing bubble, high current account deficit, 
dependence on foreign finance, low productivity and high private indebtedness 
and how they led to the crisis. Ferreiro and Serrano (2012) have stressed the 
unsustainable GDP growth composition during the upturn, which relied on 
indebtedness, external financing, imports and domestic consumption. A score of 
	 24	
specialised papers have looked into each of these particular imbalances and 
structural flaws of the Spanish economy. Bentolila et al. (2012) have drawn 
attention to the pernicious dual nature of the labour market, which greatly 
discriminated against those with short-term, insecure, contracts and created 
perverse incentives for the formation of human capital, factors that are at least 
partly to blame for the country´s chronically high levels of unemployment. The 
decrease in competitiveness has been another major issue of attention. Galí 
(2012), among others, has focused on the increase in labour costs and the drag 
that it has imposed on Spain´s competitiveness. Estrada (2009) has explored in 
detail the effect that the combination of low productivity and increasing unit labour 
costs and corporate margins had on Spanish firms’ competitiveness and the 
corresponding increase in the current account deficit. 
 
The role of particular sectors in generating the crisis, especially housing and 
banking, has also been the subject of analysis. Daly and Zarco (2015) have 
analysed in detailed the causes and evolution of the housing bubble. Otero-
Iglesias et al. (2016: 11) have provided a detailed examination of the causes of 
the crisis in the Spanish financial sector, highlighting among them the:  
 
Deteriorating economic conditions, (…), implosion of the real-estate bubble 
(…), weaknesses in the regulatory framework (…), bad lending practices 
(…), the passivity of the Bank of Spain, governance problems in the cajas 
sector (…), vulnerabilities associated with heavy investment in the real 
estate sector (…), dependency on wholesale markets for funding (…), an 
element of bad luck from the deterioration of the external environment (…) 
and euro membership.  
 
They conclude that the Spanish financial crisis confirms the ‘long-standing tenant 
that financial systems collapse when they take on too much risk and when they do 
not have sufficient capital in reserve’ (ibid.: 11). Ruiz et al (2015) have analysed 
the causes leading to the troubles that affected in particular the cajas de ahorros 
(Spanish saving banks) and Solé-Ollé and Valdecans-Marsal (2013) and 
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013) have looked at the role of institutional factors 
and regional and local urban laws in fuelling the housing bubble. Carballo-Cruz 
(2011) has, for example, examined the interplay between these two sectors and 
how the crisis of the Spanish financial industry, especially its cajas de ahorros, as 
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a result of the bad debts generated by the bursting of the housing bubble, has 
been both cause and consequence of Spain´s economic difficulties, creating a 
vicious loop with the sovereign debt. This feeds into a large literature on past 
financial crises. Claessens et al. (2013) for example identify four major causes of 
past financial crises, which also characterised the Spanish crisis (Bank of Spain, 
2011): rapid increases in asset prices, credit booms, a dramatic expansion in 
marginal loans, and regulation and supervision that failed to keep up with 
developments. 
 
Other studies have looked at wider issues such as the contribution of a deficient 
public sector to Spain´s structural economic weakness, analysing issues such as 
the impact of the low productivity of the public sector on the country´s overall 
economic performance (Alfonso et al., 2005), the role of regional finances in the 
country´s public deficit troubles (Conde-Ruiz and Ruiz, 2012) or the flaws of the 
Spanish tax system, especially how its many loopholes make ineffective efforts to 
close budget deficits through tax increases (ibid.). More recently, Ferreiro et al. 
(2014) have highlighted the counterproductive effect that discretionary public 
spending can have on both the growth cycle and as response to the crisis, when 
exacerbating macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances. 
 
These economic imbalances are relevant to attempting to explain not only the 
origins of the crisis, but also its management, as the government´s response was 
significantly constrained by them (Ortega and Peñalosa, 2012). For example, the 
budget and current account deficits that these imbalances led to, and the 
increasing reluctance of international investors to finance them once doubt was 
cast on their sustainability, forced the government to adopt measures aimed at 
recovering the credibility of the markets and investors in order to prevent a liquidity 
crisis in the context of a monetary union where recourse to the ‘printing presses’ of 
the central bank is not an option. 
 
Yet, although it is undeniable that domestic economic imbalances were a 
fundamental cause of the crisis and constrained the government’s response to it, 
they are too limited to explain the prevalence of economic considerations in either 
the origins or the management of the crisis in Spain. Firstly, many of the economic 
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disequilibria identified had their origin in political and institutional factors, as the 
next section will show. For example, the vulnerability that the cajas represented 
for the Spanish financial system is clearly linked to their defective governance and 
the role played in it by political parties (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2013).  
 
Secondly, while large budget deficits and public debt can lead to economic crises 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), this was certainly not explanatory of Spain’s case, at 
least with public finances. In 2007 Spain had one of the lowest public debt-to GDP 
ratios in the euro zone, at 37 per cent of GDP, significantly lower than that of 
Germany or France. Furthermore, the correlation between debt and growth is still 
contentious (Koo, 2008; Krugman, 2012; Herndon, 2013) and many countries 
have been known to grow and have access to credit while enduring higher levels 
of public debt (Krugman, 2013). Finally, recent analyses by the IMF (Guajardo et 
al., 2011; Blanchard and Leigh, 2013) cast doubt on previous assumptions on the 
positive impact of austerity on economic growth. Yet austerity policies, which by 
most accounts have had a depressive impact on economic growth, were still 
implemented in Spain.  
 
Thirdly, De Grauwe and Ji (2013a, 2013b) have persuasively shown how the 
evolution of sovereign debt spreads in Spain and other southern periphery states 
was correlated with political decisions at EU level much more than with national 
macroeconomic fundamentals. In the same vein Klose and Weigert (2013: 1), 
have, in their analysis of the evolution of sovereign debt spreads during the euro 
crisis, concluded that ‘beside fundamental factors a systemic risk component 
played a role in determination of sovereign yields’. The drop in the financing costs 
of Spain and Italy after the intervention by the President of the ECB Mario Draghi 
points to the fact that economic fundamentals were trumped by other factors, in 
this case the quasi-political intervention by the ECB, when it comes to explaining 
the evolution of the bond spread.  
 
Fourthly, it is difficult to deny that Spain´s membership of the euro zone 
constrained the range and nature of instruments at the government´s disposal, 
pointing to the influence of institutional and political constraints beyond mere 
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economic or market-centred explanation. A significant body of literature has 
argued in this case, as shown in the previous section.  
 
And fifthly, as already argued, the Spanish response to the crisis displayed 
important differences from those of other states facing some of the same 
economic imbalances (a housing bubble and troubled financial sector in Ireland, a 
large public deficit once the crisis started in Greece), that are difficult to explain 
without reference to Spain´s institutional and domestic context. These were also 
described in the previous section and include, for example, the refusal to accept a 
bailout or the unexpected reform of the Constitution. 
 
 
Domestic political perspectives on the origins of the crisis 
 
Given the limitations of the existing explanations based on external constraints 
and domestic economic factors, it is surprising that the role of domestic politics 
has not been given greater consideration in attempting to explain the origins and 
especially management of the crisis in Spain. After all, as Pinto (2013: 103) has 
argued in his analysis of previous economic crises, ‘the occurrence, timing and 
severity of economic crises are directly related to political decisions made along 
the backdrop of the business cycle’. There is of course an intense debate on the 
role that the failures of the Spanish political establishment and institutions might 
have played in causing Spain´s economic woes and on whether it was these 
political failings that led to the economic crisis or vice versa. A significant body of 
literature (Molinas, 2012, 2013; De la Dehesa, 2013; Fernández-Villaverde et al. 
2013; Royo, 2013, 2015; Garicano, 2013, 2014) has pointed to domestic political 
and institutional factors as the underlying reason of the economic problems the 
country developed in the run-up to the crisis, highlighting issues like the high 
levels of corruption (Royo, 2015) or the weakness of the institutional 
arrangements that came out of the transition to democracy after the Franco 
dictatorship, from the legal structure of the cajas to the protectionist nature of the 
labour market (Garicano, 2013, 2014; Molinas, 2013) or the allegedly inefficient 
and duplicity-prone decentralised administrative structure of the state. For 
example, Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013) have explored the role that 
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decentralisation played in the development of the housing bubble. The radical 
decentralisation process that accompanied the transition to democracy led to 
urban zoning competencies’ being transferred to regional governments that in turn 
transferred to local authorities that, in association with private developers, were 
then free to build whole new areas of township. At the same time, two key issues 
changed in the governance of the cajas with the arrival of democracy. First, their 
control was transferred to the regional governments and, second, they were 
allowed to expand territorially. This opened the door to easy finance to politically 
well-connected developers and made possible the construction boom that led to 
Spain´s housing bubble. In sum, the ‘self-reinforcing triangle of regional 
governments, developers, and (…) cajas’ (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2013: 153) 
added fuel to other factors like the low interest rates brought about by euro zone 
membership or high immigration to create Spain´s housing bubble.  
 
Royo (2013) has commented in detail on the corruption and supposed 
incompetence of the Spanish political class in the origin of the crisis, pointing to 
the inability of President Zapatero to see its depth or even, long after it was 
obvious, to acknowledge its existence. The Spanish political class is said not only 
to be incompetent but also to have ‘developed its own particular set of interests 
and instruments to sustain it through a system of rent-seeking based on crony 
capitalism’ (Royo, 2013: 14). The centrality of a dysfunctional political class has 
also been forcefully argued by Molinas (2012, 2013). In his view the roots of the 
economic crisis are to be found in the political arrangements that came out of the 
transition to democracy and in particular in the electoral and party system 
established by the political elite. The adoption of proportional representation with 
blocked lists that strengthened the power of the party elite and insulated it from 
external pressures, together with other institutional developments such as 
decentralisation, led to a self-serving, corrupt and inefficient political class which 
was fundamental in allowing a rent-seeking and corporatist economic system to 
develop. The collusion of political and economic elites led to a process of income 
and resource extraction (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), which blocked much 
needed structural reform and was responsible for many of the imbalances that led 
to the crisis, such as the credit boom and housing bubble. 
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The financial sector is a particularly salient example of these oligopolistic 
practices, a fact that is at the heart of many of the imbalances that led to the crisis 
(Pérez, 1997; Royo, 2013; Fishman, 2011, 2012). Writing before the crisis, Perez 
(1997) argued that the country´s political economy institutional framework 
sheltered the financial sector from competition after its entry to the EU. The vested 
interests built into the regulatory and supervisory regime help explain the slow and 
half-hearted reform of a broken financial system during the crisis. Fishman (2011, 
2012) has found in the corrosive role played by the banking sector and its 
oligopolistic practices a key cause of Spain´s economic problems, including 
unemployment. From a VoC angle, Royo (2013) has found in the country´s 
political economy institutions the origins of the financial sector´s historic high 
regulation and protection from competition. 
 
Yet approaches that place responsibility for the failures that led to the crisis on the 
failures of the Spanish political and institutional systems have also been forcefully 
challenged. Sanchez Cuenca (2014) for example has critically analysed this 
literature and questioned (ibid.: 76-77) why, if domestic flaws were responsible, 
the economic crisis affected countries with markedly different political and 
institutional structures from those of Spain, such as Greece, Italy or Ireland. The 
causes of the crisis are to be found, in his view, not in the Spanish political class, 
but in external factors and most notably in the role of the global financial markets 
and the institutional deficiencies of EMU, as described in the previous section. 
 
 
Domestic political perspectives on the management of the crisis 
 
Yet, beyond these accounts of the role of political factors in the origins of the 
crisis, the literature devoted to exploring the role of domestic politics in the 
management of the crisis itself is relatively limited and, as we shall now see, is 
often intertwined with attempts to explain its origins. A first approach has relied on 
the VoC literature in trying to explain Spain´s response (as opposed to 
Germany´s, which was covered in the previous section). Hall (2014: 143) has, for 
reasons already explained, claimed that ‘each nation´s initial response to the crisis 
was conditioned by its institutional architecture’. Thus the initial response in mixed 
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market economies such as Spain was to rely on stimulus to promote internal 
demand, which explains the initial substantial fiscal stimulus adopted in Spain, 
before pressure from the EU and Germany to adopt austerity measures became 
salient.  
 
In two of the most comprehensive studies of the Spanish economic crisis from a 
political perspective, Royo (2013, 2015) has also applied the VoC framework to 
advance two alternative explanations of the role of domestic institutions in shaping 
the response to the crisis. In his most recent work (Royo, 2015) he finds in 
Spain´s domestic institutions, and in particular their progressive deterioration, the 
key both to the origins and response to the crisis. On this interpretation 
institutional degeneration in the years prior to the crisis created a pervasive lack of 
accountability which: 
 
Led to a Spanish version of crony capitalism characterized by the 
misgovernment of the public, an outdated and inadequate policy-making 
process; an inefficient state and an often corrupt and inefficient political 
class. (ibid.: 2)  
 
These institutional deficiencies were, in Royo´s view, also present in the 
management of the crisis, at least in its early stages (Royo, 2015: 19). It is notable 
that while, as previously reviewed, Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013) have found 
in EMU a causal explanation of this institutional deterioration, Royo uses the same 
evidence to draw an altogether different conclusion, namely that the deterioration 
of Spain´s institutions had an endogenous origin and that EMU, far from having 
led to institutional convergence among its members, has actually been witness to 
a divergence (Royo, 2013: 19). 
 
In an earlier analysis, Royo (2013: 106-224) has suggested a complementary 
explanation of the management of the crisis, rooted also in a VoC approach to the 
crisis, based on what he terms ‘policy continuities’ and ‘the endemic inability of the 
Spanish political system to generate alternative responses to address economic 
challenges’ (ibid: 224). According to this view, in many sectors of the economy, 
the different governments since the transition to democracy, either from the PSOE 
or the conservative PP, have adopted similar policies, regardless of the paucity of 
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their effectiveness. He explains this policy continuity in the management of the 
present crisis with reference to Spain´s political economy institutional 
arrangements, and especially to the informal coordination mechanisms that 
granted significant influence in economic policymaking to existing social agents. 
Unlike in other more formally coordinated market economies, such as those of 
Germany or the Scandinavian states (Hall and Soskice, 2001), Spain´s social and 
economic agents do not represent large segments of workers and citizens, 
especially those who were worst affected by the crisis, which allowed for vested 
interests to dominate the bargaining process, creating significant barriers to 
change. The management of the crisis with respect to the financial sector is, in 
Royo´s (2013: 177) view, particularly illustrative in confirming the relevance of a 
VoC approach to understanding the crisis. His analysis assigns an important role 
to financial institutions in explaining attempts to reform the financial system during 
the first phase of the crisis, stressing the agency of domestic actors, in this case 
the banks, in shaping national financial system change. Furthermore, Royo´s 
analysis also purports to show that the management of the global financial crisis in 
Spain promoted rather than undermined coordination among domestic economic 
actors. Far from converging towards deregulation as a result of the pressures of 
globalisation, the crisis led to extensive regulatory intervention that served to 
reinforce the preexisting model of coordination, at least in financial markets, with 
Royo (2013: 35) concluding that ‘analysis of the Spanish experience during the 
crisis confirms the thesis that coordination is a political process’. 
 
Fishman (2012) has pointed in a similar direction of flawed policy continuity inertia, 
citing the evolution of the labour market and insistence of successive governments 
on adopting policies that focused on increasing the flexibility and liberalisation of 
the labour market even in the face of their failure to reduce unemployment (ibid.: 
70). This ‘recurrent use of an unsuccessful strategy is an anomaly of policy 
making’ (ibid.: 69) in Spain which explains the failure to address not only chronic 
unemployment but also other of Spain´s structural economic problems, such as 
low productivity and particularly pronounced boom and bust cycles.  
 
Fishman (2012: 70-71) goes on to criticise accounts of the origins and response to 
the crisis based on a supposed lack of market freedom, claiming that: 
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An adequate answer to that question requires us to look beyond the 
variables emphasized by the narrow version of economic analysis that 
assumes that market freedoms and incentives can resolve all problems.  
 
He suggests exploring the impact of policies, legal structures and network 
structures. Allowing for the role of these domestic and institutional factors helps 
explain, for example, the role of Spain´s finance sector, and its oligopolistic nature, 
in many of the country´s economic management, not least:  
 
Endemically poor labour market performance through the mediating 
mechanism of restricted lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
thus undercutting the ability of such firms to increase employment or invest 
in innovation. (ibid.: 71) 
 
Key to understanding both the origins and management of the crisis is, therefore, 
according to Fishman (2012: 74), recognition that despite evidence of poor 
performance and intense social pressure against further labour market 
liberalisation, the political system has tended to screen out the voices of socially 
disadvantaged sectors to a greater extent than otherwise comparable polities such 
as Portugal. In Fishman´s (ibid.: 74) view, Spain’s resilient neo-liberal economic 
policy paradigm is emblematic of broader features of the country’s post-Franco 
political system and can be explained to a significant extent by the hegemony of a 
technocratic elite nurtured in the Bank of Spain and which has supplied most of 
Spain´s top economic policy-makers since the transition to democracy. This has 
led, Fishman argues, to an anomaly in Spain with respect to other states: there 
has hardly been any competition on economic policy ideas between the two 
largest parties for the last 30 years. Rather, it has been driven by a ‘neoliberal 
consensus’ implemented even by the Socialists. This ‘policy consensus’ is 
fundamental, Fishman argues, to explaining the orthodox response to the crisis by 
the Socialist government, much more than putative external pressures by markets 
or the EU institutions and partners.  
 
Beyond these political-economy institutional analyses, other authors have 
explored the management of the crisis in terms of electoral politics and 
parliamentary alliances (Dellepiane and Hardiman, 2013; Field, 2013; Calvo, 
2014). Dellepiane and Hardiman (2013: 220) have argued, in their comparative 
	 33	
study of the crisis in Spain and Ireland that, although both countries faced external 
pressures that caused policy changes: 
 
There are marked differences in the way these decisions were arrived at, 
which can only be understood in the context of the partisan dynamics of 
party competition and the underlying political cleavages in the two 
societies. Partisan differentiation of policy preferences was more deeply 
rooted in Spain than in Ireland, which meant that the breach in the 
preferred government policy stance in May 2010 was particularly damaging 
for the incumbent PSOE. 
 
The role of parliamentary dynamics in exercising pressure on the government 
during its management of the crisis is confirmed by data on the questions faced by 
the PSOE government in Parliament during this period. Analysis of these by 
Borghetto (2014: 1) shows that the economy completely dominated the political 
agenda: 
 
As never before in Spanish democratic history, the legislative agenda 
contracted and the economy dwarfed all other issues (…). This results 
mainly from the opposition parties’ strategy of directing attention to 
economic failings so as to attack the government and gain an electoral 
advantage. 
 
Focusing also on the role of parliamentary dynamics, Field (2013) finds that there 
was a marked change in the alliance strategy of the Socialist government from 
one of asymmetric geometry siding with different parties in order to pass each 
item of legislation during the first, less politically difficult, phase of the 
management of the crisis, to a more encompassing agreement that allowed the 
government to pass the difficult economic measures during the second stage from 
May 2010, when tough decisions became unavoidable. According to this account 
(ibid.: 76) ‘while the strategy change can be explained by the economic crisis, the 
choice of allies has much to do with territorial politics and the largely orthodox 
policy response’. What is interesting in this analysis is that it shows that a minority 
position was no obstacle to the government’s adopting the policies it considered 
necessary, since it could use concessions, sometimes in the realm of regional 
politics, to gain its allies’ support. 
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Complementing this perspective, Calvo (2014) has usefully looked at how the 
decentralisation of the Spanish state and Spanish politics played an important role 
in the crisis. She argues that the parliamentary power of regional parties made 
management of the crisis more complex, as many of the policy instruments were 
not in the hands of the central government, which made them subject to regional 
political dynamics. However, she shares Field´s view (Field, 2013) that it also 
allowed President Zapatero to put reforms through Parliament without a 
parliamentary majority, by being able to rely on the support of regional parties in 
return for concessions on regional policy. 
 
Other political accounts have centred on personality or ‘leadership’ traits in 
explaining President Zapatero´s response to the crisis. For example, Olmeda and 
Colino (2014) have argued that it was his inability to recognise an important 
change in his leadership context (namely the advent of the crisis) that explains his 
poor management. They claim that: 
 
Due to this lack of vision he could not make sense of the looming crisis, 
complicating his communicative performance because he was not able to 
make meaning [of the crisis] to explain his policy change and unpopular 
reforms. As a result there was an acute loss of political capital and 
credibility. (ibid.: 16)  
 
Which, one could add, also prevented him from managing the crisis more 
effectively. 
 
The ineffective decision-making process that characterised various episodes of 
the management of the crisis has been the subject of study by other authors. For 
example, in their analysis of the crisis in the financial sector, Otero-Iglesias et al. 
(2016: 11) highlight the role played by ‘misdiagnoses by the political authorities in 
its early and medium stages (…) and the slowness in reacting throughout the 
process, (…)’. In similar vein Bosco (2013) has looked at Zapatero´s government 
response from a management perspective, emphasising its management failures 
and claiming (ibid.: 28) that ‘the government´s attitude towards the crisis – first 
denied, then played down, and finally suffered – was a big blow to the President´s 
credibility’. As we have seen before, references to alleged incompetence and 
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erroneous diagnosis of the government are common in other analyses of the 
management of the crisis (Royo, 2013; Molinas, 2013). 
 
Finally, it is clear that the social cost of the crisis, in particular the dramatic rise in 
unemployment and the social discontent it brought about, also conditioned the 
government´s response. Polavieja (2013) and Álvarez-Díaz et al. (2015) have 
provided evidence of the causal relationship between the increase in 
unemployment and the deterioration of the political situation in Spain. It is 
significant that, according to the latter, there is a lag of about one year between a 
negative shift in unemployment figures and its negative effect on the public´s 
opinion of the political situation (Álvarez-Díaz et al., 2015: 57), which helps explain 
why domestic political pressure might have been a factor in the shift to reform by 
mid-2009, just over a year after the unemployment figures started to increase 
dramatically in mid 2008 (by the end of 2008, the number of unemployed had 
increased by over 600,000 in a single year (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
(INE), 2008)). 
 
Valuable as all the above contributions are, they only offer partial explanation of 
how domestic political factors may have shaped the management of the crisis in 
Spain. Arguments relying on ‘policy inertia’ caused by the political economy of 
Spain´s institutional arrangements fail to take into consideration the role of agency 
and in particular the diagnostic errors that were so critical in the management of 
the crisis. Parliamentary dynamics and the strategy of ‘variable geometry’, siding 
with different parties to pass different items of legislation, can of course be helpful 
in understanding how the Socialist government was able to pass measures that 
were opposed not only by a majority of the Spanish electorate, but also by a 
majority of the parliamentary parties. But they are of limited value in helping us 
understand why the government adopted the measures it pursued, often contrary 
to its own electoral manifesto. Similarly, regional dynamics were of course vital in 
the parliamentary game, as the Socialist government was very often able to pass 
legislation by counting on the support of regional parties in return for concessions 
on regional issues. Yet, again, while this asymmetrical parliamentary game 
explains how the government was able to pass its unpopular policies, it is does 
not explain why it decided to adopt such measures. Explanations relying on 
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electoral dynamics also pose some questions. They certainly explain some 
aspects of the crisis, like for example the decision to reform the Constitution rather 
than adopt the more electorally damaging second labour market reform that his 
EU partners were demanding from President Zapatero, but they cannot explain 
the immensely unpopular measures that the Socialist government took from May 
2010 onwards. Finally, management and leadership ‘styles’ or lack of ability are 
unlikely to be the major factor in explaining how the crisis was managed. 
Diagnostic errors were widespread among Spain´s political elite and figures with 
markedly different backgrounds and management profiles, from the Minister of 
Economy and Finance to the Governor of the Bank of Spain, partook in them, as 
they did in the failure to undertake the necessary measures to deal more 
effectively with the crisis. 
 
 
1.2.3. Summary: the limitations of the existing literature 
 
This literature review reveals that existing explanations cannot fully account, each 
for different reasons, for a number of relevant aspects of the immediate origins 
and management of the crisis by the PSOE government. The prevailing narrative 
has privileged the role of external constraints and suggested that, as a result, 
domestic politics were rendered of little effect. Illustrative of this approach is 
Armingeon and Baccaro´s (2012: 162) assertion, in a recent volume analysing the 
response of European peripheral states to the crisis (Bermeo and Pontusson, 
2012), that ‘domestic institutions and politics matter very little for [sic] explaining 
responses to the sovereign debt crisis, and that external constraints are much 
more important’. Similarly, Hopkins, one of the few authors that, as we have seen, 
has closely studied the Spanish crisis from an comparative perspective, has 
asserted that: 
 
Although there has been a mix of centre-left and centre-right political forces 
in power across Southern Europe in the period since the crisis began, the 
overriding imperative of deficit reduction through fiscal tightening, and the 
absence of available monetary levers at the national level, have meant that 
policy has been little affected by the electoral process. (Hopkins, 2015: 19). 
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As we have seen, this reliance on external constraints to explain the management 
of the crisis is shared by many other well-informed academics when analysing the 
response to the crisis in Spain and the European periphery (Marzinotto et al., 
2010; De Grauwe, 2011; Ontiveros, 2011; Pisani-Ferry, 2011, 2012; Bastasín, 
2012; Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; Molina and Steinberg, 2012; De Grauwe 
and Ji, 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Hall, 2013, 2014; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2013; 
Hopkins, 2013, 2015; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2014; Torreblanca, 2014). These claims 
have been given further apparent support by journalistic accounts (De Barrón 
2014a, 2014b) which have reported in detail the external pressures to which the 
Spanish government was subject, not least to accept a bailout, from directly 
concerned parties like the heads of state of other EMU members or the head of 
the ECB. 
 
Yet explanations privileging external constraints, while undoubtedly relevant in 
many respects, have also been shown to have serious limitations. Firstly, global 
macroeconomic imbalances and global financial markets certainly enabled the 
development of the credit boom and asset price bubbles, but explanations 
predicated upon them ignore the constraints that other political and institutional 
factors such as EMU membership played. Investors and the bond spread certainly 
exerted pressure on the government and constrained its response, but the 
evolution of this spread was more closely correlated with the sequence of the euro 
crisis and actions by the ECB than to Spain´s macroeconomic fundamentals (De 
Grauwe, 2011; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013a, 2013b).  
 
The second set of external constraints identified by the literature, namely 
institutional flaws in EMU, were again undoubtedly a significant factor shaping 
both the origins and management of the crisis, not least the absence of a lender of 
last resort, a more integrated approach to banking regulation and the rescue of 
troubled institutions, or the lack of appropriate sovereign crisis resolution 
mechanisms. The role of Germany in imposing a particular narrative of the crisis 
and a corresponding set of measures based on austerity and structural reform, 
was a third major external constraint identified, whether path-dependant, given its 
set of political economy institutions and economic system, or driven by an interest 
in framing the crisis in a way that was politically advantageous. Finally, the 
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ideological bias of policy-makers in Germany and the European institutions have 
also been referred to as an external factor constraining the Spanish government´s 
response to the crisis. Yet explanations of the origins and, especially, 
management of the crisis predicated on the influence of global markets, EMU´s 
design flaws, Germany´s pressure or external ideological constraints, fail to 
account for the particularities that defined both the origins and management of the 
crisis in Spain and the occasions on which the government did not respond to 
pressures from EU sources or Germany. A number of instances, which will be 
explored in detail throughout the dissertation, offer substantial evidence of this.  
 
Firstly, these external constraints cannot account for why, despite ample external 
pressure from the European Commission or the ECB, Spanish President Zapatero 
refused to acknowledge the gravity of the crisis for many months. It is also 
surprising that during these first few months the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
insisted on portraying the crisis as a temporary recession triggered by the real-
estate crash despite the fact that many economic analysts, and even the electoral 
manifesto of the Socialist Party, had warned of the serious structural flaws of the 
Spanish growth model and its vulnerability to a credit crunch because of its high, 
externally financed, current account deficit.  
 
Secondly, accounts privileging external considerations fail satisfactorily to explain 
why the government failed to accompany the fiscal stimulus measures in the early 
stages of the crisis with a credible plan to return to financial sustainability. This is 
especially noticeable as at the time there was ample foreign pressure to do so and 
economic rationale also pointed in such direction.  
 
Thirdly, it is also difficult to explain from an external constraints perspective why 
the problems of the financial sector were so underestimated. External factors 
cannot properly account for why the Bank of Spain failed to warn the government 
of the weak state of many of the cajas and for why the government did not take 
more forceful action and mishandled the financial reform when the state of Spain´s 
financial sector was a constant source of concern for the EU and its EMU partners 
from late 2009 onwards.  
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Fourthly, external constraints cannot explain why an effective strategy did not 
materialize to implement reforms that were economically necessary, had been 
identified in the PSOE manifesto and for which there was strong external 
pressure. For example, external constraints can hardly account for the way in 
which the government managed the reform of the labour market. Despite strong 
international pressure and an economic rationale (at least in the view of the 
domestic business sector) for the reform, the Zapatero government refused to act 
promptly on this matter and when the reform was finally adopted in May 2010 it 
was much less far-reaching than the business community demanded, even though 
responding to its demands would probably have given his government significant 
credibility not only domestically but also with international institutions, markets and 
investors. 
 
Fifthly, as already mentioned, it remains to be properly explained why the 
government did not yield to the pressures of its European partners in accepting a 
bailout, which was asked of the Spanish government on three occasions 
(Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013). It was not as certain as it might look now a posteriori 
that the government would never consider asking for a bailout, even at times when 
the risk premium on Spanish sovereign debt reached unsustainable levels and 
Spanish companies, affected by this ‘sovereign’ risk, found it impossible to access 
the foreign credit markets. Just as significant is the fact that the government never 
contemplated an exit from the euro that would have allowed the country to gain 
competitiveness via a devaluation of the exchange rate rather than painful internal 
devaluation, which led to massive public disapproval and certain electoral defeat. 
 
Finally, it is also difficult to understand from a point of view privileging external 
constraints the decision of the Spanish government to respond to the requests by 
the ECB for substantial measures in return for the purchasing of Spanish 
sovereign bonds, not by acting on the labour market, as requested by the ECB, 
but by reforming the Constitution. As we shall see, neither the ECB nor Germany 
and its allies in the European Council ever explicitly requested such a reform. 
 
If accounts privileging external constraints have been shown to be insufficient, so 
have analyses focusing on domestic economic factors. While economic 
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disequilibria had certainly led Spain to a very vulnerable position by 2007, a 
number of issues are difficult to reconcile with a response driven by domestic 
economic rationale: why was the government so slow to acknowledge and react to 
the crisis? Why once the gravity of the crisis had become apparent did it not act 
more forcefully to address problems that obviously and urgently required solution, 
from the labour market to the financial sector? Why did it not accompany the fiscal 
stimulus with a mid-term rebalancing plan that would have offered sovereign debt 
markets certain guarantees of fiscal prudence? Why did crucial elements of the 
response, from rejection of a bailout to reform of the Constitution, prevail, when 
not immediately explainable from a domestic economic perspective? And why 
were some of these responses so different to those from other countries facing 
similar economic predicaments? 
 
Notwithstanding the partial explanatory power of external constraints and 
domestic economic issues, the literature review has shown how domestic political 
factors can prove vital in understanding both the immediate origins and 
management of the Spanish crisis. However, as the review has also shown, this 
approach has been the subject of limited attention, offering valuable but partial 
explanations of the management of the crisis and its origins. What is lacking is 
empirical evidence that can strengthen and enrich these claims, helping build an 
account that ties together these and other domestic political considerations and 
provides a more nuanced, holistic and systematic account of the role played by 
domestic political factors in the management of the crisis that does not invalidate, 
but complements existing explanations. This is the objective of this dissertation 
and of the research question that guides it. 
 
 
1.3. Research question and theoretical framework 
 
1.3.1. Research question 
 
This dissertation privileges a domestic political perspective in the analysis of the 
management of the crisis in Spain. It aims to make a contribution to the literature 
in two ways. Firstly, there is to my knowledge no comprehensive account of the 
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management of the crisis based on primary research exploring the role played by 
domestic political factors in the decisions of Spanish policy-makers during the 
crisis and its immediate origins, and certainly not one based on first-hand 
knowledge provided by the decision-makers themselves. Secondly, it conducts 
this analysis in a time-specific context through a chronological reconstruction of 
events and decision-making in the key episodes of the crisis as it unfolded before 
the eyes of the PSOE government. 
 
In order to do so the research question that the dissertation will aim to answer is: 
what role did domestic political factors play in the PSOE government´s 
management of the crisis in Spain and in its immediate origins? It is important to 
note that, in thus framing the research question, there is no assumption that 
external factors did not play a role. On the contrary, global financial markets, 
Spain´s membership of EMU or Germany´s attitudes played an important role in 
the origins and management of the crisis. These and other international political 
and economic factors interacted to create a complex political dynamic. Yet, as 
Gourevitch (1978: 911) argued in his seminal study of the relationship between 
international and domestic politics (‘the second image reversed’), ‘however 
compelling external pressures may be, they are unlikely to be fully determining’. 
The PSOE government was forced to balance forceful external political constraints 
with domestic political realities; an international political context defined by the 
battle for survival of an increasingly threatened EMU with a challenging domestic 
political scene in which interests, ideology, party politics and electoral dynamics 
were always present. While the external constraints were important, the claim of 
this dissertation, substantiated by the analysis conducted in the literature review, 
is that it is essential also to look at domestic political factors and recognise that 
these may not have been given sufficient consideration in some of the 
predominant accounts of the management of the Spanish crisis. That politics 
matter in the management of the economy is, of course, quite uncontroversial. 
Yet, as we shall see, the purpose of the dissertation is not only to attest to the 
relevance of domestic politics in the management of the crisis, but also to explore 
why and how they influenced it.  
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These political factors can enrich our understanding of the management of the 
crisis in Spain in at least in three ways. Firstly, they can provide explanatory 
variables for developments which otherwise are difficult to explain. Secondly, they 
can provide an alternative explanation of decisions that, while conditioned by 
external factors, may actually be more fully explained by incorporating domestic 
political factors. And thirdly, while external constraints might have forced the 
government to act in a certain way, the specific measures with which the 
government attempted to reduce those pressures, were, as we shall see, often 
determined by domestic political factors. 
 
 
1.3.2. Theoretical framework 
 
In theoretical terms, this dissertation locates itself within the debate on the impact 
of economic globalisation on states’ capacity to act, privileging a domestic 
perspective in determining what states can do under conditions of international 
economic integration. It aims to provide primary research to substantiate this claim 
to the relevance of domestic political factors in the particular context of the 
Spanish crisis. The debate on the impact of globalisation on states’ economic 
discretion is an intense one (Hay, 2008). A well-established academic literature 
(Strange, 1988, 1996; Ohmae, 1990; Rodrik, 1997, 2012; Ruggie, 1998; Held et 
al., 1999; Stiglitz, 2010; Gamble, 2014) has argued and chronicled how the 
process of economic integration that is said to characterise the global economy 
has led to a weakening of the state’s power and autonomy. According to one line 
of thought, originally and most forcefully argued by Strange (1988, 1996), power 
over others is exercised through a number of structural forces, such as security, 
credit, knowledge and production that have for the last decades spilled over the 
territorial boundaries of states. In an analysis particularly premonitory of the euro 
area sovereign crisis, Strange (1996: 192) argued that: 
 
The management of foreign debt (…) is a good example of the structural 
power of powerful states exercised indirectly through the bureaucracies of 
international organizations. 
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The impact of financial globalisation is also said from this perspective to have 
been critical in diminishing the autonomy of the state (Stiglitz, 2010). Having lost 
the ability to control capital flows and thus tax capital, states have been forced to 
compete for investment by adopting low taxation and investment-friendly policies, 
which usually entail increased labour market flexibility and overall deregulation, 
regardless of domestic political needs or ideological preferences. 
 
A second perspective (Held et al., 1999) has highlighted the transnational nature 
of many of today´s economic and global dynamics and advocated the need for a 
new regime of global governance that would supersede the limitations of nation 
states to deal with them. In this context, liberal internationalists (Ruggie, 1998) 
have long argued that a set of international regimes has been supplanting the 
state as the key locus of political action. 
 
Finally, a third mainstream line of argument, often critical of the impact of 
globalisation and its ‘neoliberal’ underpinnings, has focused on the challenges that 
globalisation presents to democracy (Rodrik, 1997, 2012; Gamble, 2014). The 
high level of economic interdependence which characterises the modern economy 
has led to a need for political governance functions above the state level, which 
require either global governance or government, as described above, or 
hegemonic leadership (Kindleberger, 1973). In neither case is there a necessary 
connection with democracy, leading to what has been termed the ‘democratic 
deficit’ (Gamble, 2014: 117) or the trilemma of hyperglobalisation, which Rodrik 
(1997, 2012) has theorised as the impossible attempt to accommodate at the 
same time deep economic integration, democracy and national sovereignty. The 
alleged undermining of the state´s capacity to act democratically caused by 
globalisation is further intensified by a neoliberal ideology that privileges open 
markets and nudges states towards investment-friendly policies (Gamble, 2014). It 
is not so much that due to globalisation national governments do not have a 
choice. They do have formal discretion, but often the alternatives are unpalatable 
(ibid.: 117) or ‘national governments impose these constraints on themselves as 
the price for remaining in the larger entity’ (ibid.: 116). This leads to a constant 
tension between democracy and supranational governance, which has been 
particularly noticeable in the EU during the crisis. 
	 44	
 
However compelling these claims may be, the alleged loss of autonomy and 
capacity to act of states may not be as conclusive as suggested. Firstly, questions 
can be asked as to whether we really live in such an economically integrated 
world and concerning the theoretical and empirical veracity of the mechanisms 
through which it is said to limit the ability of states to act (Feldstein and Horioka, 
1980; Dunning, 1988; Zevin, 1992; Frankel, 1997; Rodrik, 1997, 2012; Cooke and 
Noble, 1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Traxler and Woitech, 2000; Hay, 2008; 
Bekaert and Wang, 2009). Claims of an unprecedented level of economic 
globalisation are predicated on assumptions that are questionable both 
theoretically and empirically. At a theoretical level, and as Hay (2008: 320) has 
argued, the most important of these, the alleged high mobility of capital, is based 
on dubious assumptions: that capital has perfect information and will go where it 
can secure the highest return, that it has perfect mobility, that the cost of exit is 
zero, that it will secure the greatest return where there are more flexible labour 
markets and lower taxation, and that the welfare state has no positive 
externalities. The challenges to the idea that we live in such an economically 
integrated world are also empirical. International trade is less as a percentage of 
global GDP than it has been in previous ages (Hirst and Thompson, 1999) and is 
concentrated within regions and within Europe, North America and Asia Pacific, 
with geography still being the single highest correlated factor (Frankel, 1997). The 
true extent of the globalisation of capital is also questionable. Were global capital 
flows to be truly integrated they would be expected to lead to a convergence in 
asset prices. Yet, as Bekaert and Wang (2009: 37-38) have concluded in their 
extensive review of several measures of convergence of bond and equity returns, 
as well as of interest rates, ‘it is somewhat challenging to document strong effects 
of globalisation on the convergence of asset prices’, something which, in their 
view:  
 
Confirms the findings of early studies of the dynamics of market integration 
(…) which argue that integration is a non-smooth process that may actually 
reverse and is only weakly linked to de jure openness. (ibid.)  
 
Furthermore, if global capital flows were truly integrated, there should be a low 
correlation between domestic savings and investment, as foreign direct 
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investment (FDI) would be readily available from external sources. Yet this was 
not the case in the early stages of globalisation (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980), 
and, while the so-called ‘Feldstein-Horioka puzzle’ has been called into question in 
recent times, the challenges to it are not conclusive (Hay, 2008: 339-340). 
 
Even if economic globalisation were a reality, whether this process has been 
accompanied by a weakening of the state is an altogether different question. 
There is first the issue of whether in fact the state has less of a presence today 
than it used to. Theoretical implications from the hyperglobalizaton thesis would 
tend to imply it must. If there were perfect mobility of capital, then there should be 
a constant pressure on states to lower corporate tax rates that would result in 
lower tax receipts and thus lower public expenditure (unless governments borrow, 
an assumption not warranted by the relatively moderate levels of public debt as a 
percentage of GDP, in historical terms, that most developed economies presented 
until the crisis). Similarly, it would generate a race to the bottom in issues such as 
labour and environmental regulation to reduce costs to investment. Yet the 
empirical evidence does not warrant this conclusion. Contrary to what the 
hyperglobalisation thesis may suggest, there is no inverse correlation between 
openness and stateness (Hay, 2008: 333); in fact there is a continued positive 
correlation between public expenditure and economic openness (Rodrik, 1997). 
Similarly there is no inverse correlation between FDI and levels of corporate 
taxation, labour market regulation or generosity of welfare benefits protection 
(Dunning, 1988; Cooke and Noble, 1998; Traxler and Woitech, 2000). 
 
Finally, to the claim that the origins of the crisis of the nation state reside, not in 
economic globalisation per se, but in the increasingly global nature of the 
problems faced and the inability of the state to deal with them (Held et al., 1999), 
the obvious response is that such a claim tells us nothing about the state´s ability 
to deal with the kind of problems it has traditionally had to deal with. While dealing 
with transnational issues may in fact pose a challenge, this challenge says more 
about the difficulties that a system of sovereign states has in dealing with 
transnational problems than it does about the ability of the state to manage the 
problems it has traditionally had to deal with (Hay, 2008: 325). An altogether 
different issue is the use of globalisation by national policymakers as a convenient 
	 46	
scapegoat for unpopular policies that have nothing to do with it (Fernández-
Albertos et al., 2013). As Hay (2008: 315) has suggested: 
 
There is a certain danger that, in accepting over-hastily an influential 
conception of the inevitable demise of the nation state´s capacity an 
autonomy, we provide a convenient alibi for politicians keen to justify 
otherwise social and economic reforms by appeal to the harsh reality of a 
global age.  
 
Beyond these theoretical and empirical arguments, other observations from the 
recent crisis also question whether globalisation has rendered the state 
powerless. Firstly, the crisis undermined the validity of the efficient market 
hypothesis and corresponding claims that markets could be relied upon to self-
regulate; the need for regulation, which often must still emanate from national 
parliaments, has become unquestionable. Furthermore, responses to the crisis, 
whether through fiscal stimulus or bank bailouts, were predominantly national, 
even within the EU. Secondly, as seen in the literature review and predicted in the 
VoC literature, the response to the crisis was defined in part by the type of 
capitalism predominant in a country, whether in Germany or Spain, going to show 
that there are differences marked by the state and domestic political institutions. 
Or, to invert the argument, if the state were irrelevant, we would have seen a 
convergence in responses, which was certainly not the case, at least in the initial 
stages: the shape of the fiscal stimulus took a very different form in Spain from 
that in Germany, for example.  
 
There are therefore substantive reasons to argue that globalisation and economic 
integration has not fundamentally annulled the economic discretion of the state. 
Yet what this general argument highlighting state autonomy does not explain is 
the way in which domestic political factors shape economic policy and outcomes. 
The interaction of politics and markets at state level is, however, a subject for 
which there is ample theoretical guidance emanating from the field of political 
economy and, in particular, comparative political economy. The most relevant 
contemporary point of departure for any analysis of the political dimension of the 
domestic management of economic crises is probably Karl Polanyi´s (1944) The 
Great Transformation. In his genealogy of the rise of the modern market from the 
18th century to the convulsions of the 1930s, including of course the Great 
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Depression, Polanyi emphasises the cultural and political underpinnings of 
markets, and shows how these are embedded in a particular institutional and 
political context, and can neither be understood nor operate sustainably without 
them. In recent times various research agendas have explored how domestic 
political factors shape economic outcomes, and it is to them that we must turn our 
attention to establish a theoretical framework within which to set the dissertation. 
These contemporary approaches to the study of comparative political economy 
can be usefully structured around the privileging of the explanatory power of three 
sets of factors: institutions, interests (material and political) and ideas. Taking into 
account these factors, and following discussions in Hall (1997) Blyth (2009) and 
Bermeo and Pontusson (2012), I identify four main comparative political economy 
research agendas: institutional, interest-based, partisanship-based and ideational. 
 
 
Institutional political economy 
 
A first approach relies on the role of institutions to explain economic outcomes, 
both in normal times and during crises (Deyo, 1987; Haggard, 1990; Wade, 1990; 
Hall and Soskice, 2001; Greif, 2006; Iversen, 2007; Royo, 2008; Chung and 
Thewissen, 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Hooren et al., 2014). Probably 
the most important research agenda in this field is that of VoC (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Iversen, 2007), which has been discussed in the 
literature review from a more empirical standpoint with respect to how it helps 
explain Germany´s and Spain´s response to the crisis. At a theoretical level, this 
approach argues that variations in economic policy can be traced to institutional 
differences between nations and it identifies the level of coordination between 
business firms and the state that emanates from these institutional arrangements 
as the key differentiation factor between models of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). These can be classified into coordinated market economies (generally 
speaking continental European countries) and liberal market economies 
(exemplified by the US and the UK). This original model was expanded with the 
category of mixed market economies for those countries that do not naturally fit in 
either of the two main categories; Mediterranean economies such as Spain are 
deemed to be of this category. According to this literature (Royo, 2008), Spain is 
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characterised by strong coordination in financial markets but not in labour 
relations.  
 
A VoC approach enriches political economy analyses in a number of ways (Hall, 
1997: 182): it helps move beyond the tendency of economics to treat all 
developed economies as institutionally identical; it puts firms at the centre of the 
analysis and highlights how institutions interact to create distinct outcomes; and, in 
so far as it is based on the assumptions of rational agents responding to 
incentives in a game theoretical framework, it offers an approach to political 
economy that can be conversant with contemporary economic science. The VoC 
framework can also help explain governments´ responses to crisis as domestic 
political economy institutions are seen as playing a key role in shaping the 
demand for policy choices (Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Iversen, 2007). In fact, 
Iversen´s analysis suggests that we can plausibly predict the way a crisis will be 
managed in a given country given its model of capitalism. According to this 
approach ‘exogenous shocks are expected to lead to different government 
responses depending on existing institutional frameworks’ (Iversen, 2007: 278). 
These claims have been corroborated by further literature. Chung and Thewissen 
(2011: 357) have argued that ‘existing institutional settings shape the expectations 
and behaviour of citizens, politicians, and pressure groups’, and that the 
institutional differences that the VoC literature identifies ‘act as powerful 
inducements to replicate existing institutions’. Hooren et al. (2014) have further 
argued that governments stick to crisis routines anchored in existing institutions, 
primarily because people opt for rigidity and well-known ‘old habits’ during times of 
uncertainty. 
 
Beyond VoC, Greif (2006), in his game-theoretical analysis of the different 
evolution of medieval Christian and Muslim traders, identifies cultural beliefs rather 
than interests as the key factor that determines the formation and evolution of 
institutions. The latter are not just the politically and interest-determined rules by 
which economic transactions are governed in a society; they are the combination 
of cultural beliefs as conveyed by formal and informal rules. Different institutions 
arise among nations because of the different cultures, norms and organised 
groups with differing degrees of power that prevail in each country. 
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Finally, a more historical approach has also tried to understand the difference that 
institutions have made in economic development. Focusing on East Asia, Deyo 
(1987) and Haggard (1990) have focused on the role of the state in industrial 
development, while Wade (1990) has placed emphasis on the successful 
experience of some East Asian states in governing the market. More recently, 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) have also defended the centrality of institutions in 
explaining why some nations fail and others succeed, suggesting that the 
difference is to be found in whether a state is characterised by the centrality of 
extractive institutions, where a corporatist elite exploits a nation´s resources to its 
benefit, or by inclusive institutions, where a more ample representation of the 
population acts as a barrier to such exploitation. 
 
 
Interest-based political economy 
 
The material interests of different producer-group coalitions can have a substantial 
influence on economic policy (Gourevitch, 1986; Rogowski, 1989; Alesina and 
Drazen, 1991; Frieden, 1991; Hiscox, 2002; Mares, 2003; Iversen, 2005). 
According to certain interpretations, of which Peter Gourevitch´s Politics in Hard 
Times (1986) is the modern foundational source, coalitional dynamics trump 
ideology, institutions and international factors in explaining policy choices during 
crises. Although policy responses adopted during crisis are putatively aimed at 
addressing the economic and social impact, what they really reflect is the efforts of 
these different organised interests to shape political and economic environments 
to their benefit. The content of those responses is therefore a function of the 
expected distributional consequences and the ability of affected organised 
interests to mobilise politically to shape them. Whatever the external constraints, 
there is always an element of choice in the government´s response and therefore 
domestic politics, and the fight to define the response by the various organised 
interests, always plays a role. Crises are thus critical moments when a new 
political-economy equilibrium for the country is set:  
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History has its points of critical choice, moments of flux when several things 
might happen but only one actually does. For years afterward, the winning 
alternative will pre-empt other possibilities, and things will seem more 
closed. Economic crises create one such set of points of choice. 
(Gourevitch, 1986: 9–10) 
 
These interests-based coalitions may not be sector-specific. Shifts in the terms of 
trade of a nation can shift the interests of larger groups across sectors (workers, 
capital owners, etc.) and lead to a new class or factor-based coalitions (Rogowski, 
1989) or across specific sectors according to their competitiveness (Frieden, 
1991). Whether these coalitions are narrowly defined by sector or take a broader 
foundation may in fact be related to the degree of inter-industry factor mobility 
(Hiscox, 2002), with less advanced economies, where skills transfer is more 
feasible, more likely to engender class-based coalitions. In fact, an alternative 
approach to understanding coalition forming has focused on the role of skills. One 
interpretation suggests that the shared interest of workers and employers in skill 
acquisition could lead to coalitions among them forming across sectors (Mares, 
2003), which could lead to different welfare and employment protection schemes 
across nations, depending on the distribution of skills in a given economy. An 
alternative skill-based explanation (Iversen, 2005) places the explanatory power 
on whether an economy relies on general or more specific skills, with the latter 
more conducive to creating welfare systems that can protect workers in the riskier 
situation of acquiring specific skills. 
  
Finally, other strands of work (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) have focused on the 
study of the mechanisms by which organised interests shape policy decisions with 
substantial distributional implications. According to this interpretation this process 
is defined (ibid.: 1170) by a ‘war of attrition’ where each socio-economic group 
finds it rational to ‘wait each other out’ in trying to shift the burden of stabilization, 
which only occurs when ‘one group concedes and is forced to bear a 
disproportionate share of the burden of fiscal adjustment’. 
 
An interest-based approach may prove particularly fruitful in understanding the 
management of the Spanish crisis. The political economy arrangements that 
developed out of the transition to democracy were characterised by a deep 
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enmeshing of the public and the private, thus allowing many channels for the 
interests of the different stakeholders, whether unions, business organizations or 
representatives of individuals sectors or firms, to influence government policy. 
Regulated or formerly regulated industries constitute the bulk of the Spanish 
economy and thus the relationship between many firms and the regulators and the 
government is deep. Furthermore, the corporatist nature of the Spanish economy 
that resulted from such political-economy arrangements led to different interest 
coalitions. Some were across different business sectors, such as those that 
developed as a result of the housing boom between financial firms, especially the 
cajas, and construction firms. But other coalitions brought together actors from 
trade unions and business organisations, both of which had an interest in 
maintaining the system of collective bargaining that gave them both ample social 
power and economic means. 
 
 
Partisanship-based political economy 
 
The interests that shape economic policy may be material but also political.  
Accordingly, partisanship can be a conditioning factor in economic policy-making 
(Nordhaus, 1975; Hibbs, 1977; Alt, 1985; Weir and Skocpol, 1985; Alesina, 1989; 
Scharpf, 1987; Boix, 1996, 1998; Garret, 1998; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Broz, 
2013; Galasso, 2014). According to this line of thought it is the interest of political 
leaders and parties in re-election that helps explain economic policy decisions. 
This partisanship approach serves as a bridge between interest-based 
approaches, where some authors have actually located them (Hall, 1997), and 
ideology-based explanations, which are of course closely related to partisanship. 
 
Alternative interpretations have been put forward in the ample literature that has 
examined the role of partisanship in shaping economic policy. Nordhaus’ (1975) 
pioneering work on political business cycles, that is, on how political factors 
determine macroeconomic cycles, attributed decisions on economic policy to pre-
electoral considerations. Hibbs (1977) suggested that partisan policymakers (on 
the left or the right) had different macroeconomic goals along the inflation/full 
employment axis and that it was these differences that explained variance in 
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economic policy-making. Boix (1996: 347) has also argued persuasively that 
partisanship determines policy responses, identifying party preferences, as well as 
the ideas and institutions within which they operate, as the defining variables by 
which partisanship shapes policy outcomes. Accordingly, social democratic parties 
would in principle look to increase public spending in order to expand social 
policies to redress inequality, which would imply higher taxes. By contrast 
conservative parties would take measures to encourage the workings of the free 
market, such as a reduction of public spending and taxes. Iversen and Soskice 
(2006) have shown how electoral systems, a dimension somewhere between 
institutional and partisanship-based approaches, are crucial in determining the 
composition of governing coalitions, which in turn explain variance in 
redistribution. Centre-left governments are more common in proportional 
representation systems, which redistribute more than majoritarian systems, where 
centre-right governments dominate.  
 
Other authors have supported the view that partisanship shapes economic policy 
but with certain qualifications. Alt (1985) has allowed for the importance of 
partisanship but conditioned by the international economic context, while both 
Weir and Skocpol (1985) and Scharpf (1987) have framed the margin of action of 
partisanship in the changing institutional circumstances within which they operate. 
Alesina (1989) has argued that the impact of partisanship is to be found in the 
approach to the unemployment / inflation trade-off, claiming that, when elected, 
social democratic parties tend to focus first on fighting the former, conservatives 
on the latter. Garret (1998) has focused his work on the intermediating role played 
by trade unions. Most recently, Galasso (2014), in his analysis of the relationship 
between political partisanship and structural reforms in the labour, product and 
financial markets of OECD countries, has concluded that partisanship does indeed 
matter for structural reform, with right-wing governments more in favour of it. 
However, he also observes that crises modify partisan behaviour: conservative 
governments refrain from privatisation and stricter financial regulation, while left-
wing parties are more open to privatisation. This willingness to go against their 
traditional policy positions suggests that ‘during a crisis, these parties may learn 
the true cost of these non-competitive regulations, and can credibly convey it to 
their electorate’ (Galasso, 2014: 145). Furthermore, Broz (2013: 75), in his 
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analysis of partisanship in financial cycles, has shown how the partisan character 
of government is both cause and consequence of financial crises, claiming that 
there is a ‘partisan-policy financial cycle’ in which right-wing governments preside 
over financial booms funding credit expansion and asset price appreciation with 
large current-account deficits.  
 
This literature may be helpful analysing the Spanish crisis in a number of ways. 
Approaches that highlight how the election cycle influences economic policy may 
well be particularly suited to explaining why the Spanish government downplayed 
the effect of the crisis in the run-up to the 2008 general election. Explanations that 
rely on partisanship factors to explain economic policies aligned with specific 
centre-left policy preferences, such as high public spending or low unemployment, 
even at the risk of inflation or the generation of a housing bubble, may also prove 
to be a useful prism through which to understand the actions of the PSOE 
government. Finally, approaches that predict more openness by centre-left 
governments to liberal policies and reform in times of crisis may of course be 
relevant in explaining the apparent contradiction between the PSOE´s traditional 
support for high levels of public spending and the austerity drive it put in place 
from May 2010. 
 
 
Ideational political economy 
 
Ideas, culture and ideology can also influence economic policy (Katzenstein, 
1985; Hall, 1989; Fligstein, 1990; Sikking, 1991; Sabel, 1995; McNamara, 1998; 
Berman, 2006; Jabko, 2006; MacKenzie, 2006; Blyth, 2009, 2013). An early 
application of such an approach was the suggestion that ideology explained why 
smaller, and in principle more vulnerable European economies, came out better 
from the 1970s crisis with reference to how they shared an ideology of social 
partnership that made it easier to make the necessary adjustments (Katzenstein, 
1985). More recent approaches that privilege the role of ideas claim they can do 
so in at least two ways (Blyth, 2009: 210).  
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Firstly, ideas are said to be of substantive instrumental influence in shaping 
economic policy in so far as agents use ideas and ideological constructs to realise 
their interests. On this interpretation, epistemic communities play a vital role in 
defining economic policy and the dominant ideas within a given professional group 
are essential to explaining the choice of policies (Hall, 1989; Fligstein, 1990; 
Sikkink, 1991). In the context of European integration such approaches have been 
used to suggest, for example, an alleged neoliberal bias in the original 
construction of EMU, which would have been the result of the predominance of 
neoliberal ideas among economists and policy-makers responsible for its design 
(McNamara, 1998). Blyth (2013) has also adopted an interest-based ideational 
argument to explain the framing of the crisis as one caused by sovereign debt and 
thus the privileging of austerity as a remedy despite ample evidence of its 
counterproductive impact. 
 
Some interpretations have taken this ideational approach further and suggested 
that, once deployed, ideas can actually take the interests at the service of which 
they were initially deployed in different directions. Berman (2006) and Blyth (2009) 
have reasoned in such a manner in their attempt to explain the different political 
and institutional outcomes that resulted out of the Great Depression. More 
relevant to this dissertation, Jabko (2006) has deployed such a line of argument to 
account for the EU´s institutional design, focusing on the role of the European 
Commission, a weak actor which, nevertheless, as transmitter of a set of ideas 
privileging market liberalism, was able to create a momentum for an integrationist 
outcome which superseded the interests of the actors on behalf of whom it has 
originally set out to work. 
 
A second set of ideational approaches goes beyond an instrumental 
understanding of the role of ideas and suggests that these can be the main forces 
behind economic policies and not just mediating factors for pre-existent material 
interests of actors or the path dependency created by institutions. On this 
interpretation, ideas not only describe the context within which firms and states 
operate but in fact help create the kind of assumptions that they predicate. The 
work of MacKenzie (2006) on the financial sector is an example of such an 
approach, suggesting that development of a financial idea such as the Black-
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Scholes valuation model and its deployment by market agents to an increasing 
number of asset classes ended up altering pricing patterns in such a way that 
made reality fit the stylized model. Going further down this line of argument, other 
authors (Johnson, 1994; Ziegler, 1997; Sabel, 1995) have argued that ideas and 
culture should be considered the primary cause of economic outcomes since they 
underlie the systems upon which all individual and social action takes place, 
including economic ones. 
 
An ideational approach may be of value in helping understand certain episodes of 
the management of the Spanish crisis. A number of issues are difficult to explain 
without reference to the centre-left ideological preferences held by President 
Zapatero and some of his key ministers: the resistance to liberalisation in the 
labour market despite ample pressure from domestic and external sources to 
allow it; the reluctance to institute structural reforms in areas requiring an increase 
in competition, which can be traced back to the PSOE´s and in particular 
President Zapatero´s belief in the role of an active state in the management of the 
economy and in the public/private social dialogue that had characterised the 
PSOE´s approach to industrial relations; or the eagerness to adopt a large fiscal 
stimulus, even at the risk of running a significant deficit. An ideational approach 
may also be useful in explaining aspects of the crisis beyond the attitudes of the 
Socialist government. For example, ideational approaches that privilege the 
explanatory power of the role played by epistemic communities in advancing 
particular ideas may be suited to explaining the role of the Bank of Spain, the staff 
of which has traditionally held quasi-hegemonic power in the development of 
economic ideas in the nation. Finally, an ideational approach may of course be 
particularly relevant in explaining the framing of the euro crisis as one of excessive 
public spending in the European periphery and privileging the idea of austerity as 
the preferred policy path for these states, including Spain. 
 
In sum, the discipline of comparative political economy offers a rich set of 
domestic political factors that may help to guide an understanding of Spanish 
economic policy-making in the management of the crisis. An institutional approach 
may help explain the role of key institutions such as those of political economy 
that govern areas like industrial relations and corporate governance, as well as 
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others such as Parliament and the electoral system or the Bank of Spain. Yet such 
an approach may not be able to capture the interests of key actors, whether 
material or political, an aspect for which interest-based and partisanship-based 
approaches may prove more fruitful. In turn these interests are shaped by 
ideological preferences held by policy-makers as well as by other stakeholders 
such as trade unions or the business elite, and ideational approaches may be 
useful to filling this gap. This set of variables and the differences between them 
will be used to frame the dissertation´s empirical analysis and its findings will allow 
us to consider in the Conclusion whether the Spanish case supports the predictive 
assumptions of these different research agendas.  
 
 
1.4. Methodology and chapter structure 
 
This dissertation employs a qualitative research approach, relying on both primary 
and secondary sources. The primary research techniques used are those of 
process tracing and elite interviewing. Among the various research techniques at 
the disposal of qualitative researchers (King et al., 1994; Brady and Collier, 2010) 
these two are deemed the most appropriate for this research project. Process 
tracing is especially useful for qualitative research projects in the social sciences 
where the goal is to obtain information about well-defined and specific events and 
processes (George and Bennett, 2005), as is the case with this dissertation. Elite 
interviews are often the most suitable method for policy process tracing research, 
as they offer researchers a rich vehicle for obtaining unique data from ideally 
placed interviewees with which to investigate the complexities of policy and 
politics (Dexter, 1970). They also offer a chance to obtain information on the policy 
decision-making process and rationale which can be critical to explaining political 
economy developments and which would otherwise be difficult to get. As Beamer 
(2002: 87) explains when referring to elite interviewees:  
 
These individuals may have special insight into the causal process of 
politics and interviewing them permits in-depth exploration of specific 
policies and political issues.  
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This objective also guides the sampling process, since the choice of interviewees 
should have as its goal obtaining information from the subjects best positioned to 
analyse the phenomenon at hand. Such an approach to sampling and 
investigation is consciously not probabilistic in nature, but rather aims to identify 
the best-placed individuals to help make causal observations that can explain the 
phenomenon studied. As Tansey (2007: 765) has put it: 
 
The most appropriate sampling procedures are thus those that identify the 
key political actors, those who have had the most involvement with the 
processes of interest. The aim is not to draw a representative sample of a 
larger population of political actors that can be used as the basis to make 
generalizations about the full population, but to draw a sample that includes 
the most important political players who have participated in the political 
events being studied.  
  
 
The choice of interviewees for this dissertation was guided by such an approach.	
The dissertation is based on extensive in-depth interviews with twenty-four senior 
government officials and policy makers at the highest level of government. These 
officials were selected because they were the key protagonists in the 
management of the crisis or were in a privileged position from which to observe it. 
With the exception of the President, who was not available for interview, the most 
senior policymakers in all the key departments involved in the management of the 
crisis have all been interviewed. These include the ministers of all the ministries 
closely involved in the management of the crisis, many of the secretaries of state 
in those ministries and senior officials in other relevant institutions, such as the 
President´s Office, the President´s Economic Office and the Bank of Spain. 
Because of the seniority of these officials, the fact some of them are still active in 
politics, and the sensitivity of the issues discussed, it was agreed their responses 
would be reported anonymously.  
 
A number of methods exist to ensure the reliability of the data obtained in this type 
of interviews (Beamer, 2002: 939). Firstly, newspaper articles, legislative records 
and other similar sources can be useful to ensuring that the interviewees’ answers 
are factually accurate. Secondly, responses to similar questions can be compared 
to detect inconsistencies. Similarly, if various interviewees provide similar answers 
to a question it can be seen as a probable indication of the respondents’ accuracy. 
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The dissertation will follow these methods. In general, an evidence-based 
empirical claim will be made if at least two separate sources that are deemed trust 
worthy on the issue have corroborated it. Besides the interviews with senior 
government officials, the dissertation relies on other materials such as legislative 
records from the Spanish Parliament and EU institutions, newspaper articles, 
speeches and press conferences from Spanish and European officials, as well as 
data sets and reports from the Spanish Ministry of Economy Finance, the Bank of 
Spain, the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
[INE]) or the National Sociological Research Centre (Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas [CIS]), as well as from international organisations, such as the IMF, 
the OECD or the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat). 
 
The project´s research design, following the definition of the research question 
and the consideration of the broad theoretical debate within which the dissertation 
places itself, consisted of the following steps. Firstly, it was necessary to define 
the key episodes along which the account of the crisis and its origins could be 
structured. Secondly, a set of issues and questions were determined to help 
understand how these various episodes were managed. Thirdly, extensive 
interviews were conducted orally, using unstructured interview guides that covered 
all of the main topics but offered the flexibility to gather the most valuable 
information from each senior official. Fourthly, the information was classified 
chronologically along the key episodes previously identified. Fifthly, the answers 
were assessed for possible contradictions and to ensure their veracity as far as 
possible, employing the methods described above. Sixthly, the findings were 
analysed. And seventhly, an account of the management of the crisis and its 
immediate origins was elaborated and conclusions gathered with relation to the 
research question. The final output of the dissertation is an analytical account that 
reconstructs the key episodes that defined the management of the crisis and its 
immediate origins and illuminates the factors that shaped it, helping understand 
what was going on in the black box of the government´s response to the crisis. 
 
In order to conduct this exercise, the dissertation is structured in six chapters. 
Following the present Introduction, Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 conform the empirical 
core of the dissertation, offering a chronologically organised account of the 
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management of the crisis and its immediate origins informed by the outcome of 
the interviews. Chapter 2 analyses the actions of the government in the period 
immediately prior to the crisis and examines the reasons for its apparent inaction 
when faced with mounting economic imbalances. Chapter 3 provides an informed 
explanation of the decisions taken by policy-makers from the onset of the financial 
and economic crises in 2007 until May 2010, a period characterized first by the 
downplaying of the crisis and then by a reaction based on fiscal stimuli and some 
early structural reforms, but always preserving social policies. Chapter 4 analyses 
the management of the crisis from May 2010, when the spread of concerns about 
Greece ignited the euro crisis and forced the Spanish government to adopt a U-
turn and start implementing unpopular austerity policies and more substantial 
structural reforms. Finally, Chapter 5 covers the management of the crisis during 
the second phase of the euro crisis up to the end of the Socialist government´s 
time in office in December 2011. The concluding chapter summarises the 
empirical findings and draws the relevant conclusions, developing a domestic 
political perspective of the management of the crisis in Spain that identifies the 
key factors and mechanisms at play. It concludes by considering the relevance of 
these findings for the research agendas identified in this Introduction and suggests 
how they can help advance future research on the subject and on related 
theoretical and empirical agendas. 
  
	 60	
Chapter 2. Inaction   
(March 2004 to August 2007) 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the role of domestic political factors in the management of 
Spain´s main economic imbalances prior to the crisis. While the main objective of 
the dissertation is to study domestic politics during the crisis rather than its origins, 
it is useful, for at least two reasons, to explore the years up to the crisis. Firstly, 
many of the factors that shaped the management of the crisis were already 
present in, indeed emanated from, these early stages. And secondly, it provides 
early illustrations of economic policies and decisions that were shaped by 
domestic political factors. In so doing the chapter serves as a transition between 
analysis of the origins of the crisis and that of its management.   
 
Two caveats are, however, necessary. Firstly, this chapter will concentrate on the 
study of domestic factors and will only consider the role played by external 
constraints in so far as what has already been explored in the previous chapter. 
The external context in the years before the crisis was relatively benign: there was 
little direct pressure from external agents, either investors or other governments, 
on the Spanish government to act in a given way.  
 
Secondly, this chapter will not attempt a detailed study of all the complexities of 
the relationship between economic and political factors during these years, as the 
main focus of the dissertation is the management of the crisis and not the years 
prior to it. Nor will it aim to explore in detail whether Spain´s putative political 
deficiencies, with all their institutional complexities, caused the economic crisis or 
vice-versa. It will limit itself to the analysis of the specific issue of the role played 
by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party´s (Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
[PSOE]) government in the management of the economy during these years. In 
particular, it will explore why some key economic imbalances were managed as 
they were, and whether domestic political factors played a significant role. 
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2.2. Management of the economic imbalances 		
The management of four issues in particular merits analysis, since they were 
significant economic problems that had been clearly identified but where action 
was not taken, and which help throw some light on the PSOE government´s 
approach to economic management. These four issues were the housing bubble, 
the credit boom and associated current account deficit and high levels of private 
debt, the dysfunctional labour market and the absence of reforms to change 
Spain´s growth model from one based on low productivity and competitiveness 
towards high productivity tasks and sectors. The problems afflicting the financial 
sector, one of defining factors of the Spanish crisis, are not discussed in this 
section, as they were, for the most part, not particularly salient prior to 2007, but 
developed during the crisis. They are therefore discussed in the next two 
chapters. 
 
 
2.2.1. Credit boom, current account deficit and high private debt 
 
The most noticeable imbalance that Spain displayed in the run-up to the crisis was 
probably its massive current account deficit, which reached almost 11 per cent of 
GDP in 2007 (Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat), 2014). This 
deficit was at least in part the direct consequence of the monetary shock entailed 
by Spain´s accession to the euro. International financial markets reacted to the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) by reducing the perceived risk of all member 
states, including the euro zone periphery, which brought about a substantial 
reduction in interest rates in Spain among other members (Pisani-Ferry and 
Posen, 2009: 9). As described in the literature review, some interpretations 
(Hopkins, 2013, 2015; Bastasín, 2012) have placed responsibility for the massive 
capital inflows that Spain experienced not on EMU´s institutional flaws but on the 
inability (or unwillingness) of Germany and other northern European states more 
responsibly to control their capital outflows and the lending of their banks. In any 
case, the large capital inflows set the stage for the remarkable increase in the 
country´s current account deficit and private debt, most of it externally financed. 
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By 2007 household debt had reached 86 per cent of GDP and total private debt 
(household, corporate and financial) 378 per cent of GDP (Haver Analytics, 2013). 
 
Restricting the flow of credit within a monetary union is not easy. Spain was 
caught in what Shoenmaker (2011) has called ‘the financial trilemma’: it is 
impossible to achieve financial stability, integration and national financial policies 
all at the same time. Yet, as officials in the Ministry of Economy and Finance have 
acknowledged,3 more could have been done, or at least attempted, to stem the 
growth of credit. Even if the Bank of Spain could not set interest rates, signals 
could have been sent to economic agents showing more forcefully the 
government´s concerns at excessive credit lending and its willingness to take 
measures to deal with the housing bubble. Measures such as the scrapping of tax 
credits for mortgage repayments, raising taxes to stem consumption or tightening 
financial regulation to nudge banks toward restricting credit, were all within the 
government´s reach. 
 
Given that the signs of a credit bubble were increasingly apparent and the 
economic consequences this could bring about were well known from experience, 
it is pertinent to ask why the government did not act. As a senior figure in the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance acknowledged:4 ‘we all knew that this massive 
expansion had to come to an end at some point and the failure to act was clearly 
reflective of a lack of political will’. From the interviews conducted a number of 
factors seem to stand out when trying to explain why. 
 
The first was the failure of Spanish policymakers to understand the implications of 
EMU. This is of course an issue that was not peculiar to Spain, yet in so far as it 
points to the technical ability or lack thereof of Spain´s decision-makers and their 
advisers, it can certainly be considered a key domestic political determinant. 
There was among economic policy-makers in Spain, as acknowledged by a senior 
member of the President´s economic team:5  
																																																								3	Research	interviews.	4	Research	interview.	5	Research	interview.	
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A lack of understanding of how debt and current account deficits would 
affect a member of the euro zone; some economists argued that, being part 
of EMU, current account deficits no longer mattered.  
 
The failure to appreciate the implications of EMU, which was in the words of this 
official ‘a once-in-a-lifetime monetary shock’, was behind both increased private 
indebtedness and the current account deficit. On the latter, often an early indicator 
of a crisis, policy-makers clearly relaxed their concern once Spain entered EMU.6 
A high-ranking official of the Ministry of Economy and Finance witnessed the 
prevalence of such sanguine attitudes among government officials:7 
 
In so far as they represented a lack of financing, current account deficits 
could not lead to a sudden stop, given our membership of EMU. In the 
same way that no one really knows what is the current account deficit 
between California and Florida, many thought that things in EMU would 
work the same way.  
 
Yet the crisis showed that that was obviously not the case. This relaxed attitude 
extended to the high level of private debt. While the increase in the indebtedness 
of individuals and corporations was impossible to miss, Spanish policy-makers 
were hoping,8  according to a senior official at the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, that this process was a natural consequence of EMU membership 
(Pisani-Ferry, 2011; Eichengreen, 2012) that markets would tolerate. As a result of 
being in a framework where the economies were more stable, so the thinking 
went, there were fewer macroeconomic risks. Interest rates were lower and it was 
therefore possible to borrow more. It is symptomatic of how pervasive this attitude 
was within the government that even Pedro Solbes, the Vice-President and 
Minister of Economy and Finance and former European Commission Vice-
President, did not foresee the implications of EMU. In his memoirs (Solbes, 2013: 
348) Mr Solbes accepts that at first he was not overly concerned by the first 
episodes of the subprime crisis in the US in the summer of 2007. Mr Solbes was, 
however, not alone in this attitude. A senior economic advisor to President 
Zapatero recalled:9  
 																																																								6	Research	interview.	7	Research	interview.	8	Research	interview.	9	Research	interview.	
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What we thought was that, in a financial system structured around the euro 
as a single currency, where capital is free to move and where there are 
excess savings, we would not experience a shortage of financing. We were 
relatively relaxed about our high current account deficit; we did not give it 
too much importance (…). The second question was: will we have access 
to credit? And we thought, well if there is an excess of savings in the euro 
zone and we have freedom of movement of capital, we should be able to. 
No one at that time thought there would be a renationalization of credit as 
we would start to see in 2008. 
 
These difficulties in assessing the potential implications of the credit bubble were 
behind a second political factor that seems to have acted as an obstacle to action:  
the disagreement and division within the cabinet between those who thought 
action was justified in order to avoid a hard landing, and those who thought such a 
hard landing was unlikely and was therefore not worth the political cost the 
measures would entail. Unsurprisingly, each party placed emphasis differently. 
Senior officials at the Ministry of Economy and Finance10 claim to have warned the 
President about the danger signals piling up and to have advised him to take 
precautionary measures. However, other ministers and senior political advisors to 
the President claim Mr Solbes and the Ministry´s team ignored the dangers of the 
credit boom and failed to take action. In any case it seems beyond doubt that the 
President was himself optimistic and little worried about a hard landing, a view 
confirmed by two of his closest advisors.11 
 
The attitude of the President towards the credit boom was also conditioned by 
electoral worries, as many of the measures required to reduce the credit flow 
would have been unpopular. One of the most effective, constantly pointed to by 
economists and international financial institutions, was the scrapping of the tax 
deduction for first-residence mortgage repayments. Yet such a measure was 
hugely unpopular with voters. PSOE party officials and the more political of 
cabinet ministers feared the negative reaction of public opinion and advised the 
President against it.12 		
																																																								10	Research	interviews.	11	Research	interviews.	12	Research	interviews.	
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The party was not the only organised interest to lobby against more determined 
action to stop the flow of easy credit. The financial sector was of course very 
active in this respect as well. The housing bubble and the consumption credit 
boom were significant sources of profit for the sector through the financing of 
construction companies, mortgages and consumer loans (Fernández-Villaverde et 
al., 2010; Carballo-Cruz, 2011). Furthermore, banks in Spain were already being 
subjected to counter-cyclical provisions, unique in the EU, so they were resistant 
to further measures that would affect their competitiveness. Executives in the 
financial sector knew that such a level of credit expansion was unsustainable but 
were of course keen to reap the profits for as long as possible. As explained in 
Chapter 1, the cajas were particularly vulnerable given their exposure to the 
housing sector. They discretely lobbied the government, and directly the 
President, advising against taking any serious measures, raising the risk of 
financial stability. Various members of government13 pointed to one person in 
particular as particularly influential in this respect: Mr Botin, the head of Banco de 
Santander, who had direct access to the President.	
 
The key to the effectiveness of such pressure was, various government sources 
recalled,14 the banks’ constant claim to have reached a point of no return and that 
trying to burst the credit bubble would be too destabilising. One of the ministers in 
Zapatero´s government put it in graphic terms when he asserted:15 ‘The banks 
have you in their claws, so to speak, and that certainly greatly conditioned our 
response’. This is why pressure came much more from the banks than from 
construction companies, he added: ‘construction companies could be allowed to 
fail, but the biggest risk was the collapse of part of the financial establishment’.  
 
Anecdotal evidence of this climate of looking the other way came, for example, 
when, as early as 2003, an article (Ayuso et al., 2003: 65) in the Boletín 
Económico del Banco de España, the Bank of Spain´s prestigious economics 
bulletin, warned that property prices could be overvalued by between 10 and 25 
per cent. The article was criticised by the Minister for the Economy in the Partido 																																																								13	Research	interviews.	14	Research	interviews.	15	Research	interview.	
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Popular (PP) conservative government, Rodrigo Rato, accusing the authors of 
exaggeration (De Barrón, 2011). Behind this criticism was, according to a senior 
Socialist figure,16 the pressure of the financial sector. To talk of a bubble at the 
time was, he says, ‘taboo’. 
 
Another area where more forceful government intervention would have been 
possible to deal with excessive credit was in improving the highly-politicised 
corporate governance of the cajas de ahorros (Royo, 2013; Fernández-Villaverde 
et al., 2013; Santos, 2014), the regional saving banks behind a lot of the 
excessive and bad-quality credit to housing and construction. But politics again 
proved an impossible hurdle, as all political parties were represented on the cajas’ 
boards and benefited from them, not least in ensuring that credit was available for 
popular projects that would grant political dividends, as a senior member of the 
PSOE government familiar with the workings of the cajas admitted.17  
 
The pressure on the cajas to provide credit came not only from politicians but also 
from unexpected quarters. An interviewee recalled 18  hearing executives from 
these institutions say, at the height of the bubble, that the Bank of Spain was 
encouraging them to provide more mortgages and loans to developers, as it was 
important for them to grow into bigger entities and the only way of extending their 
balance sheet was through lending to the property sector. Although it is true that 
the small size of many of these cajas and the fragmented nature of the sector was 
a constant worry to Spanish banking regulators, it is difficult to see that such a call 
to enlarge their balance sheets would have been allowed without political 
acquiescence at the highest level of the Bank of Spain, something that one of the 
highest ranking officials at the Ministry of Economy and Finance admitted.19  
 
In this and other respects, not least its failure to be more forceful in its regulatory 
and supervisory capacity, the role played by the Bank of Spain has been widely 
criticised, with one well-placed member of the President´s Office harbouring no 																																																								16	Research	interview.	17	Research	interview.	18	Research	interview.	19	Research	interview.	
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doubts that ‘the Bank of Spain fed the property bubble’.20 The ideological collusion 
of the Bank of Spain with the more orthodox elements of Spain´s economic and 
financial world has also been analysed in the previous chapter from a more 
academic angle (Fishman, 2012) and has been the subject of various journalistic 
investigations.21 Although it is clear with hindsight that a credit bubble did take 
shape under the surveillance of the Bank of Spain, and that its regulatory and 
supervisory capacities would have allowed the Bank to act more decisively to try 
to stop it, it is of course also true that monetary policy was no longer the 
responsibility of the Bank. Furthermore, the Bank was not alone in its 
complacency. Defending the actions of the Bank during this period, one of its most 
senior officials22 pointed to a May 2006 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report 
on the Spanish financial system (IMF, 2006) which argued that the Spanish 
financial system was well positioned to absorb any potential credit shock. 
 
In sum, it seems clear that it was not only the low interest rates or freedom of 
movement of capital associated with EMU that led to the credit boom in Spain. 
Domestic political factors contributed significantly to it too. A poor understanding 
of the workings of EMU, divisions within the cabinet as to the likelihood of a hard 
landing and the need for precautionary measures, an unwillingness to face up to 
the pressure of the financial sector to stem the flow of credit, the politically-driven 
supervisory failures at the Bank of Spain or the politicised governance of the cajas 
de ahorros, were all factors that were crucial in allowing the credit boom and 
current account deficit to develop. 
 
 
2.2.2. The housing bubble 
 
The worst effect of this massive credit expansion was the housing bubble that 
Spain experienced in the years before the crisis. According to data from the Bank 
of Spain (Banco de España, 2010), house prices grew at an annual rate of 13.7 
per cent between 2000 and 2003 and of over 8 per cent between 2004 and 2008, 																																																								20	Research	interview	21	See	for	example	De	Barrón,	2011.	22	Research	interview.	
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when investment in the housing sector grew over 7 per cent annually. 75 per cent 
of all funds obtained by the financial sector were channelled to the construction 
sector, and 52 per cent of all banking assets were in the property sector. Mortgage 
lending reached growth rates of 30 per cent and an average of 20 per cent 
between 2000 and 2007. The contribution of the construction sector to Gross 
Value Added (GVA) in 2007 amounted to 12.3 per cent of GDP.  
 
The causes of the housing bubble were briefly discussed in the previous chapter 
(Carballo-Cruz, 2011; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2013; Solé-Ollé and 
Viladecans-Marsal, 2013) and cannot here be covered in detail.  Suffice it to say 
that it was fed not only by cheap credit but also by the poor design of urban zoning 
laws, the decentralisation process (Daly and Zarco, 2015; Fernández-Villaverde et 
al., 2013), the role of the cajas (Ruiz et al., 2015) and counterproductive tax 
incentives. In any case, the possible overheating of the housing sector was 
already a matter of concern by the time the PSOE reached government in 2004. In 
fact, the need to tackle a possible housing bubble was included in the PSOE´s 
economic manifesto for the 2004 general election (PSOE, 2004). This concern 
continued during the first Socialist term, yet, as a senior official in the President´s 
Economic Office acknowledged,23  it was systematically ignored, an omission 
symptomatic of the lack of willingness to undertake the necessary reforms. In fact, 
within months of arriving in office, the government’s discourse had changed, 
according to a senior official in the President´s Economic Office,24 from one of 
‘puncturing the bubble’ to one of ‘riding the bubble to change the economic model’ 
and using the revenues the bubble generated to invest in research and 
development and other measures to shift the economy to higher valued-added 
sectors. The public warnings of senior officials, including the then Deputy Minister 
for Economy and Finance and later Governor of the Bank of Spain, Miguel Ángel 
Fernández Ordóñez,25 were systematically ignored.  
 
The question is then why a problem that experts both at home and abroad had 
had clearly identified (IMF, 2006) was not addressed. The potential electoral cost 																																																								23	Research	interview.	24	Research	interview.	25	Research	interviews.	
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of the unpopular measures required to puncture the bubble was a principal reason 
for the change in discourse and policy. Representatives of both the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance and the President´s Economic Office have acknowledged26 
that the scrapping of the tax deduction for primary residence mortgages, one of 
the most important measures that would have been required to address the 
housing bubble, was not implemented mainly because of the electoral cost it 
would have entailed. This potential electoral cost of acting to dampen the growth 
in the housing market was made worse by the fact that the construction bubble 
benefited, at least in the short term, a large segment of society. It did so in two 
ways. Firstly, through an increase in the stock of wealth, since Spain has a high 
house ownership ratio and thus the increase in value of housing assets benefitted 
a significant proportion of the population, either directly through the sale of 
property or at least through the ‘wealth effect’ of increased valuations. And, 
secondly, it boosted employment. According to figures provided by Valeriano 
Gómez, Minister of Labour in the last two years of the Socialist government,27 
employment in the construction sector went from 800,000 in 1984 to 2.7 million in 
2010, when, according to analysis conducted by his department, the ‘natural’ level 
of employment in the sector should have been no more than 900,000. In 2005 
Spain added, in just one year, 900,000 new employees, most of them in the 
construction sector. 
 
Another reason for the resistance to pricking the housing bubble was that the tax 
revenue created by the bubble was paying for the social policies the Socialists had 
pledged in their manifesto and securing a high level of support among the 
electorate. The increase in property construction and transactions generated 
significant tax revenue both at local level through property taxes and at national 
level through corporate tax on the profits of developers and construction firms and 
income tax on their hundreds of thousands of new employees (Fernández-
Villaverde and Rubio- Ramirez, 2009). As a high-ranking official in the Ministry of 
																																																								26	Research	interviews.	27	Research	interview.	
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Economy and Finance acknowledged:28 ‘in the short term the housing bubble was 
very good for the public coffers’. 
 
These positives side effects of the bubble led to an undue optimism and lack of 
caution among policy-makers that characterised the management of the economy 
in these pre-crisis years. This optimism was well on display when, as employment 
figures started to turn sour in the third quarter of 2007, members of the 
government would question the official figures claiming that the National Statistics 
Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística [INE]) was not properly capturing all 
existing employment.29 It was this optimism that also partially explains why the 
government did not to pursue a more counter-cyclical policy during the first term to 
try to reduce the housing bubble and instead adopted pro-cyclical measures such 
as the reduction in tax rates or, as a government minister self-critically 
acknowledges, the lowering of national insurance contributions. In his own 
words:30 
 
Economic policy-makers may sound prudent in their public statements, but 
are quite happy to see the public coffers fill up when employment and tax 
intakes are at record high. 
 
Even the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Bank of Spain, traditionally 
seen as the guarantors of financial stability and therefore inclined to greater 
prudence, shared this optimism, which was fuelled in part by absence at the time 
of any significant external pressure to act. Maybe because of the high economic 
growth rates, and beyond recommendations for some limited policy changes like 
that discussed above regarding the residential mortgage tax deduction, the 
housing bubble was not an issue to which, at that stage, international financial 
institutions attached great importance, claimed a senior member of the 
President´s Economic Office:31 
 
I don´t recall their ever raising any excessive concern about the bubble, 
probably because they thought the regulation of the Bank of Spain would 																																																								28	Research	interviews.	29	Research	interview.	30	Research	interview.	31	Research	interview.	
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eventually take care of it. Neither the international financial institutions, nor 
the regulators, nor the political establishment were conscious of the 
problems that the internal disequilibria could cause for Spain. It is true that 
international organisations were warning of the problems, but the problem 
was knowing when and how and with what probability these disequilibria 
would lead to disruptions in the macro financial stability.  
 
This attitude was supported by the Bank of Spain´s own analysis. The Bank´s 
January 2004 Economic Bulletin (Boletín Económico) ruled out the existence of a 
housing bubble and talked positively of the increase in the valuation of housing 
assets, as a factor contributing to the ‘overall healthy state’ of household finances 
(Banco de España, 2004: 13). Furthermore, according to Miguel Sebastian, one of 
the President´s closest economic advisors, the Bank´s top brass denied the 
existence of a housing bubble in a private conversation with Zapatero in 2004 
while the PSOE was still in opposition (Sebastian, 2015).  
 
Key in explaining the government´s behaviour was also the opposition of different 
political actors to dealing with the excesses of the construction bubble. One such 
source of pressure could be found in the regional governments, which had little 
interest in reducing the investments in infrastructure and construction that were 
generating so many local jobs, as confirmed by senior PSOE regional leaders.32 
The pressure of regional and local governments was especially strong from those 
controlled by the Socialists, given the important role that the PSOE structure has 
traditionally given to its regional leaders, according to an official at the President´s 
Economic Office who witnessed these pressures first-hand.33 Together the party 
and the cajas de ahorros served as the main mechanism of transmission for this 
pressure (Santos, 2014; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2013), given the highly 
politicised nature of their boards. 
 
Pressure on government officials was coming not only from the party or regional 
governments, but also from organised industry interests, most notably the banking 
sector. According to even one of the government´s most liberal ministers,34 banks 
were constantly warning government officials, in public and in private, that a 																																																								32	Research	interviews.	33	Research	interview.	34	Research	interview.	
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reduction in the price of property assets would gravely harm their balance sheets, 
which would cause them to close the flow of credit and lead to a recession. 
 
The fear of possible financial instability was compounded by the uncertainty about 
other disruptive effects that measures to prick the bubble could have. The impact 
of a sudden burst of the bubble on economic growth, employment and fiscal 
revenue was unknown but likely to be more than politicians without an urgent 
need to undertake them were willing to risk. As an official in the Bank of Spain and 
former senior member of the President´s Economic office acknowledged:35 ‘it is 
always more difficult to undertake serious reforms when times are good and it is 
difficult to predict the impact they will have’.  
 
In conclusion, domestic political factors seem to have played a crucial role in the 
management of the housing bubble before the crisis. The electoral cost of the 
unpopular measures that would have been required, the influence of the PSOE, 
especially its regional leaders, the lobbying efforts of the financial sector and the 
unwillingness to compromise the tax revenue it generated to pay for social 
services, were all factors that weighed heavily on the government and go a long 
way in explaining why no more forceful action was taken to dampen the 
overheated housing sector. As a leading figure of the PSOE´s economic team 
during this first term said when referring to the relevance of these political factors 
in not dealing more forcefully with the bubble:36 ‘Once in government you see all of 
the benefits and are painfully aware of the costs. And, if no one is pressuring to 
act on it, why pay the price?’ 
 
 
2.2.3. A dysfunctional labour market 
 
A third issue which merits attention is the labour market. Even before the advent 
of the crisis Spain had for decades suffered chronic unemployment problems.  
That in 2008, after twelve years of continuous growth, unemployment was, and 
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had never been below, 8 per cent is clearly symptomatic of a serious problem in 
Spain´s job market. While Spain´s economy, geared to low-productivity sectors 
and incapable of generating resilient employment in high-value added sectors, 
was certainly a key factor explaining the country´s dismal employment record, 
Spain´s labour laws and institutions were also deeply dysfunctional and conducive 
to chronically high unemployment. The collective bargaining system added to the 
labour market´s inefficiencies, as it was conducted at provincial/sectorial level, 
which was not efficient in capturing either micro or macroeconomic change, as 
well as feeding inflation, another of Spain´s chronic problems (Bentolila et al., 
2012a, 2012b; Jaumotte and Morsy, 2012). 
 
For these reasons reform of the labour market had been on the agenda of all 
governments since the transition to democracy and the goal of most of these 
policies was to increase flexibility. One of the most relevant changes was the 
promotion of temporary contracts (not part-time but full-time short-term contracts), 
which accounted for 33 per cent of all contracts between 1998 and 2007 in Spain, 
compared with just 15 per cent in the euro area (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2010a). As argued by Bentolila et al. 
(2012), creating a two-tier labour market was a politically viable way of introducing 
flexibility when resistance of unions was strong, a strategy followed by both 
conservative and progressive governments. This however created a dual labour 
market-place with a corrosive insider/outsider dynamic, where young new entrants 
to the job market were mainly employed through temporary contracts with very low 
levels of job security while older employees were protected by the high security 
provided by their indefinite contracts negotiated under the umbrella of collective 
bargaining. 
 
Despite the high flexibility expected from these policies, the reality is that the 
Spanish labour market performed very poorly both before and during the crisis. 
Bentolila et al. (2012) argue that although temporary contracts promote job 
creation during expansionary economic periods, they also increase job destruction 
during downward economic cycles. They concluded that a directly relevant part of 
the poor performance of the Spanish labour market can be explained by the 
generalised use of this kind of contract and in particular by the lax regulation on 
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their use and the large gap in firing costs between permanent and temporary 
workers (Betolila et al., 2012: 184). According to other analysts (Fishman, 2012; 
Dubin, 2012) this corrosive duality of the labour market is the result of the 
continuous push for liberalisation and flexibility that, despite its poor record, has 
characterised all attempts at labour market reform in the last three decades. 
According to this interpretation these reforms were driven as much by an 
economic rationale as by an ideological conservative bias.37  
 
In any case, failure to undertake a comprehensive reform of labour legislation was 
one of the main criticisms levelled at the government by most economists and it 
had, well before the crisis, become a sign to international investors of a lack of 
resolve to fix the country´s economic problems (Schmieding, 2008). There was 
therefore clear economic reason as well as pressure from international economic 
institutions and investors to act in this direction, and yet it did not happen.  There 
are a number of reasons for this. 
 
Firstly, there was a clear political commitment by the President and his Minister of 
Labour and close ally, Jesús Caldera, to protect workers´ rights against the 
liberalising labour reform demanded by the business community and international 
institutions, which advocated increasing flexibility and limiting labour rights. This 
commitment was grounded on three political factors: electoral considerations, 
ideological preferences and the strong ties of the PSOE and many members of 
the government, including the President himself, with the trade unions. These 
factors will be explored in more detail when the labour reform of 2010 is analysed 
in the next chapter but, in so far as they were already at play at this early stage, it 
is necessary at least to introduce them at this point. 
 
As explained above, Spanish labour legislation is characterised by high levels of 
protection for permanent contracts (Bentolila et al., 2012). Any attempt to reduce 
this protection, by lowering dismissal compensation or making it easier to dismiss 
employees, has traditionally been extremely toxic politically, leading in the past to 
																																																								37	Dubin	(2012)	has	discussed	in	detail	how	reforms	of	the	welfare	state	and	especially	the	labour	market	were	driven	by	‘neoliberal’	principles	and	policies.	
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various general strikes. It is therefore not surprising that the Socialist government 
did not entertain such a reform at a time when Spain had reached its lowest level 
of unemployment in recent history and there seemed to be little urgent need for it. 
 
Reluctance to increase the flexibility of the labour market by lowering workers’ 
rights was not only a political calculation for President Zapatero and Minister 
Caldera and his team at the Ministry of Labour, but also an ideological 
commitment. In interviews for this project, a senior official at the Ministry of 
Labour38 acknowledged that President Zapatero and Minister Caldera were both 
clear that, under their watch, worker´s rights were not going to be diminished: ‘it 
was a principle’. Of course, this ideological stand was backed by an analysis of 
the origins of Spain´s labour ills, that, contrary to what the business community 
and international investors argued, claimed that the problem of the labour market 
had less to do with dysfunctional norms than with a business culture that refused 
to behave in a responsible manner and abused the legislative framework resulting 
in an epidemic of temporary work that undermined productivity. 
 
In defence of this view one may note that public expenditure in unemployment 
subsidies barely fell despite the dramatic decrease in unemployment during the 
high-growth period, a fact that senior officials at the Ministry of Labour ascribed to 
the ‘spurious use of labour protection mechanisms’39 and abuse of the legislation 
by employers. As an example he cited the fact that up to 500,000 workers were, 
each week, ‘dismissed on a Friday and rehired on a Monday’40 in order to keep 
them under temporary contracts and benefit from public incentives. The 750,000 
illegally working immigrants the Ministry´s ‘immigration amnesty’ disclosed also 
evidenced, according to this view, employers’ lack of respect for labour legislation. 
This is the reason why the Socialist labour reform of 2006, which Mr Caldera 
sponsored, centred not on changing the labour legislation to deal with issues 
identified by the business community (rigidity, excessive dismissal costs and 
burdensome collective bargaining) but on trying to foster stable employment by 
trying to reduce the abuse of temporary employment mechanisms. That this 																																																								38	Research	interview.	39	Research	interview.	40	Research	interview.	
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interpretation of the ills of the labour market was not just an ideological stance 
taken personally by Mr Caldera but that it pervaded the Ministry of Labour, which 
was the department tasked with its reform, is given further support by his views’ 
being shared by Valeriano Gómez, Caldera´s deputy and himself Minister of 
Labour from 2010 to 2011.41 It is therefore clear that there was a nucleus of high 
government officials in ideological opposition to further liberalisation of the labour 
market who were close to the President and influential in blocking further reform. 
That successive labour ministers ascribed the labour market ills, not to regulation, 
but to a corrosive business culture is not only quite remarkable but also a clear 
example of the significant impact of ideological and personal political views in the 
government´s approach to reforming the labour market in the years leading up to 
the crisis. 
 
Needless to say, this view was well aligned with that of the trade unions. The 
extent and nature of their influence on government policy and, in particular, their 
ascendancy over President Zapatero, has long been a matter of dispute and will 
be considered more closely in the next chapter. Suffice it at this stage to say that a 
minister of labour in Zapatero´s government acknowledged42 that the trade unions 
‘did have a lot of influence’ in the government, but he saw this as a positive factor 
since, he claimed, trade unions had been a responsible partner in the past, 
helping achieve wage moderation when needed, a view that has been defended 
also by more impartial observers (Hopkins, 2015). According to various officials 
close to him,43 President Zapatero agreed with the perspective the unions and Mr 
Caldera took of the ills of the labour market and that reform should be orientated 
not to increase flexibility but to close loopholes and discourage employers’ abuse. 
And he did so, according to these accounts,44 out of both ‘ideological conviction 
and willingness to find consensus with the unions’. It was, one of these officials 
said, 45  a clear party line: ‘no one in the PSOE would have conceived of 
undertaking a labour reform without working with the unions’.  																																																								41	Research	interview.	42	Research	interview.	43	Research	interview.	44	Research	interview.	45	Research	interview.	
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This a priori political alliance with the trade unions had a rather less positive side 
in that it undermined the government´s negotiating power when it came to 
negotiation with trade unions and business representatives on the 2006 labour 
reform. As a senior official at the Ministry of Economy and Finance in charge of 
negotiating parts of this labour reform with the trade unions lamented:46  
 
From the moment the President publicly announced that he would not sign 
any reform that was not acceptable to the trade unions he quashed any 
negotiating power the Ministry of Economy could have. 
 
In sum, it is clear that the trade unions exercised significant influence on the 
government´s economic policy in the years before the crisis. In the words of this 
same government official,47 ‘nothing that was against the interest of the trade 
unions could be done’, perhaps an exaggerated claim but, no doubt, one that 
expressed a justified concern. 
 
The way that communications and decision-making on this issue were organised 
also seems to have played a key role in blocking any serious reform. Business 
representatives and trade unions would hold discussions under the guidance of 
the Secretary of State of Labour, Valeriano Gómez, who would then communicate 
with the Minister, Mr Caldera, whom in turn would inform the President. Mr Gómez 
was close to the trade unions. In fact, he was a member of the General Union of 
Workers (Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT)), the country´s second largest 
union and with traditionally strong links to the PSOE, which is likely to have given 
him a pro-union bias in the negotiations. The process was therefore one in which 
negotiation was controlled by the Ministry of Labour and where the Minister of 
Economy and Finance, Pedro Solbes, was left, with the acquiescence of the 
President, in a weakened position, as senior officials within his ministry have 
acknowledged.48 This sidestepping of Mr Solbes was further facilitated by the 
President´s Economic Office, which, under the leadership of Miguel Sebastián, the 
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President´s closest economic advisor and a personal friend, had become a 
channel through which economic affairs often reached the President directly. 
 
An episode in the early days of Zapatero´s government illustrates this dynamic. At 
the first cabinet meeting after election to office the Socialist government adopted a 
significant increase in the minimum wage. Mr Solbes has described in his 
memoirs (Solbes, 2013: 271) how he felt uncomfortable with this decision. Yet, 
what is less known, but was confirmed by two ministers interviewed for this project 
who were present in the cabinet meeting, is that there was actually a heated 
debate on the subject, and the President sided clearly with Mr Caldera in defence 
of a substantial rise. Such a public rebuttal of Mr Solbes in front of other cabinet 
colleagues can only be interpreted as a deliberate action by the President to 
undermine Mr Solbes’ authority in the labour market reform. 
 
In sum, it is clear that, whether from their influence or simply because of a shared 
ideological view of the relationship between business and workers, increasing 
labour market flexibility against the will of the trade unions was not a priority of the 
Socialist government in the years leading up to the crisis. There was a clear 
political logic that underpinned the government´s refusal to undertake a radical 
labour reform, caused by a combination of electoral motives, closeness to the 
trade unions and ideological preferences. 
 
 
2.2.4. Change of growth model 
 
The PSOE´s 2004 electoral manifesto (PSOE, 2004) had clearly identified Spain´s 
excesses during the growth period as well as the need for Spain to adopt a growth 
model based on higher productivity and competitiveness. Spain had suffered a 
sustained loss of competitiveness during these years (Galí, 2012), caused by poor 
productivity, whose growth between 1996 and 2008 was a mere 0.6 per cent 
compared with an EU average of 2.3 per cent (Statistical Office of the European 
Union, 2014), higher growth in unit labour costs (Spain´s costs growing by 6.7 per 
cent between 1996 and 2008, compared with an EU average of just 3.3 per cent 
(ibid.)) and high corporate profit margins (Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
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[BBVA], 2010). By 2007 there was clear evidence that Spain´s growth model, 
based on easy credit, a construction boom and concentrated on low productivity 
tasks and sectors, was becoming exhausted. The reforms needed to redress 
these imbalances were also well known. In the words of one of the closest 
advisors to President Zapatero, who played a leading role in the Socialist´s 
economic manifesto:49 ‘we were perfectly aware of these disequilibria and we 
knew what we had to do’. The question must then be why they were not 
addressed.  
 
The single most important factor was that many of these reforms were unpopular 
and the long period of growth removed any need for the first Zapatero government 
to act, as it had for the conservative government before it. There was little 
incentive to pay an electoral price for taking unpopular measures, such as the 
elimination of the mortgage tax deduction discussed earlier, when there was no 
imminent pressure to do so. As a high-ranking official who occupied senior posts 
at both the President´s Economic Office and the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
put it:50 ‘it is very difficult to adopt difficult reforms when there is no immediate 
reward and a high political cost’. The reluctance to assume the political cost of 
such unpopular measures was compounded by the fact that the 2004 Socialist 
electoral victory came as a surprise to many in the party, who did not expect to 
have to pay the political price of implementing these unpopular reforms. One of 
the leading figures in the PSOE´s economic team while in opposition put it 
bluntly:51 
 
We did not expect to win the 2004 election, so that allowed us to identify all 
the imbalances the economy was suffering from and incorporate in our 
manifestos the painful solutions; but we never expected to have to 
implement them.  
 
Another indication that political resistance was a crucial determinant of the 
government´s passive attitude towards its own reform agenda is the fact that other 
policies and reforms that had been included in the Socialist manifesto and which 
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did not entail a political cost were indeed pursued. Efforts to improve Spain´s 
dismal research and development and innovation record are a clear example. 
From 2004 to 2008 public investment in research and development grew from less 
than three billion euros to 7.6 billion euros (PSOE, 2008). But as a Director 
General in charge of innovation at the President´s Economic Office readily 
admitted:52  
 
The reason why there were indeed advances in increasing the budget for 
research and development and innovation is because there was the money 
to do so and it did not incur any political cost. 
 
A second factor that accounts for the little progress with these structural reforms 
was the influence and capture (Hopkins, 2015; Molinas, 2013; Ortega, 2014) of 
the policy decision-making process by the sectors that would have been affected. 
The construction sector is a clear example. A senior member of the President´s 
cabinet described the process in the following manner:53 
 
My thesis is that when we first joined the EU we asked for structural funds 
and we made good use of them because there was a lot of civil infrastructure 
we needed to build and we did. But then the funds kept coming and we put 
ourselves in the hands of the construction companies who have an interest in 
the continued provision of these funds and we ended up confusing means 
with ends; it was no longer about building needed infrastructure, which was a 
means for a more productive economy, but about feeding the construction 
companies as an end in itself. And why is this system perpetuated? Because 
construction is not only positive in terms of employment creating but also in 
terms of tax revenues, a lot of it going to regional governments and from 
there to financing political parties. 
 
Construction companies captured the decision-making process through insistence 
on the need not only to keep building housing and civil infrastructure but also in 
more novel sectors. The renewable energy sector, for example, became a new 
activity thorough which construction firms secured vast sums from the state and, 
in turn, financed political parties illegally (Hernández and Romero, 2013). This was 
made easier by Spain’s decentralized political and administrative system 
(Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2013). Most illegal financing episodes have taken 
place at regional and local level, where the strict controls that were established for 																																																								52	Research	interview.	53	Research	interviews.	
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the central government after the wave of corruption scandals in the early nineties 
are not in place. 
 
The high degree of economic management that decentralisation bestowed upon 
regional governments was also key in feeding the excessive investment in 
infrastructure as opposed to research and development or other more productive 
sectors. One of the leading officials in the government´s drive to foster research 
and development during the first Socialist term recalled54 that regional government 
officials would always demand more investment in physical infrastructure and be 
sceptical of and reluctant to have research and development investment instead:  
 
They would always ask: “how many immediate jobs will this generate, how 
much income for my budget?” When we answered that the short-term 
returns were less but that that when the proposed research and 
development projects grew they would provide stable and high quality jobs 
and income, they were often sceptical and uninterested. 
 
This attitude was deeply entrenched, even after the crisis hit. A minister with an 
economic portfolio during Zapatero´s second term recalled55 that the President 
kept telling him how, in his visits to the regions, regional party bosses never asked 
for investment in research and development and innovation and were only 
interested in getting investment related to physical infrastructure, especially the 
high speed train.  
 
Domestic political factors such as the decentralised nature of the Spanish political 
system and the collusion of construction firms and government, especially at local 
and regional level, seem, in sum, to be have been at the heart of this excessive 
investment in infrastructure. The steady flow of EU structural and cohesion funds 
of course also played a role. Yet this explanation has its limitations, as the EU 
funds represented at most a net annual financing surplus of no more than 1.2 or 
1.3 per cent of Spain´s GDP and yet at the height of the bubble construction 
represented 16 per cent of GDP.56 
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The personal characteristics and judgement of the decision-makers, not least the 
two most important figures at this time, President Zapatero and Vice-President 
and Minister of Economy and Finance Pedro Solbes, are one final factor that 
seems to have played an important role in the failure to address Spain´s economic 
shortcomings and change the growth model in the years preceding the crisis. In 
the case of the latter, despite his deft managing of the country´s finances (in 2007 
he achieved a budget surplus of two per cent of GDP and brought the public debt 
to a historically low of 37 per cent), his conservative approach is deemed by many 
to have stood in the way of the bold reforms Spain needed. A senior Spanish 
political figure who has occupied important positions in both the Spanish 
government and EU institutions was in no doubt that this helps explain the actions 
of Vice-President Solbes.57 According to his analysis, with which other former 
government officials agreed,58 Solbes had always been one for whom the priorities 
were budgetary and fiscal policy; a stronger economic policy hat, which is what 
enacting the much-needed structural reforms would have required, was not 
something he was characterized by. This approach was already evident during 
Solbes´ tenure in the European Commission. When Mr Solbes abandoned his 
post as European Commissioner to join the Spanish government, the DG for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, which had been under Solbes’ supervision was, 
according sources in the Commission,59 chiefly concerned with budget oversight 
and had time and resources for little else. This attitude continued during his tenure 
in the Spanish government, according to this same source:60  
 
In the years up to the crisis I would sometimes meet Spanish officials, 
including Solbes, and show them with concern our analysis pointing to the 
divergence in Spanish unit labour costs, loss of competitiveness, higher 
structural inflation, and other disequilibria. I would explain that, in the 
absence of a much tighter fiscal policy to achieve a higher primary surplus, 
and given that the ECB´s monetary policy was fuelling Spain’s housing 
bubble, it was essential to undertake structural reforms to change the 
growth pattern. But this would fall on deaf ears. The only thing they cared 
about was balancing the books, not serious reform. And this certainly 
influenced the government´s reaction, as Solbes was at the time the 
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economic strongman in the government, and he imposed his insistence on 
budgetary issues, fiscal discipline and achieving a budget surplus. 
 
President Zapatero´s personality has also been blamed for the failure to adopt 
more audacious reform during the first term. His perennial optimism, which would 
be derided during the worse moments of the crisis, was already at this early stage 
blamed for a failure to acknowledge the depth of the crisis. Others who have 
worked closely with him for years61 have criticised his short-termism, his tendency 
to choose politically divisive issues that would allow him to keep the opposition in 
check rather than focus on necessary economic reforms, or a lack of economic 
knowledge and acumen that prevented him from understanding the gravity of the 
problems Spain faced. In reference to one of the most controversial comments 
made by the President in the first term, claiming that low taxation was a left-wing 
objective, one of Spain´s leading economic commentators, close to the PSOE, 
and an insider in economic policy circles for over twenty years, said:62 
 
Why does he say such an odd thing as ‘lowering taxes is progressive’? I 
think because first he is imbued with the Washington Consensus thinking as 
a result of certain insecurity when it comes to the understanding of economic 
affairs and second because he wants to project an image of modernity and 
even audacity. But he does it in a manner that is completely counter-
productive for what was needed at the time was to raise taxes to cool off the 
economy. I think there is also a bit of narcissism of looking at the mirror and 
wanting to be provocative and admired. This is also valued in politics and he 
knows it. 
 
In a context in which prices, interest rates and inflation were all distorted and not 
useful as danger signals, and in which there was no immediate need to act, 
leadership in taking the decisive step to reform would have been essential. And in 
this case, in the words of a senior Spanish socialist:63 ‘the character of the leaders 
was not there’. 
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2.3. Conclusion 
 
It is clear that an attitude of certain complacency had come to dominate the 
management of the economy under the Zapatero administration in the period 
leading up to the crisis and prevented action to deal with the economy´s 
worsening imbalances. This attitude was to a significant extent driven by domestic 
political factors and it would come to shape the management of the crisis itself 
when, in 2007, the global financial crisis started to take shape. These domestic 
political factors affected the management of the various imbalances in different 
ways. 
 
The electoral cost of unpopular measures was critical in the government´s 
decision not to pursue reforms identified in its electoral manifesto to deal with the 
housing bubble, most notably the scrapping of the tax deduction for first-residence 
mortgages. It was also behind the unwillingness to take measures to try to stem 
the credit flow and consumption, such as stricter bank regulation or increased 
taxes on loans and consumption, that could have helped ameliorate the credit 
boom and associated current account deficit. 
 
Party politics was also critical. The influence of the regional PSOE leaders was 
key in allowing the construction bubble, as construction became an increasingly 
important source of funding for local governments, developing a perverse 
incentive to keep feeding the bubble. Similarly, the benefit that regional party 
representatives derived from their presence on the cajas de ahorros’ boards was a 
key factor in preventing reform of the politicised governance of these institutions, 
which fuelled the ineffective lending behind the construction and housing bubbles. 
Finally, there was an unwillingness to compromise the tax revenues generated by 
these bubbles and which paid for the social services upon which the government´s 
popularity rested to a significant degree. All of these factors weighed heavily on 
the government and go a long way in explaining why no more forceful action was 
taken to dampen the overheated construction and housing sectors. 
 
The highly decentralised nature of the Spanish public administration was also an 
important factor. The high levels of autonomy and resources that decentralisation 
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bestowed upon regional governments were key in feeding the excessive 
investment in infrastructure that characterized this period, as it generated local 
jobs and tax revenues. Decentralization was also a factor that fuelled the highly 
political nature of the governance of the cajas.  
 
Ideological opposition to further liberalisation of the labour market that dominated 
Socialist thinking was a significant obstacle to necessary labour reform. There was 
a clear political commitment by the President and his Minister of Labour and close 
ally, Jesus Caldera, to protect workers´ rights against the liberalising labour reform 
demanded by the business community and international institutions, which 
advocated increasing flexibility and decreasing labour rights. This commitment 
was grounded on strong ideological preferences among senior government 
members, not least the President himself.  
 
Differing views as to the likelihood of a hard landing prevented more forceful 
action that could have helped stem the credit boom and associated housing 
bubble, a sign that divisions within the cabinet also played a critical role. The 
divisions between officials in the Ministry of Labour, closer to the position of the 
trade unions, and in the Ministry of the Economy and the President´s Economic 
Office also prevented more forceful action to reform the labour market. 
 
The financial sector successfully lobbied the government and the Bank of Spain 
against more stringent regulation that could have slowed the pace of the credit 
boom that fuelled the housing and construction bubble, offering a clear example of 
how the pressure of organised interests was also critical. Trade unions were also 
influential in preventing more forceful labour reform. Whether by virtue of their 
influence or simply because of a shared ideological view on the relationship 
between business and workers, increasing labour market flexibility against the will 
of the trade unions was not a priority of the Socialist government in the years up to 
the crisis. The influence and capture of the policy decision-making process by the 
sectors that would have been affected by structural reform also explains why the 
much needed change in growth model did not take place during the high growth 
years when it would have been more economically feasible. 
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Finally, the personal characteristics of the leaders were also behind the failure to 
address Spain´s economic shortcomings in the years prior to the crisis. Pedro 
Solbes´ conservative approach stood in the way of the bold reforms that Spain 
needed and the attitude of the President, always optimistic, consensus-driven and 
temperamentally uncomfortable with fighting the trade unions that had helped him 
to power, also precluded more determined action. 	
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Chapter 3. From downplay to reaction   
(Mid 2007 to May 2010) 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
It was in this attitude of complacency and politically driven resistance to adopting 
difficult measures that Spanish decision-makers confronted the early stages of the 
crisis in the summer of 2007. During the following months, even when some 
warning signs such as the unemployment figures started to signal a deteriorating 
domestic situation, the government showed a reluctance to acknowledge the 
impending crisis. Events would, however, eventually force it to react, even if only 
gradually.  
 
This first stage of the management of the crisis had various distinct phases. The 
first, once the first signals of distress had come from the US in the summer of 
2007, was to deny that there was a crisis at all and to argue that the difficulties 
were confined to the US, would not affect Spain and that, at most, there would be 
a temporary but moderate growth glitch. The second stage started in September 
2008, with the advent of the post-Lehman Brothers global financial crisis and 
acceptance that the crisis had hit Spain, but blaming international factors for 
Spain´s woes, rather than anything to do with Spain´s own economic disequilibria 
and insisting that the downturn would be short and moderate. This response took 
the form, as in most others developed economies, of actions to prop up the 
financial sector and a substantial fiscal stimulus. Finally, from mid 2009 came the 
third stage, with the realisation that the crisis was deeper than had been expected, 
that Spain had its own problems and remedial action was necessary, leading to 
some early reforms.  
 
The following sections present an analytical chronicle of this evolution of the 
management of this crisis. The narrative uses as its anchor points key policy 
decisions, considering the role played by domestic political factors, but also 
exploring alternative possible explanations based on external constraints. 
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3.2. Downplay (mid 2007 to October 2008) 
 
There is no exact date for the beginning of the crisis in Spain. The first warning 
signs came, as in the rest of the world, in August 2007, with the crash of the 
mortgage backed securities (MBS) market in the US and the associated 
turbulence in the international credit markets. That autumn saw the first indicators 
of a deteriorating economic situation in Spain, especially in the employment 
figures, which saw a slower rate of growth than in third quarter, with 
unemployment increasing by over 30,000 to 8,03 per cent (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística [INE], 2008). The situation would deteriorate quite rapidly over the 
following months. From the second quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2008 
unemployment increased by over 620,000 and the unemployment rate increased 
from 7.95 per cent to 10.44 per cent. The first signs of trouble in the housing 
sector also became apparent with the collapse in July 2008 of Martinsa-Fadesa, 
one of the largest construction firms in the country. 
 
Despite this evidence of a worsening economic situation, the government did little 
to respond to it. For example, as early as August 2007 a senior member of the 
President´s Office1 had expressed his worries about a serious potential slowdown 
to Vice-President Solbes, only to be told that the crisis was unlikely to have a 
serious impact on Spain and that, although there was likely to be a slowdown, it 
would be moderate. Mr Solbes, according to this source, was of the view that it 
was an American problem, arguing that it emanated from the nature of the 
American mortgage market and that the Spanish mortgage market was completely 
different and was unlikely to be affected. Various other ministers who spoke with 
Mr Solbes at the time agreed with this description of events.2 One categorically 
affirmed:3 ‘neither Solbes nor Fernández Ordóñez [Governor of the Bank of Spain] 
ever mentioned before 2008 the possibility of a serious crisis’. In fact, a high-
ranking member of government with senior responsibilities at the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance has acknowledged that they underestimated the depth of 
																																																								1	Research	interview.	2	Research	interviews.	3	Research	interview.	
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the crisis: 4 ´We knew there would be a slowdown, but no one expected the crisis 
to have the depth and length it eventually had’. 
 
Yet Mr Solbes was not alone in his downplaying of the economic perils the country 
was facing. The President´s Economic Office was also slow to acknowledge the 
oncoming crisis. Its Director, Miguel Sebastian, was known to be the economic 
advisor closest to the President and, according to numerous accounts, the most 
influential in shaping his opinion, and thus played a key role in downplaying the 
gravity of the situation in its early stages. A senior official in the President´s Office 
and also one of his closest political advisors recalled5 that they would express 
their concerns to the President about the slowdown and he would repeatedly refer 
to Mr Sebastian to counter their worries. A senior figure in the President´s 
Economic Office, also close to the President, admitted during interview6 that his 
department underestimated the consequences the American subprime crisis could 
have in Spain, referring to factors such as the resilience of consumption as 
evidence that the Spanish economy did not face any serious difficulty. However, 
he claimed7 that their failing in this respect was not as marked as that of Mr 
Solbes: ‘The last person to accept that there was a crisis was Solbes’. 
 
The Ministry of Labour, as one of its senior officials has admitted8, also dismissed 
the worsening employment figures as indicative of nothing more than a temporary 
slowdown after years of high employment growth, without giving due consideration 
to the structural nature of the worsening employment situation, obviously tied to 
the dramatic slowing of the construction sector. President Zapatero himself shared 
this attitude of denial. In a meeting of the Spanish Socialist Workers´ Party 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español [PSOE]) executive committee in early 2008 to 
prepare the strategy for the forthcoming general election, the issue of the crisis 
was raised, but the President had, according to a senior official present,9 an 
‘almost virulent reaction’, claiming that it was all an artificial creation and that the 																																																								4	Research	interview.	5	Research	interview.	6	Research	interview.	7	Research	interview.	8	Research	interview.	9	Research	interview.	
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best proof of this was that Spain was going to close 2007 with the best economic 
indicators in its recent history.  
 
The question of why the government did not react more swiftly when the first signs 
of the slowdown became apparent in late 2007 is difficult to answer but it is clear 
that external constraints cannot properly account for it. While it is true that at this 
point one of the external factors that would later prove to be one of the most 
forceful constraints – bond market pressure – was not in play, by this stage 
international actors were, nonetheless, starting to express their concern at the lack 
of reaction by the government. For example, in the review of the National Reform 
Plan conducted by the European Commission (2007: 61) in December 2007, 
officials warned about the various disequilibria developing in Spain, and 
specifically about the high current account deficit (already 8.5 per cent) and the 
low levels of productivity and competitiveness. Such international pressure would 
actually have provided a degree of cover for the government to adopt some of the 
unpopular measures it had committed to taking in its manifesto. Blaming difficult 
decisions on the European Union (EU) has after all been a recurrent strategy for 
national governments across Europe. And yet the government did not adopt such 
reforms. Furthermore, even if these imbalances were not addressed, an 
acknowledgement of the crisis, and of its potential seriousness, was well within 
the government´s competence. And yet the government chose to downplay it. If 
external constraints were not behind the downplaying of the crisis, what other 
factors explain the government´s attitude? A careful analysis of this stage of the 
crisis points to a number of key domestic political factors that can at least partially 
explain it.  
 
Electoral considerations were a first critical factor that influenced the 
government´s reluctance to accept the gravity of the crisis. In March 2008 the 
Socialist government faced a general election and its economic record until just a 
few months before had been enviable: four years of high growth that had led to 
the lowest unemployment figures and the first fiscal surplus in the country’s recent 
history. The PSOE, consequently, fought that campaign on the key message of its 
ability to run the economy and any acknowledgement of serious economic 
problems would have undermined that message. 
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The electoral campaign also witnessed some electorally motivated policy 
decisions that would come to shape the international perception of how the 
government managed the crisis and the reaction of investors to it. One of the most 
controversial was the 400-euro income tax credit, announced by Zapatero during 
the campaign, and justified as a way to stimulate consumption and demand but 
obviously politically motivated. Not only was it popular but it also helped the 
government counter opposition from other left-leaning parties which, pointing to 
that year´s budget surplus, demanded an increase in public expenditure to finance 
improved social services.10 The tax credit was adopted despite at least one senior 
minister expressing privately to the President his opposition to this measure.11 A 
second measure with clear electoral considerations in mind was the scrapping of 
the impuesto de patrimonio, or wealth tax, announced during the electoral 
campaign and finally enacted in April 2008. When asked during research interview 
about economic measures that had been politically motivated, a senior member of 
the President´s Office responded: ‘obviously, the scrapping of the wealth tax’.12 
And in July of the previous year the government had announced another major 
spending initiative, a 2,500-euro benefit for each child born. Together, these 
decisions painted a picture of fiscal laxity in the face of a deteriorating economic 
situation and of a government unwilling to take difficult decisions to contain public 
spending that was to haunt the government during the whole management of the 
crisis. As a former Spanish Socialist government minister in a senior post in the 
European Commission at the time conceded, the perception in Brussels was that 
the government was ‘in denial’.13  
 
The imminence of the general election also predisposed President Zapatero, 
according to sources in the President´s Office, 14  to believe information that 
allowed him to confirm his preferred view that the crisis would be short, like the 
dot.com crisis of the late 1990s, as it would of course have been extremely risky to 
																																																								10	Research	interviews.	11	Research	interview.	12	Research	interview.	13	Research	interview.	14	Research	interview.	
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call the elections in the midst of a serious crisis.15 Finally, the voices of key people 
in the financial sector suggesting that, as described in the previous section, the 
crisis would be a short one and no drastic measures were necessary were also 
instrumental in promoting this attitude of denial at this early stage, according to 
sources in the President´s Office that acted as an informal channel of 
communication with financial executives.16 In sum, electoral considerations seem 
to have been at play, not only in policy decisions, but also in a certain attitude of 
denial by the President. As a senior official in the Bank of Spain, close to the 
PSOE, put it:17 
 
Zapatero´s error is not that he recognised the existence of the crisis too 
late, but rather that he convinced himself, because it was in his interest, 
that Spain´s problems were mainly caused by the international financial 
crisis and he did not want to accept that there was a domestic problem, 
what I call the national crisis, that we would have had to face even if we 
had not had an international crisis. He wanted to believe, and he projected 
to the public, that once the international crisis had resolved itself, the 
Spanish economy would also recover. 
 
The PSOE went on to win the March 2008 election. The victory was, however, 
bittersweet, as the party again fell short of an absolute majority. Securing sufficient 
support in Parliament to be reappointed required President Zapatero to build a 
new coalition, a task that would prove to be another decisive issue in the 
management of the crisis.18 During its first term the PSOE had been able to rely 
on the support of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a left-wing 
nationalist Catalonian party, for most of its progressive social policies. By the end 
of the four-year term, however, this partnership had ended acrimoniously as a 
result of tensions over the negotiation of Catalonia´s new statute of autonomy. 
The PSOE had to look for parliamentary support in Convergencia i Unió (CIU) and 
Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), the conservative nationalist Catalonian and 
Basque parties respectively. Backing for its policies was much harder to obtain 
with them, since they were ideologically not aligned with the PSOE and the 
concessions demanded were usually for more self-government. As a senior official 																																																								15	Research	interview.	16	Research	interviews.	17	Research	interview.	18	For	an	extensive	academic	discussion	see	Field,	2013,	and	Calvo,	2014.	
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in the President´s Office acknowledged,19  this was increasingly difficult after 
Catalonian autonomy had become one of the most divisive issues of the first term. 
 
The election´s victory honeymoon was short-lived, as it immediately became clear 
that economic clouds were gathering. Surprisingly, the attitude of the government 
did not change much. Some initial measures were taken: a plan to encourage 
hiring with subsidies to employers and a package of credit guarantees in support 
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in April; an austerity package 
concentrated on the freezing of compensation for senior public officials and a set 
of measures to foster business activity with initiatives such as the elimination of 
red tape in the establishment of new firms in June; and a plan to subsidize the car 
replacements in July. Yet, despite these measures, the public pronouncements of 
the President and his economic team kept downplaying the nature and impact of 
the crisis, even though economic indicators, especially those on unemployment, 
were deteriorating rapidly. The third quarter of 2008 saw an increase in the 
unemployed of over 217,000 from the previous quarter and the unemployment 
rate climbing to 11,3 per cent, from 10.4 per cent (INE, 2008).  
 
One of the most controversial aspects of the early stages of the crisis was the 
President’s refusal to utter the word ‘crisis’, which gave the impression of being in 
denial about the quickly deteriorating economy. External constraints, financial or 
institutional, were clearly no obstacle to acknowledging Spain´s vulnerability to a 
crisis, given its dependence on foreign credit. In fact, it would have gone some 
way to addressing the criticisms that, as described above, Spain was starting to 
hear from its EU partners and international investors for not accepting the depth of 
the crisis. While the reason for not admitting it before the election might have been 
understandable from a political perspective, many, even in his own ranks, grew 
increasingly frustrated at his refusal to face reality and call the crisis by its name 
even after the elections, as confirmed by senior members of his government and 
his political staff.20 Yet, on closer examination, a number of factors help explain 
why the President, and his government, adopted this attitude. 
																																																								19	Research	interview.	20	Research	interviews.	
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A first reason was the need to maintain credibility with the electorate. The PSOE 
had just won an election on the assurance of economic competence and any 
acceptance of a serious crisis would have undermined this message. The 
government was assisted by the fact that, even in the first half of 2008, most 
analyses still predicted a decent level of GDP growth for Spain. In May 2008 the 
consensus forecast of Funcas (2008), a collection of economic indicators from a 
number of respected sources, was still a 2.2 per cent GDP growth for 2008 and 
1.7 per cent for 2009. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued similar up-
beat predictions and, while it revised them downwards throughout the year, in its 
April outlook it still estimated a 1.8 per cent growth for 2008 and 1.7 per cent 
growth for 2009 (IMF, 2008). The Bank of Spain was even more optimistic. In April 
2008 it estimated that growth would be 2.4 per cent in 2008 and 2.1 per cent in 
2009. 
 
A second reason was persistent disagreement, most noticeably between the 
President´s Office and Economic Office, the Bank of Spain, the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance and other ministries with economic responsibilities, such as 
the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. These differences in 
opinion were profound, especially when it came to the possible depth and length 
of the crisis. The perception that Mr Solbes and his team at the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance were complacent and underestimated the potential gravity 
of the crisis was widely shared among members of the government interviewed for 
this dissertation21. Yet Mr Solbes was not alone in this nonchalant attitude to the 
dangers of the storm that was brewing across the Atlantic. The Bank of Spain, 
another key actor that could have sent early warning signals, also failed to do so 
well into 2008, allowing the President and the Ministry of Economy and Finance to 
maintain their optimistic discourse. Its 2008 annual report, published in early 2009, 
predicted gradual recovery ‘towards the end of 2009 or in 2010’ (Banco de 
España, 2009: 22). 
 
																																																								21	Research	interviews.	
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Various government officials, including Mr Solbes, have stressed the role also of 
the President´s Economic Office in leading the President to underestimate the 
crisis during this period. While admitting that he himself did not recognise the 
depth of the crisis even at this stage (Solbes, 2013: 350), Mr Solbes has 
acknowledged that he faced a constant struggle to convince other members of the 
government, not least the President and the Economic Office, of the need to 
contain public spending in the good times in order to have fiscal room for 
manoeuvre if and when the crisis hit. A top official at the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance with direct access to the President confirmed this view: 
 
I tried to instil in him [President Zapatero] an understanding that during the 
last few years the country had experienced the largest fluctuation in capital 
distribution in its history and a lot of that capital had gone to the 
construction industry and we had built houses, highways and airports that 
were completely useless. Although I was very worried at the time, my 
perception always was the President did not share my concerns and my 
sense of urgency and I probably failed to transmit to him the gravity and 
urgency of the situation.  
 
This points to an important reason why these divisions in the cabinet were 
important: they were a crucial factor in not responding more swiftly or forcefully in 
the early stages of the crisis. Government officials across various departments22 
are highly critical of the Ministry of Economy and Finance for blocking any attempt 
to take serious steps and undertake reform because it did not accept the 
dimension of the crisis even after the March 2008 general election. A clear 
example of this came with the Ministry´s reluctance to accept that credit was 
already becoming increasingly difficult to obtain for many businesses during the 
second half of 2008. A revealing anecdote related to events in the summer of 
2008 substantiates this criticism. The Ministry of Industry and Trade had created 
the Plan Soria, a plan to encourage industrial projects in the province of Soria 
where the government would guarantee loan repayments. On a trip the region the 
Minister, Miguel Sebastián, found out that not a single project had been able to 
secure finance from the banks. He was incensed as, with government guarantee, 
they were almost fail-safe. But it was proof that the banks were just not lending, 
even when the projects were guaranteed by the state. Yet, when he attended the 																																																								22	Research	interviews.	
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Inter-ministerial Commission for Economic Affairs later that week, the officials from 
the Ministry of Economy Finance, including Mr Solbes, insisted that credit was 
available and difficulties in obtaining it were related to the quality of the demand. 
According to sources familiar with the event23 this episode was an inflection point, 
as it led President Zapatero to realise that the credit crisis was far deeper than he 
thought and that ‘Solbes was not taking action, that he was overwhelmed or 
paralysed’. Contrary to this view, Mr Solbes has claimed in his memoirs (Solbes, 
2013) that he was well aware of the dangers the crisis posed, had an action plan, 
and it was the President´s refusal to heed his advice that led to his resignation. 
 
This lack of action was not only the result of internal division within the 
government but also of an ineffective decision-making process. A high-ranking 
official in the President´s Office, who was closely involved in many of the 
President´s important decisions,24 claimed that Zapatero would often base his 
relaxed views of the gravity of the crisis on anecdotal evidence provided by close 
confidants. The poor quality of advice often received from economists or financial 
experts who clearly were also unable to predict the crisis or its implications added 
to the problem. The issue of the poor reliability of experts’ advice is of course not 
confined to Spain, but it certainly offered the President a perfect cover for his 
unconcerned stand. A senior member of the President´s Office, who was often 
present when such advice was offered to the President, complained:25 
 
If the government seeks counsel from technical experts and what it gets are 
absolutely contradictory inputs it really defeats any purpose such advice 
may have and one cannot expect the government actually to be ahead in 
terms of its decisions if not even the experts can agree on what the 
situation is.  
 
The unreliability of the advice received was compounded by another important 
factor: that President Zapatero, like every other former Spanish President, had no 
previous formal training in economics. According to some people close to the 
President, this was an important factor in his inability to deal with the crisis more 
effectively. As one of the senior figures in charge of economic affairs for the PSOE 																																																								23	Research	interview.	24	Research	interview.	25	Research	interview.	
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while in opposition and who interacted closely with Zapatero put it:26  ‘in my 
experience, the subject intimidates politicians with no training in economics. 
Zapatero was no exception’. Furthermore, by mid 2008, this official recalled,27 
Zapatero was beginning to realise that the issue that had allowed him to ride his 
first term successfully, management of the economy, was turning sour and, while 
he had seen himself perfectly capable of dealing with issues such as negotiations 
with the nationalists or social policies, felt far less confident in this realm. 
 
One final political factor contributed to the President´s attitude of downplaying the 
crisis: the fear that acceptance of it would undermine confidence among 
consumers and investors and make the crisis a self-fulfilling prophecy. Rodríguez 
Zapatero  (2013: 201) clearly acknowledged in his memoirs that this played a key 
role in his underestimating of the crisis and other government officials interviewed 
for this project shared this view.28 
 
However, by mid 2008 the President was under heavy pressure to accept Spain´s 
economic difficulties and utter in public the word ‘crisis’, as the opposition had 
become effective in painting a picture of a government that was deceiving public 
opinion and blind to evident fact. The number of voters who said they had voted 
for the PSOE in the general elections and would do so again dropped by 15 
percentage points in barely thee months following the elections (Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas [CIS], 2008). The electorate was losing trust in the 
government´s ability to manage the economy and witnessed the obvious absence 
of a plan to deal with the crisis, despite the government´s attempt to blame the 
situation on the global financial markets.29 The President himself would come to 
acknowledge, two years later, that he had been too late in publicly accepting the 
existence of the crisis (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013). Finally, in June the President 
admitted that growth would be under 2 per cent but it would not be until July 2008 
that he would finally use the word crisis during a TV interview. 																																																								26	Research	interview.	27	Research	interview.	28	Research	interviews.	29	For	an	extensive	discussion	of	why	it	made	sense	to	do	so	see	Fernández-Albertos,	2013.	
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In sum, the early stages of the crisis, before October 2008, were characterised by 
downplaying the effect that the international crisis could have in Spain, an attitude 
that would come to shape the management of the crisis all along. As the evidence 
provided above indicates, domestic political factors played a key role in this 
dynamic. These were of course not the only factors shaping the response: 
external constraints also played a role. Yet the management of the crisis in this 
early period cannot be understood without reference to domestic political factors. 
Electoral considerations forced the President to maintain an excessively optimistic 
message and project an image of denial. The absence of a parliamentary majority 
and of reliable coalition partners hindered more decisive action. Disagreement in 
the cabinet as to the gravity of the crisis delayed the response, as did an 
ineffective decision-making process, a problem to which the President’s lack of 
knowledge and experience of economics contributed. 
 
 
3.3. Reaction: financial sector support and stimulus (September 2008 to mid 
2009) 
 
While by the fall of 2008 the government had admitted the crisis and the 
seriousness of the downturn, its strategy was still very much that of presenting it 
as a moderate downturn caused by the international credit crunch. Yet attempts to 
downplay the importance of the crisis were rendered useless by the implosion of 
the financial markets in September 2008, which saw all the pressures that had 
been building over the international financial system come to a climax. The 
collapse of various financial institutions in the US and the equivalent of a run on 
the money market funds led the global financial system, in the words of the then 
head of the IMF, to ‘the brink of a systemic meltdown’ (British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), 2008).  
 
The virulence of the global markets´ crash and the credit crunch that ensued took 
the Spanish government by surprise and awoke fears for liquidity in the Spanish 
financial system. The stock market suffered serious losses, dropping by over 9 per 
cent on a single day on 10 October and by over 21 per cent in that week. Banks 
were particularly hard hit, with even the two largest, Banco de Santander and 
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Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), dropping both by 12 per cent on the 
same day and losing, by the end of the week, around a quarter of their market 
capitalisation (26.8 per cent BBVA and 24.1 Banco de Santander) (Invertia, 2016). 
The collapse in their market value was a sign of the difficulties the sector was 
facing. As in the rest of the euro zone and the US, interbank credit was quickly 
drying up and repo rates substantially increasing for Spanish banks (Hordahl and 
King, 2008; Ayuso, 2013). The psychological impact created by the collapse in the 
markets and the fear of bank runs forced the government to react. The response 
had two main components: actions to prop up the financial sector and a fiscal 
stimulus to counter the drop in private demand brought about by the credit crunch.  
 
 
3.3.1. Financial sector support 
 
Most western governments moved swiftly to take measures to support their 
financial systems and Spain was no exception. On 7 October 2008 the 
government adopted a number of emergency measures, the two most important 
being the increase in the level of guaranteed deposits to 100,000 euros and the 
creation of a 30-billion-euro fund to buy non-toxic assets from financial institutions 
in order to facilitate liquidity and ameliorate the global credit crunch and virtual 
shutdown of global credit on which Spain, with its significant current account 
deficit and high external financing needs, was so dependent. 
 
While the decision to act was obviously driven by the international financial 
situation, the way in which it was taken and the shape the final measures took 
were shaped by domestic political considerations. The meeting at which the 
decision to lift the deposit guarantee limit was taken, as recounted by government 
officials30 that were present, serves to illustrate a number of these factors. The 
government was under heavy pressure from senior figures in the financial sector 
to act quickly, with the President taking direct telephone calls from senior banking 
executives. Various government officials mentioned31 Emilio Botin, the powerful 
																																																								30	Research	interviews.	31	Research	interviews.	
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Chairman of Banco de Santander. The proposal that had been submitted by the 
technical advisors had suggested raising the guaranteed funds to 50,000 euros. 
Vice-President Solbes informed the President that some EU states had raised the 
protection level to 60,000 euros, some to 80,000 and others to 100,000 euros. The 
President intervened, insisting that Spain´s prestige was at stake and that, as the 
fourth largest euro zone economy, it could not set a lower limit than its peers. 
When the Vice-President suggested setting it at 80,000, weary of the financial 
implications, the President retorted that it should be 100,000 euros to be ‘at the 
top of the league’, as a source present at the meeting recalled.32 
 
While it is certainly true that once Ireland moved to set the limit at 100,000 euros 
there was a risk that there would be capital flight within the euro zone to the 
country with the highest level of protection, it seems obvious from the account 
above that this was not the only reason motivating and shaping the decision. Two 
highly political factors were crucial for the President. Firstly, the swiftness of the 
response is illustrative of the pressure of organised interests, in this case a 
financial sector faced with increasing financing difficulties and collapsing market 
values, and which, as we shall see in the next chapter, has been shown to be 
highly influential at various moments in this period of the management of the 
crisis.33 One of the President´s closest economic advisors and himself formerly a 
banking executive, claimed that ‘we were in the hands of the banks’,34 in an 
assertion which, while clearly excessively dramatic, is illustrative of the fears 
banking executives were instilling in the government and the President himself of 
the consequences of a sudden credit stoppage and the collapse of the financial 
sector. 
 
A second political factor that influenced the decision was the President´s desire 
that Spain come across as a serious international player. In fact, the 
preoccupation with ‘national prestige’ was an ever-present factor in the mind of 																																																								32	Research	interview.	33	Santos,	2014;	Flishman,	2013;	Fernández-Villaverde	et	al.,	2013;	Royo,	2013,	and	previously	Pérez,	1997,	have	all	provided	academic	analyses	of	the	enmeshing	of	the	banking	sector	and	politics	in	Spain. 	34	Research	interview.	
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President Zapatero that shaped economic decisions as much as technical 
aspects, according to senior advisors to the President.35 While present ‘in all 
leaders in my experience’, claimed an official who held senior roles within the 
Presidency with former socialist President Felipe Gonzalez as well as with Mr 
Zapatero, ‘Zapatero was particularly subject to this pressure’.36 This episode is 
also illustrative of an unorthodox decision making process. What is striking, and 
especially in this period of Zapatero´s presidency, is the chaotic manner in which 
decisions seem to have been taken, according to many of the officials interviewed, 
including some who had served in previous administrations and were close 
observers of presidential decision-making.37 
 
The need to try to convey an image of being an important player in the world, with 
the domestic political electorate in mind, was also apparently vital to Spain´s 
enormous diplomatic effort to take part in the G20 summit in Washington DC on 
14 November, to which Spain had not originally been invited, and where a call for 
fiscal stimulus to counter the effects of the crisis was made. President Zapatero 
(2013) himself has described the importance he placed on securing an invitation 
and the lengths to which he went to secure it. This event is significant since it 
highlights a number of factors that help explain subsequent decisions by the 
Zapatero government. Firstly, the invitation to the G20 summit allowed Zapatero to 
show to his domestic audience that Spain ‘mattered’ in the international arena, but 
that in turn required him to show that the invitation had not been a mistake and 
that Spain was capable of acting decisively. An economic advisor close to the 
President described it in the following terms:38 
 
Spain´s stimulus package comes out of the G20 summit, where a stimulus 
consensus developed because there was a collective global consciousness 
that the global economy was heading towards a 1929 depression and that 
markets wanted a stimulus plan. You have to remember that governments 
are always very sensible to markets, sometimes a bit too much in my view. 
And at the time markets rewarded those countries that came up with a 
larger stimulus package or acted more quickly, so I think the President had 
this inclination to be the best pupil in the class and show that we were 																																																								35	Research	interviews.	36	Research	interview.	37	Research	interview.	38	Research	interview.	
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capable of quickly putting in place a stimulus plan which, not only in its 
design but also execution, would have a quick impact.  
 
Secondly, the summit gave cover to the President´s ideological and political 
predisposition to public spending. It is true that at the time all international 
economic and financial organisations were calling for such a fiscal stimulus. It was 
not only the G20; the EU´s own Economic Recovery Plan from November 2008 
cited two main priorities, the first of which was for EU members to engage in a 
‘major injection of purchasing power into the economy, to boost demand and 
stimulate confidence’ (European Commission 2008: 2). Yet this international call 
for fiscal stimuli was naturally music to a socialist President´s ears. The funds 
served to finance a number of the government´s domestic political objectives, from 
conducting an active industrial policy by supporting two key sectors, tourism and 
car manufacturing, to increased expenditure for the unemployed. As an official in 
the President´s Economic Office recalled:39 ‘When one sees that the country is 
destroying 40,000 jobs a day you are desperate to try to do something’. There was 
in fact a politically driven urgency to ‘throw money’ at the problem. ‘In late 2008 
and early 2009 there was an attitude of “lets spend as much as we can”, it was 
madness really’, one of the deputy Director Generals at the President´s Economic 
Office recalled.40 
 
 
3.3.2. Stimulus: the Plan E 
 
It was in this context that on 27 November President Zapatero announced in 
Parliament (Congreso de los Diputados, 2008) a set of emergency measures 
aimed at providing an economic stimulus and, in particular, at dealing with the 
massive increase in unemployment. What would be formally labelled as Plan E 
the following January, was launched. There were various components to the plan. 
Firstly, a significant fiscal stimulus through an increase in public expenditure, 
channelled through two new funds: an eight-billion-euro Local Investment Fund 
(Fondo de Inversión Local) destined for infrastructure works at local level and to 																																																								39	Research	interview.	40	Research	interview.	
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be spent by local authorities, and a three-billion-euro State Fund for the Economy 
and Employment (Fondo Estatal de Dinamización de la Economía y el Empleo) 
that was to be disbursed through central government. Two further support plans 
for specific sectors were also announced, one for the automotive sector, the other 
for the tourist industry. These measures were complemented by a program to 
facilitate liquidity up to 47 billion euro through the credit lines of the National 
Institute of Credit (Instituto de Credito Oficial [ICO]). 
 
This fiscal stimulus package was, of course, very much a result of the impact of 
external factors, not least the call to action at the G20 meeting and of many other 
international economic and financial organisations. Yet what external constraints 
cannot explain is the way the plan was designed and implemented, which in many 
ways went against the kind of measures that international organisations such as 
the IMF (2008) or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) (2007) had been demanding from Spain. A stimulus package driven by 
the priorities expressed by these organisations would have led to the funds’ being 
devoted to remedying Spain´s structural deficiencies, increasing, for example, 
expenditure in research and development or education in order to boost Spain´s 
chronic productivity problems. While the need expediently to boost consumption 
and investment in order to deal with the sudden drop in demand experienced in 
late 2008 might have justified spending in less strategically effective areas, it 
would certainly not have favoured channelling the brunt of the funds to the 
construction sector and infrastructures, where it was clear to international 
observers the country had over-invested. And yet that it is precisely what 
happened. Such an outcome is, however, easier to explain when domestic 
political factors are brought into the equation. A close analysis of the design and 
implementation of the Plan E describes a process, as we shall see, shaped by 
domestic politics as much as economic considerations.  
 
Firstly, the fiscal stimulus that the Plan E represented was not only well aligned 
with ideological inclinations towards public expenditure of the PSOE government 
but it of course also gave international cover to a measure with clear party and 
political benefits to the government. As one of the most senior figures at Ministry 
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of Economy and Finance in the last years of Zapatero´s administration 
acknowledged:41 
 
In late 2008 and early 2009 the message that was coming from outside was 
that the global economy was in dire straits as a result of the US-originated 
credit crunch and that the most important thing was to take measures to 
sustain aggregate demand. This coincided with a moment in Spanish 
history when we had accumulated many disequilibria and one could see 
that we would need to undertake measures different from simply adopting a 
fiscal stimulus. But the external environment allowed the government to do 
two things. Firstly, not properly to acknowledge the crisis, in order to avoid 
the need to undertake painful measures, because the argument could be 
made that the factors that had caused the crisis, namely subprime 
mortgages, were not present in Spain. And secondly, to justify an increase 
in public expenditure and in demand-sided policies, which in reality were 
not appropriate for Spain, as we did not have a cyclical but a structural 
crisis. 
 
Secondly, the design of the plan came from the political much more than the 
technical sphere, from the world of ‘Serrano, Zarrías, Chaves, etc.’ as one source 
in the President´s economic team critically put it,42 referring to powerful political 
figures in the party with strong connections to its regional and local chapters that 
would benefit from the plan. The role of the Ministry of Economy and Finance was 
far weaker than it had hitherto been, which is in itself an indication of how 
management of the crisis was already being handled more directly by the 
President and political figures around him. While in the first term President 
Zapatero had allowed Vice-President Solbes a free hand in running the economy, 
Plan E marked an inflection point. In the words of a close advisor to the President: 
‘at some point, for whatever reason, the President took control. I don´t know if it 
was because he saw that Solbes was overwhelmed’.  
 
A revealing anecdote throws some light on possible reasons for this and is 
testament to how personal considerations shaped economic policy outcomes. It is 
a significant yet little known fact that, after all the effort to get Spain on to the G20, 
Vice-President Solbes decided not to attend the G20 preparatory ministerial 
summit in Washington, sending a deputy in his place. Yet, as he was not of 
																																																								41	Research	interview.	42	Research	interview.	
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ministerial level, he was not allowed in the room. According to a senior member of 
the government close to the President,43 Zapatero did not understand Mr Solbes´ 
decision and from that moment onwards there was a gradual split between them, 
which led to the President’s assuming the leadership in economic affairs, and 
which eventually led to Solbes’ resignation. Whether or not this was the turning 
point, from the Plan E onwards the President took a much more hands-on 
approach to the management of the economy. 
 
Thirdly, to the architects of the plan, more preoccupied with politics than with 
economic efficiency, the stimulus package did not have any sort of strategic 
purpose but was rather an instrument for creating emergency employment and 
dealing with the more politically costly aspect of the sudden collapse in economic 
activity, mainly in the construction sector: unemployment. A senior official in the 
Ministry of Labour during this period recalled:44  
 
At the time we were facing an economic and social emergency. The level of 
job destruction was terrible so we designed something simply to try to get 
people to work and put a salary in their pockets. From that point of view it 
made sense that expenditure should be directed to this sector, given that 
most of the employment losses were in the construction sector.  
 
In fact, it soon became obvious that the expenditure was both excessive and 
difficult to justify in economic terms, at least to increasingly worried European 
Commission officials,45 as it took the public finances from a budget surplus in 2007 
to an 11.2 per cent deficit in 2009. Both the media and economists were soon 
characterising the Plan E as shortsighted Keynesian expenditure (Mallet, 2009), 
devoted to activity with little long-term benefit. As one minister himself admitted 
it:46 ‘it was just repaving streets and squares; a strategy of throwing money at the 
problem and hoping the country would get out of the recession soon’. 
 
In the eyes of the government the Plan E was not such a misguided response. 
The concern about unemployment did not only have a social logic but also a 																																																								43	Research	interview.	44	Research	interview.	45	Research	interview.	46	Research	interview.	
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financial one According to figures from the Ministry of Labour,47 Plan E created 
over 400,000 jobs in a single-year. Considering that the average monthly cost of 
an unemployed person to the state was at the time around 1,100 euros, the plan 
generated net savings to the state of at least 4.4 billion euros, in terms alone of 
what was saved in unemployment costs. This focus on providing short-term jobs 
was also the result of the mistaken assessment that the recession would be short. 
However, such an assessment was common at the time and, had it been correct 
and growth returned early, the fiscal stimulus the Plan E entailed would not have 
had an insurmountable impact on the public finances. As a senior member of the 
government intimately connected with the execution of the plan explained:48  
 
If you believe that the crisis is going to be a short one, then your sole aim is 
to offer employment during a short period of time and there is therefore no 
point in designing the plan for larger projects.  
 
The importance of regional politics was a fourth factor that clearly determined the 
design and scope of Plan E (Calvo, 2014). One of the most striking aspects of the 
initiative was the decision to disburse the majority of the funds through local 
authorities rather than national ministries or regional governments. It was not an 
obvious decision. Most public spending in Spain is administered through either 
central or regional government and local authorities often lack the capacity to 
manage large amounts of public investment. Furthermore, local authorities had 
been the level of administration most affected by corruption, as it was in them that 
administrative controls were weaker. According to sources personally involved in 
the decision,49 there were various reasons for it, all of them clearly determined by 
domestic politics and which showed the central role played by regional politics. 
The first was that, with the boom of the preceding years in investment expenditure 
and EU structural funds there was really no capacity to manage more expenditure 
projects at national level. The second, in yet another sign of the importance of 
personal factors in the response to the crisis, was the influence exercised by 
Celestino Corbacho, at the time Minister of Labour. Having been a mayor himself 
prior to being appointed minister, he was adamant that the funds could be more 																																																								47	Research	interview.	48	Research	interview.	49	Research	interview.	
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effectively deployed through local authorities, and he was instrumental in 
persuading the President to go down this route. The third reason was that, after a 
first term marked by the controversy regarding the Catalonian issue and the 
criticism for devolving too much expenditure capacity to the regions, giving them 
even more funds to spend would have been politically toxic. As a top official 
among the President´s political staff acknowledged, 50  ‘giving it to the local 
authorities then made more political sense’. And the fourth reason, as this same 
source admitted, was that, while most regional governments were in the hands of 
the opposition, local authorities were more evenly split, with a considerable 
number held by the PSOE. Dispensing Plan E funds through local authorities 
meant channelling money to the local chapters of the party at a time when the 
regional and local elections were just a few months away. 
 
Finally, Plan E was also illustrative of how a chaotic decision-making process 
affected the management of the crisis. According to a high-ranking government 
official who took part in the decision,51 ‘what was originally planned to be five 
billion euro ended up at eight billion simply through a chaotic exchange of 
telephone calls’. That such an important stimulus package was concluded, not on 
the basis of technical analysis but, in the last instance, by haggling between the 
President and his Minister of Economy and Finance under time pressure, is 
testament to the relevance of the decision making process in the way the crisis 
was managed. According to senior sources from the President´s Office directly 
involved in the decision-making process:52 
 
It was really done like that, on the go, with Solbes in Brussels, where a 
figure had to be given, and the President and us here in a room in the 
Presidential complex. It was a really chaotic situation. Zapatero was asking 
Solbes to increase the amount and it became almost like an auction. The 
President asked for ten billion and Solbes said, no, eight billion… And that 
is the way it was decided.  
 
In sum, the above account provides ample evidence of the significant role that 
domestic political factors played in shaping the government´s fiscal stimulus in 																																																								50	Research	interview.	51	Research	interview.	52	Research	interview.	
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response to the crisis. First and foremost was of course the political eagerness of 
the PSOE government to increase public expenditure in response to the G20 call 
for fiscal stimulus, something a Socialist government was always going to be 
ideologically keen to undertake. Secondly, the G20 provided international political 
cover for adoption of stimulus policies in order to address the destruction of 
employment that was fast becoming the government´s main political problem. A 
minister in Zapatero´s government, and close confidant of the President, also 
pointed to Zapatero´s political character, defining him as ‘a reformist but keen 
spender’, as an important factor behind the eagerness with which he committed 
himself to the fiscal stimulus.53 And fourthly, the stimulus served as a mechanism 
by which to channel funds to local and regional authorities, many of them in 
Socialist hands, thus serving a clear political purpose. 
 
 
3.4. Early reforms (mid 2009 to May 2010) 
 
By the spring of 2009 the severity of the crisis was beyond doubt, as the global 
credit crunch struck with greatest severity, leading to negative growth in the third 
quarter of the year (INE, 2009), which would eventually come to mark the 
beginning of a recession that would last six quarters until early 2010. The 
government realised that fiscal stimulus would not suffice and that some 
substantial reforms were inevitable. Structural reform was now the political 
mantra. 
 
There were four initial reasons for this change of attitude. Firstly, there was the 
persistence of the economic downturn and the realisation that there were 
significant disequilibria in the Spanish economy that were hampering growth; in 
other words, Spain had its own domestic crisis beyond the credit crisis. Secondly, 
there was a gradual recognition that the public was disapproving of the 
management of the crisis and that the government had to be seen to be doing 
more. The pressure for reform had built up not only from the opposition but also 
from the business community (Expansion, 2009), the media and public opinion in 																																																								53	Research	interview.	
	 109	
general, as shown by opinion surveys (CIS, 2009). Thirdly, membership of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) meant it was not possible to devalue the 
currency to deal with the recession and only through a process of internal 
devaluation was the necessary reduction in unit labour costs required to recover 
competitiveness achievable. And fourthly, by this time the first concerns about 
budget deficits were starting to be voiced by the European Commission, OECD 
and IMF (2009), as well as by international investors. Evidence of the market 
reaction came in the rise in Spain´s bond spread from the autumn of 2008, a 
reflection of investors´ increasing concerns about the government´s inability to 
curb the deficit and especially on the long-term expenditure trajectory, with 
particular reference to the generous pension system, as one of the Directors 
General at the President´s Economic Office, who was often responsible for 
meeting international economic analysis and investors, confirmed.54 
 
In sum, the change of direction was caused by a combination of domestic and 
external pressures. Yet, while the latter were starting to be noticed, at this stage 
they were, according to some of the President´s closest advisors, still not 
determinant, and it was domestic considerations that weighed more heavily in the 
President´s decision to change direction. According to a high-ranking member of 
the President´s Office:55 
 
Zapatero talked to people in the country who told him that we had to 
change the growth and employment pattern; that we could not rely solely 
on tourism and construction. 
 
A minister in charge of one of the key portfolios, who was also a senior Socialist 
figure, recalled how ‘there was pressure from all sides in the nation to undertake 
reforms, and that was the key reason behind Zapatero´s change of strategy’.56 
The pressure for reform led the government to act. It is interesting to note that this 
political pressure trumped considerations regarding the negative economic impact 
that structural reforms were likely to have. In any case, this new spirit of reform 
materialised in four major initiatives: the Sustainable Economy Law (Ley de 																																																								54	For	an	alternative	view	see	De	Grauwe	and	Ji,	2013.	55	Research	interview.	56	Research	interview.	
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Economía Sostenible [LES]), the labour reform, the financial reform and the 
pension reform, which were to be implemented gradually and at different times 
until the end of the PSOE´S time in office. 
 
 
3.4.1. The Sustainable Economy Law 
 
Neutralising accusations of an insufficient reaction to the crisis was President 
Zapatero´s main goal when, during the Debate on the State of the Nation on 12 
May (Congreso de los Diputados, 2009), he surprised the opposition with the 
announcement of a large package of measures aimed at dealing more 
aggressively with the crisis. Probably the most important one was the scrapping of 
the tax credit for first residency mortgages for all but those with the lowest income. 
The corporate tax rate was reduced by five percentage points for firms with fewer 
than 25 employees that maintained or increased their workforce, subsidies were 
announced for the purchases of cars and a streamlined process for setting up a 
business in 24 hours was announced, not for the first time. A commitment to reign 
in expenditure was made, promising to cut one billion euro in public expenditure. 
The barrage of announcements also included the promise of no fewer than fifteen 
new laws, including measures to reform the electricity market, to liberalise 
professional services, and to allow extended retail opening hours (Congreso de 
los Diputados, 2009). But the most ambitious of them all was the LES, which had 
the objective, in the words of the President of ‘fostering a new productive model’ 
(Congreso de los Diputados, 2009). It had four parts (Ortega and Pascual-
Ramsay, 2012). The first put forward the ‘vision’ of the ‘sustainable economy’ to 
which, in the government´s view, the country must change. The second part 
identified the reforms that would be put in place to achieve these objectives. The 
third identified the budgetary means to finance these reforms and the fourth and 
final section set the negotiating framework to try to ensure that a wide consensus 
was achieved for these reforms. 
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Yet, for all its ambitions, the LES and accompanying initiatives failed to have any 
significant impact.57 The reasons for this failure were various, but a number of 
factors stand out. Firstly, the law´s design and implementation were flawed. 
Rather than offering an integrated package of strategically designed reforms, the 
different ministries ended up using it as a vehicle for securing the passage of 
legislation they had hitherto had difficulty in getting through Parliament. As a result 
it mainly served to repackage many of the initiatives that had already been 
announced or were in the pipeline. Also, as with so many of Zapatero´s measures, 
this initiative withered away due to a lack of proper implementation. It failed to be 
communicated effectively to the public, who saw it as more of the patched reaction 
that had come to characterise the Socialists’ response to the crisis (Ortega and 
Pascual-Ramsay, 2012). 
 
Secondly, there was strong opposition from many organised interests. The civil 
service, for example, was instrumental in opposing measures to streamline and 
simplify administrative procedures and make it easier to do business. As a 
minister closely involved in this reform recalled:58  
 
When trying to make it easier to set up a business the strategy was to offer 
different avenues of completing the process and let the public decide, but 
the civil servants at the Ministry of Justice made it impossible. 
 
The lobbying efforts of the private sector were also critical in stifling attempts at 
reform. In Spain many sectors are heavily dependent on the public sector,59 which 
means that large corporations tend to have a close relationship to the government 
and are able to influence policy, as two figures well positioned to evaluate such 
practices in the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade have acknowledged.60 The extended ‘revolving doors’ practice allows this 
influence often to come through top civil servants that have left their public 
position to work in industry. Recent cases include the Deputy Governor of the 																																																								57	For	a	critical	assessment	of	the	LES	and	its	flaws	see	Fernández-Villaverde	et	al.,	2010.	58	Research	interview.	59	For	a	historical	interpretation	of	how	this	affected	the	origins	and	management	of	the	crisis	see	for	example	Hopkins,	2013,	2015.	60	Research	interview.	
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Bank of Spain’s moving on to a private bank or the hiring of a senior official of the 
national energy regulator by Avertis, a company with interests in the energy 
sector. The influence of the corporate sector was critical, for example, in the 
failure to adopt meaningful measures to create competition in many sectors. 
Corporatism has been a longstanding problem in Spain, as was examined in 
Chapter 1, and was acknowledged by one of the most senior members of the 
government in charge of a key economic portfolio, complaining of how the design 
of the President´s Office, with the President´s Economic Office reporting directly to 
the President, had opened the door even more to these practices:61 
 
There is always a capture by the business’ oligarchy. There are two types 
of firm: those that need the government and those that don´t. It was a 
mistake to set up the President´s Economic Office as it was. It became a 
channel for business influence. It was a mistake to leave that avenue open, 
because at the ministries people have experience in dealing with lobbying 
pressures. A clear example of this was the electricity sector and 
renewables, and the influence they were able to exercise over the 
President through the President´s Economic Office. 
 
A third factor that helps explain the failure of the LES was the lack of a 
parliamentary majority supporting the government. In the words of the key liaison 
of the President´s Office with the parliamentary party:62 
 
Often the influence of business and other vested interests is through its 
lobbying of the different parties in Congress, with different sectors lobbying 
for specific changes to norms. We had to do a lot of this because we did 
not have a majority, so to satisfy those parties that would support each 
vote, and who represented firms and sectors that were important in their 
region. It became very difficult to maintain the original objectives.  
 
 
Beyond these various domestic factors there were of course some external 
constraints that also played a role in explaining the adoption of the LES. As 
mentioned above, international institutions, such as the IMF and the European 
Commission, as well as investors, were influential in exercising pressure to adopt 
a more decisive response to the crisis. Plan E was perceived as having led to 
excessive and ineffective spending and Spain was no longer seen as the 																																																								61	Research	interview.	62	Research	interview.	
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economic miracle it had once been. The first troubles with the banks had dented 
confidence in the country´s economy. And, while the decline in GDP was far less 
than in other EU economies, the long-term expenditure trajectory and heavy 
dependence on foreign finance was enough for the bond spread to have climbed 
significantly in the early part of the year, reaching a record 124 basic points on 16 
February, from hardly ten basic points at the start of the crisis in the summer of 
2007 (Expansión, 2015). Fears of contagion after the announcement of the true 
scale of the Greek deficit in October 2009 and doubts about the health of the 
Spanish financial system added upward pressure to the bond spread. It reached 
its highest level of that period on 21 January at 122 basic points and hovered 
around that level until late February 2010, but commenced a steady decline after 
that, thanks to the improvement in the global economy and the easing of tensions 
in the global financial markets. By August 2010 it stood at 50 basic points, its pre-
October 2008 level. 
 
These external factors did indeed contribute to building an environment of 
pressure that forced the government to act. But they are less apt to explain how 
the LES came about and why it failed. For example, while it is true that the 
increase of the bond spread had been a motivating factor when the decision was 
taken to change towards reform earlier in the year, if the increase in borrowing 
costs had been the main reason to act, it is unlikely the government would have 
decided to launch the LES precisely when the pressure on the spread was 
receding. Furthermore, the international pressure was clearly not sufficient for the 
government to complete the reforms. The failure to do so had more to do, as has 
been shown above, with domestic political factors like its poor design, the lack of 
serious political will to pursue its objectives, the lobbying efforts against it of the 
sectors affected and the absence of a parliamentary majority. Politics was 
therefore crucial in explaining the outcome of the LES, quite independently of 
external constraints. 
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3.4.2. The first reform of the financial sector 
 
The following month, June 2009, saw the government take another significant 
policy decision, with its first actions to reform the Spanish financial sector. When 
the financial crisis showed its first signs in 2007, the reaction of the Spanish 
authorities was one of confidence with respect to the country´s financial system.63 
President Zapatero and Vice-President Solbes regularly spoke of the Spanish 
financial system as being ‘one of the strongest in the world’ (El Mundo, 2008). 
Their view was confirmed in the late months of 2008 and early 2009 when, after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, financial institutions all over the developed world 
had to be bailed out but not a single Spanish financial institution had to be 
rescued. The comments of a senior member of the administration who had a key 
role in the financial sector reform summarised this attitude well:64 
 
We honestly […] thought that the financial system was in a much better 
state than it actually was. That was our starting point, and I assume also of 
the Bank of Spain, because that is what they said publicly. When I hear 
Solbes say the financial system is in a good state, I believe him. When we 
have the stress tests saying that overall things are fine, beyond specific 
needs here or there, I believe it.  
 
This confidence would, however, prove to be counterproductive. The Spanish 
government, the Bank of Spain and the financial institutions themselves had put 
their faith in the crisis being short, hoping provisions would be gradually consumed 
without need for recapitalisation, at a time when US and European banks were 
already busy buttressing their capital bases. But that was of course not how 
events turned out, and once the recession prolonged its grip, property developers 
started to go bankrupt, unemployment continued to rise and mortgage defaults 
spiked. The large banks, like Banco de Santander and BBVA, did not face capital 
shortages, as they were well diversified and could count on the profits from 
emerging markets, such as Mexico and Brazil, where they had a strong presence 
and business was less affected. But the small and mid-size banks and most 
especially the cajas, the idiosyncratic Spanish regional saving banks, did start to 
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feel the effect.65 In March 2009 the Caja Castilla la Mancha, a mid-sized caja, 
became the first financial institution to be bailed out. Remarkably, its failure came 
as a surprise to the government, according to various senior officials interviewed, 
66 a first sign of the questions that would come to be asked about the effectiveness 
of the Bank of Spain’s regulation and supervision. Although the rescued caja was 
small, its effect was significant as it brought international attention to the hitherto 
little known system of cajas, as confirmed by a former Spanish socialist minister 
who at the time held a senior position in the European Commission and by an 
official at the European Central Bank (ECB).67 By June 2009 confidence in the 
system was weakening, not least internationally, and the government was forced 
to adopt the first significant financial reform, namely the creation of the Fund for 
Orderly Bank Restructuring (Fondo de Reestructuración Bancaria [FROB]). Its 
purpose was to provide funds to facilitate the process of mergers and IPOs that 
was taking place among the smaller financial institutions, especially the cajas, in 
the face of mounting losses and to help recapitalise them. 
 
The pressure exercised by external constraints in shaping these early stages of 
the management of the financial sector reform is obvious. Had it not been for the 
global credit crunch, Spanish financial institutions, and especially the cajas, would 
not have experienced the problems they did, at least at that stage. Furthermore, 
mistrust in the financial system was one of the factors that most undermined 
market and EU confidence in the Socialist management of the crisis (Bastasín, 
2012). The doubts about the solvency of the financial system, and the risk that the 
state would have to step in to bail out institutions, fed sovereign risk, leading to a 
substantial increase in the sovereign bond spread in late 2008 and early 2009, as 
we have just seen, which in itself made credit to banks more expensive, thus 
increasing their risk of default, creating a vicious circle. International 
preoccupation with the system was already significant by mid 2009 and it only got 
worse as the crisis proceeded. A top official in the European Commission 																																																								65	For	a	detailed	account	of	the	various	aspects	leading	to	the	crisis	of	the	cajas	see	Carballo	Cruz	2011,	Ruiz	et	al	2015,	Fernández-Villaverde	et	al.,	2013	and	Cuñat	and	Garicano,	2010,	as	discussed	in	the	literature	review.	66	Research	interview.	67	Research	interview.	
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recalled68 how colleagues in Brussels found it difficult to understand the attitude of 
denial with respect to the problems in the Spanish financial system, which 
contributed to undermining their confidence in the ability of the Zapatero 
government to manage the crisis effectively. The European Commission, IMF and 
international investors increasingly called for substantial reform and 
recapitalisation, and yet reform was slow, piecemeal and never sufficient to 
address the concerns of investors and external institutions. A number of domestic 
political factors can help explain why.69 
 
Firstly, the cajas had a very strong regional presence and had traditionally been 
the financial instrument of choice to finance regional development, both public and 
private. This led to their being very exposed to politically driven public investment, 
such as that for costly and unsustainable public infrastructure of dubious financial 
return. When losses started coming their way with the puncturing of the housing 
bubble and depletion of their capital cushions it was difficult to recapitalise them, 
since their dated legal structure nominally had them incorporated as foundations 
with no capital, just reserves and this legal structure prevented them from tapping 
the markets for capital. This was one of the most damaging aspects of the crisis, 
according to a top official at the ECB,70 and one that obviously originated in a 
domestic institutional factor, such as the nature and workings of the cajas. 
 
Added to that were all the difficulties brought about by the influence of politics in 
their governance. As previously explained, the boards of the cajas included, by 
law, representatives of local government, as well as other social agents such as 
the trade unions. The heavy politisation of these boards not only led to poor 
management in the run up to the crisis, but made it also more difficult to reshuffle 
them and reform the cajas in the absence of pressure. This was in contrast with 
the Landesbanken in Germany, which were urgently recapitalised when facing 
imminent demise. A high-ranking official at the Bank of Spain put it bluntly:71 																																																								68	Research	interview.	69	For	a	detailed	account	of	the	management	of	the	Spanish	financial	crisis	see	Otero-Iglesias	et	al.,	2016.  70	Research	interview.	71	Research	interview.	
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Spain has had three crises: the housing bubble, the international financial 
crisis and the euro zone crisis. The normal thing would have been for the 
Spanish financial system to collapse completely, like the Irish. And yet not a 
single bank, which was about 50 per cent of the financial system, had to be 
bailed out. They did not require any public funds, which is unheard of in the 
countries that had a bubble (the US, Ireland). So where was the problem? 
In the cajas. And here, politics was clearly key. Politicians ran them; it was 
politicians that made the appointments. And even then, only half of the 
cajas had problems, mainly those in the regions governed by the two 
largest parties, the PP and PSOE, and where the cajas served more clearly 
as instruments of corporatism. 
 
Furthermore, party politics made it even more difficult to intervene. With the 
exception of Caja Castilla La Mancha, all of the cajas that faced difficulties were in 
regions governed by the opposition Popular Party (Partido Popular [PP]) and it 
was this party that controlled their boards. It was therefore very difficult for the 
government to intervene without this being seen as a political attack on the 
opposition, as a key member of the government´s economic team with 
responsibility for financial affairs confirmed.72  
 
Politics, in sum, was a crucial determinant in the failure to act sooner, aggravating 
the poor supervision to which the cajas had been subject. An official at the highest 
level of the Ministry of Economy and Finance acknowledged that the cajas were 
not really on the radar screen until the problems were obvious and, implicitly, 
recognised a certain failure of senior government officials to act sooner: 73 
‘because of governance reasons or whatever, there was less attention paid to 
them when it came to control and supervision; that was at least my perception’. 
Another reason for the lack of early reform, as the work of Woll (2014) would have 
predicted and indeed Otero-Iglesias et al. (2016: 57) have shown was at play in 
the Spanish case, was the financial sector´s ‘power of inaction’. According to this 
view, financial firms, knowing that governments are understandably reluctant to 
liquidate a significant part of the banking sector, delay painful measures and only 
contribute to a solution, usually through mergers, once governments have pledged 
significant amounts of public money for the process. 
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Failure to regulate and supervise effectively the cajas points to a wider and 
probably the most important factor in the management of the financial reform: the 
clear diagnostic mistakes by domestic institutions, especially the Bank of Spain 
and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, not only prior to but also throughout the 
crisis (Otero-Iglesias et al., 2016). The role of the central bank has certainly been 
controversial and, to many of the protagonists, very poor. This negative view of 
the Bank of Spain´s role is remarkably widespread. A minister who was central to 
the government´s economic agenda74 was adamant that the Bank of Spain ‘was 
absolutely wrong in [its] diagnosis’. Similarly, a senior Spanish official at the 
European Commission recalled75 how every time the Minister of Economy and 
Finance, Elena Salgado, visited Brussels “she had a very hard time because she 
could not really offer coherent explanations on the state of the financial sector’. A 
senior member of the President´s Office was just as critical:76 
 
The role of the Bank of Spain in the crisis is to me incomprehensible. It is 
worrying because it questions [its] competence. Throughout the whole of 
the last term in office the Bank talked about labour reform much more than 
about what it should have. I knew well Solbes and Salgado [the two 
successive Ministers of Economy and Finance] and they would not lie to 
me. The problems with the financial system went undetected by the Bank 
and the Ministry to which it reported. 
 
While, as a top official at the Bank of Spain argued,77 ‘it is the responsibility of the 
Bank of Spain, as an independent entity, to tell the government about dangerous 
imbalances, so we had to talk about the labour market’, many blame the Bank of 
Spain for being too focused during the crisis on pressing the government to 
undertake structural reform, especially of the labour market, while not paying 
sufficient attention to its primary area of responsibility, the financial sector, and 
failing to supervise it effectively. As the supervisor, it was the Bank that had the 
best information on the risks and the real health of a financial system that was 
																																																								74	Research	interview.	75	Research	interview	76	Research	interview.	77	Research	interview.	
	 119	
badly affected by the bubble. A senior member of the Bank who had also held 
responsibilities at the President´s Economic Office, admitted:78 
 
The Bank reacted late. It put too much emphasis on criticising institutional 
and governance issues, setting the cajas against the banks, and failed to 
get a good overall view of the general economic downturn and how this 
was going to affect the balance sheets of all institutions. For example, the 
idea of a bad bank, which was finally set up in 2013, was already discussed 
in 2008 and 2009 and the Bank saw no need to set it up. 
 
The accusation of negligence levelled against the Bank of Spain extends to the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, the government department most closely 
associated with it. According to officials at the highest level of the President´s 
Office, 79  as late as January 2009, Vice-President Solbes submitted to the 
President and the cabinet a briefing in which he set out what he thought were the 
key issues and decisions to be taken to manage the crisis and, in that document, 
‘there was not a single word about the financial system’. According to various 
accounts,80 Mr Solbes did receive some worrying reports from the Bank of Spain 
during his first term of office but with the appointment of his friend and ally 
Fernández-Ordóñez as governor he distanced himself from keeping an eye on the 
financial sector, delegating the task to him. The problem was of course that 
acknowledging banks had been careless in their lending would imply admitting its 
own supervisory failure, which the Bank and his governor were understandably 
reluctant to do. One of Minister Solbes’ deputies acknowledged81 that ‘it is clear 
the government could and should have been more demanding of the Bank of 
Spain’, while another official at the highest level of the Ministry, traditionally 
consensus-driven, admitted that relations between the Ministry and the Bank of 
Spain were not as good as they should have been:82 
 
It did not bother me so much that the Bank spoke about non-financial 
issues. Mervin King also made economic policy recommendations. But it is 
true that there was an excessive fixation with the labour market, with a 
specific model in mind, and that is a different story. It just did not look good 																																																								78	Research	interview.	79	Research	interview.	80	See	for	example	Ekáizer,	2012.	81	Research	interview.	82	Research	interview.	
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that the Bank spoke so much about the labour market and so little about 
the financial sector. 
 
This of course also influenced Zapatero´s view of the crisis. According to one of 
his closest economic advisors:83 
 
Until the end Zapatero was convinced that the only problem was the small 
cajas (…). I think Zapatero was misled by the banks, but also by the 
Ministry and the Bank of Spain. Because even if our banking system was 
very diversified and internationalised, with the size of the bubble we had, it 
was impossible for the banks not to be affected. 
 
In fact, according to some sources, President Zapatero had wanted reform of the 
financial sector to be undertaken earlier, when the first signs of problems in the 
sector were becoming apparent, but Vice-President Solbes and the Governor of 
the Bank of Spain prevented this, something the President accepted because ‘he 
was profoundly respectful of the independence of the Bank of Spain’, according to 
an official in the President´s Economic Office.84  
 
The lobbying efforts of the financial sector also played a role in the conduct of the 
Bank of Spain and the government’s underestimating the problems of the sector 
and are another of the key factors that shaped the management of the financial 
reform. Interestingly, and according to interviews with senior officials, 85  this 
influence was more subtle and indirect than could is often assumed to be, yet not 
less significant. Financial executives influenced events both through the Bank of 
Spain and through their direct relationship with the government. On the former, the 
figure of the governor has been the subject of much controversy. From his 
appointment doubts were raised about his suitability for the post. A former 
Secretary of State in the previous Socialist government, and a key ally of Mr 
Solbes, Mr Fernández Ordóñez was the first Governor of the Bank of Spain to be 
a member of a political party, in this case the PSOE. It was not only his political 
affiliation, but also doubts about his qualifications for the job that generated 
unease. According to some of his critics, including one of the most senior 																																																								83	Research	interview.	84	Research	interview.	85	Research	interviews.	
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economic ministers in the government,86 he did not have sufficient knowledge of 
financial issues. This was important because it meant he had to rely on the views 
of the banks and the counsel of the staff at the Bank, often colonised also by the 
financial sector. In the words of this minister:87  
 
He was a great microeconomist, with very good knowledge of issues 
relating to competition, the energy sector, etc. But he knew very little about 
finance, so he really was in the hands of the financial institutions.  
 
It is probably inevitable that the head of a central bank be susceptible to the 
arguments of those with whom he engages daily and somewhat ‘colonized’ by 
their views. As a top official in the President´s Office who has been in a privileged 
position to observe the lobbying efforts of different sectors for over twenty years 
has said,88 there is always an ‘ideological alignment’ with certain pressure groups 
in virtue of the portfolio they are in charge of. Yet in the case of Governor 
Fernández Ordóñez, he was seen by some not only as downplaying potential 
threats to the system´s stability, but acting in tandem with the financial sector in 
pressuring the government to adopt deeper economic structural reform in other 
realms and in effect deflecting attention and delaying the necessary reform of the 
financial sector.  
 
Financial executives also lobbied the government directly. As various senior 
government officials acknowledged,89  the President listened to many industry 
executives, especially Mr Botin (the Chairman of Banco de Santander) and Mr 
Faine (Chairman of La Caixa, at the time the second largest caja and one of the 
largest lenders in the country), but also others, like Miguel Blesa, the Chairman of 
Caja Madrid, which would end up being the largest Spanish financial institution 
rescued. Their influence on the government, and especially on President 
Zapatero, was substantial, according to various sources in the President´s Office 
who had direct observation of this.90 This influence was, however, often more 
indirect than direct, not so much opposing specific measures but more shaping the 																																																								86	Research	interview.	87	Research	interview.	88	Research	interview.	89	Research	interviews.	90	Research	interviews.	
	 122	
key decision-makers’ views, not only the Governor´s but also the President´s. In 
the worlds of a close aide of the President who would often be present in these 
meetings:91  
 
There is an influence of organised interests, but it is not an automatic tit-for-
that. It is a general kind of relationship, an understanding that if you help 
me then you can count on me to help you. 
 
This view was shared by one of the top officials at the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance who also dealt closely with the financial community:92  
 
It is true that some senior executives had a direct line to the President. 
They did use it, but only on key occasions when they really felt they had to, 
probably less than people think. 
 
A senior official at the Bank of Spain has admitted that even the Bank itself often 
sided with the banks on controversial issues. Referring, for example to the 
controversial support of the government on tax breaks for foreign acquisitions 
which benefitted firms like Banco Santander but which the European Commission 
ended up ruling as contravening EU rules, this official said:93 
 
Spain has been very generous with the banks in the past with issues such 
as state assistance. And the Bank of Spain defended many of these things. 
It brought out a note defending the Fondo de Comercio. It was shameful 
(…). I am not clear why the banks are so influential, as they are not 
monopolistic, actually some fail. 
 
This lobbying, however, had its limitations. The banks’ interests were sometimes 
at odds with those of other business sectors. In the case of the housing bubble 
and associated toxic assets, businesses pressured the state on opposing sides of 
the argument. The creation of a bad bank was a clear case in point, as explained 
by a senior official at the Ministry of Economy and Finance who was intimately 
involved in discussion of this potential solution:94 ‘If you create a bad bank, the 
interests of the developers and the banks are often at odds’. The exertion of 
pressure also went both ways, and the financial sector often found itself having to 																																																								91	Research	interview.	92	Research	interview.	93	Research	interview.	94	Research	interview.	
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accommodate and facilitate political decisions taken by the government that were 
not in its interest. For example, politics played a key role in forcing the banks to 
purchase Spanish sovereign debt and to accept recapitalisations using the 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme (Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos), which in Spain is 
funded by the banks and which contributed 25 per cent of the FROB. A top 
executive at the Bank of Spain was clear on this:95 
 
In the recapitalisation of the bank politics was also important, because it 
was a political decision by Campa [Secretary of State for the Economy] and 
the banks had to be persuaded, since it was their money. The argument 
was that they would benefit from the restructuring of the system as they 
would be left with fewer competitors, so they should also pay. 
 
Certain episodes were, however, indicative of a special relationship between 
certain financial executives and the government. The most striking was probably 
the decision by the government to grant a pardon to Alfredo Saenz, CEO of Banco 
Santander, who had been convicted of the use of privileged information. 
According to a senior government official close to the President96 it was a sign of 
how close the relationship between the financial sector and the government was: 
‘If the President granted the pardon, he knew he would be able to count on Mr 
Botin´s help when needed, even if the matter had not been explicitly discussed 
between them’. 
 
One final factor that most certainly conditioned the management of the financial 
sector reform was the political cost that some of the reforms entailed. Although 
with hindsight the need to recapitalise the cajas and some of the banks might 
seem obvious, it was at the time politically very difficult to use public funds to bail 
out financial institutions. A high-ranking official at the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance explained further political difficulties:97 
 
We did not act earlier because it was not politically feasible to do so. When 
the credit difficulties became unbearable we had to act and we set up the 
FROB; we had to put up 90 billion euro. That is nine per cent of our GDP. It 
would have been politically impossible to establish it earlier or when the 																																																								95	Research	interview.	96	Research	interview.	97	Research	interview.	
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problem was not apparent. Then, a second, bigger problem came, which 
was related to the cajas, and how many of them were not feasible. But 
most of these were in regions governed by the PP, which made it difficult 
for us to act, because we did not have the legal means and because we 
were accused of using it as a political tool. Finally, there was of course the 
danger of our intervention’s leading to a lack of confidence in the banking 
system, at a time in which the euro and sovereign crisis already had the 
country on the edge.  
 
In addition, the government was under constant attack from the opposition, which 
continued even at the risk of weakening the country’s international image, 
something of which a senior official at the Bank of Spain was particularly critical:98 
 
During the crisis we implemented a traditional financial crisis management, 
of which we had experience here from the late 70s. You don´t allow banks 
to fail because it is too expensive. You group them, you put some money in 
and you change the managers. So overall the Socialist government and the 
Bank of Spain did not do such a poor job. And yet a campaign to attack us 
was launched by the opposition, something that has not happened in any 
other country. Why did the PP do it? In my view, they did so simply to gain 
a political advantage. The PP was very destructive in that sense. 
 
To summarise, the above analysis paints a picture in which domestic political 
factors were vital in shaping this first reform of the financial sector. The influence 
of political parties in the governance and financing decisions of the cajas was 
instrumental in explaining the weakening of these credit institutions and their 
resistance to reform. The failure of the Bank of Spain to supervise the sector 
effectively and the dysfunctional role played by its very political governor, fuelling 
disagreement with the government by his attention to other structural reforms 
while risks in the financial sector went undetected, also explain the strained 
relations between the President and his economic advisors on the one side, and 
the Ministry of Economy and Bank of Spain on the other, which did much to 
prevent more effective reform. The Bank of Spain also acted as a channel of the 
influence of the financial sector, which succeeded in leading the government to 
downplay for a long time the problems that affected the sector, also of course with 
the aid of the direct relationship of some financial executives with the President. 
Finally, the political cost associated with large state assistance to banks was 																																																								98	Research	interview.	
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another key factor that explains the reluctance of the government to act, as was 
the difficulty in dealing with problematic cajas in the hands of the opposition 
without being accused of using the reform politically to attack the opposition. In 
any case, by the time these first steps were taken to try to strengthen the sector 
doubts had already been sowed within the international community, something 
that would prove to be a persistent source of vulnerability throughout the rest of 
the crisis. 
 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
The first three years of the crisis, starting in mid 2007, saw an evolution in the 
attitudes of the government, from an initial downplaying of the crisis, to an 
acknowledgment of its impact but blaming international factors, to an acceptance 
that Spain had its own structural problems that needed addressing. These phases 
were accompanied by differing responses: from early inaction, to an internationally 
backed fiscal stimulus, to, in the later stages, some lukewarm attempts at 
structural reform. External constraints played a significant role in shaping the 
government´s management of the crisis throughout these distinct phases. As early 
as 2007 the European Commission had warned Spain about the serious 
imbalances developing, adding to the pressure on the government to act. The 
implosion of the global financial crisis in the autumn of 2008 and subsequent 
credit crunch led to a recession that forced the government to acknowledge the 
gravity of the crisis and adopt the first measures, including those in support of the 
financial sector. The fiscal stimulus that followed was a direct response to the G20 
call to pursue expansionary measures. The limitations that EMU placed on 
economic policy, most importantly the impossibility of devaluing, led to some of 
the early structural reforms in 2009. Some early austerity measures adopted at the 
same time were a direct response to the increasing concern of the European 
Commission at the ballooning deficit and the increasing pressure on international 
bond investors on Spanish sovereign debt. Concerns by European Commission 
and ECB officials on the vulnerability of the Spanish financial sector, and 
especially on the opaque governance of the cajas system and their exposure to 
the bursting of the housing bubble and ability to raise capital to deal with non-
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performing loans, contributed to the Spanish government undertaking some early 
reforms of the sector, as did the pressure of international investors who factored 
this financial risk in the bond spread of sovereign debt. 
 
Yet what the analysis conducted in this chapter helps us understand is that 
domestic political considerations also influenced the response and often trumped 
economic factors and external constraints. Most importantly, electoral and public 
opinion considerations were clearly at play in the months before the March 2008 
election, when the government was keen to preserve the image of a good 
economic record gained over the previous four years, and thus had a strong 
incentive not to acknowledge the weaknesses the economy was already showing. 
Ideological predisposition towards public expenditure obviously facilitated the 
fiscal stimulus that marked the initial response to the crisis. And party pressures 
were clearly relevant in many of the decisions, such as that to disburse the fiscal 
stimulus through the local authorities, where the PSOE had a strong presence. 
 
The nature of certain domestic institutions also played an essential role. The 
decentralised Spanish public administration was essential to explain the manner in 
which the fiscal stimulus was disbursed and the political governance of the cajas 
was a key determinant in delaying the financial sector reform. Parliamentary 
dynamics were also relevant, as the absence of a parliamentary majority made it 
difficult to embark on politically costly reform. Furthermore, the pressure of 
organised interests was present at various stages. The heavy concentration of the 
Plan E stimulus in construction projects or the slow and timid early financial reform 
cannot be understood without reference to the pressure exercised by the 
representatives of these sectors. The financial sector also exercised significant 
pressure on the government to try to shape financial regulation. 
 
Finally, a disorganised and often ineffective decision-making process seems to 
have been a hallmark of the Zapatero administration throughout this period. This 
was both cause and consequence of the disagreements in the cabinet, which 
certainly conditioned the response, both in the assessment of the gravity of the 
crisis and in the measures adopted, such as the fiscal stimulus, the LES or the 
financial reform. Personal characteristics often contributed to this inefficient 
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decision-making process and were important factors in explaining the outcome, 
from Zapatero´s lack of economic experience to Solbes’ excessive conservatism 
when it came to structural reform or Fernandez-Ordóñez´s idiosyncratic approach 
to his role as Governor of the Bank of Spain. 
 
In any case, this phase of stimulus and early reform in the management of the 
crisis was still the child of the Keynesian approach that had dominated the earliest 
phase of the crisis. But by mid 2010 the wind had changed. The Greek crisis had 
focused attention on the budgetary challenges faced by other EMU states. 
Contagion was spreading, with the bond markets significantly increasing the risk 
premium on Spanish debt. The pressure on Spain started to increase, both from 
the markets and its European partners. This was the context for the sudden 
change of direction in the management of the crisis that took place in May 2010 
and which is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4. The euro zone crisis (I): austerity and reform 
(May 2010 to April 2011) 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Mid-2010 marked an inflection point in the management of the crisis, caused by a 
change in the nature of the international crisis. Until then the crisis had been 
mainly financial, affecting mostly developed economies, and had led to a deep but 
short recession addressed with fiscal stimuli. Yet by early 2010 there was 
increasing concern at the deterioration of public finances, especially in the euro 
zone periphery, as a result of both the drop in revenues associated with the 
decline in economic activity and the high levels of public expenditure caused by 
the fiscal stimulus and the bailout of financial institutions. 
 
This incipient sovereign debt crisis would find its centre stage in the euro zone and 
its catalyst in the Greek budgetary crisis. Ever since in October 2009 the Socialist 
government of Georgios Papandreou had acknowledged that the country´s budget 
deficit for that year could be as high as 12 per cent of GDP, in contrast to the 3.7 
per cent estimate of the former centre-right government, doubts had been 
accumulating over Greece´s public finances. While initially denying the need for 
any external help, after repeated downgrades and worsening financial 
perspectives, the Greek government finally announced on 23 April 2010 its 
acceptance of an aid package financed jointly by the European Union (EU) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
Yet the EU´s response to Greece´s difficulties was slow and insufficient. The 
unwillingness of a number of euro zone members, especially Germany, Finland 
and the Netherlands, to offer the necessary funds to deal forcefully with Greece´s 
problems sent a signal to bond investors that the assumption that all euro zone 
public debt was safe was could be questioned. Markets reacted by increasing 
substantially the risk premium on Greek sovereign bonds. More worryingly, these 
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doubts spread to the sovereign debt of other peripheral European Monetary Union 
(EMU) states, most notably Ireland and Portugal but also Italy and Spain.  
 
Underlying this response was the position of Germany and its allies in the EU 
Council, who viewed Greece´s difficulties as the result of fiscal irresponsibility 
(Hopkins, 2013) and were particularly concerned about the moral hazard of 
assisting Greece and other peripheral euro zone states. As a senior Spanish 
figure in the European Parliament well versed in Spanish and EU politics 
observed:1  
 
When Greece´s problems erupt it is the realisation of their [northern 
European euro zone members’] worst dreams. All they had feared could 
happen was happening and was doing so in a country than synthesised the 
fear of what they said all along could happen: fiscal indiscipline, loss of 
competitiveness, budget tricks and loss of control by EU institutions, etc. So 
Greece becomes the perfect justification for a diagnosis of the crisis that 
justifies the architecture they had built, even if the diagnosis is wrong. If the 
crisis had started in Ireland instead of Greece, just a few months later, then 
they would not have been able to build such a narrative. But they did, and 
the answer was obvious: if they have misbehaved, before helping them 
they have to be punished so as to avoid any moral hazard. That was the 
German and northern European attitude: we will have to bail them out for 
the sake of the euro, but not before we punish them. And the evidence is 
the punishing interest rates of the first aid package to Greece. I think this 
attitude paralysed the EU during a crucial time period. 
 
Just as importantly, the Greek difficulties highlighted the deficiencies in EMU´s 
architecture described in Chapter 1, especially the absence of a lender of last 
resort and of a crisis resolution mechanism. Since the inception of the common 
currency the sovereign debt bond spreads of euro zone members had converged 
substantially. For example, interest rates on 10-year Greek government bonds 
declined from 20 per cent in 1994 to 3.5 per cent in 2005 (Gibson et al., 2011). 
There were a number of reasons for this. The first was the assumption that the 
single market would eventually lead to a convergence of fundamentals. The 
second was the conviction that, even though the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFUE) expressly prohibited the monetary financing of sovereign 
debt by the ECB (Article 23) and the bail-out of a member state (Article 25), euro 
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zone members would stand up for one another in case of difficulty. The events of 
2010 put a question mark on this assumption. 
 
The absence of a crisis resolution mechanism became especially problematic, as 
the response to the Greek crisis entailed constant political negotiation in tense 
circumstances and with domestic pressures, not conducive to agreement on such 
sensitive issues. As a member of President Zapatero´s economic team who was a 
recurrent presence at many of those meetings recalled:2 
 
The first reaction to the Greek crisis is clearly driven by national political 
considerations. When other member states realise the dire straits that 
Greece is in, it becomes clear that it will need assistance. But, of course, 
those funds have to come from national budgets, which becomes a political 
issue at home. And that is where there is a request for the countries of the 
periphery to make an extra effort in the adjustment, to compensate the 
political cost at home of the northern countries. All these are very political 
decisions, driven by political criteria at the highest level. A confluence of 
political compromises underpinned by a minimum economic analysis. 
 
The euro zone woes quickly started having a detrimental impact on the Spanish 
economy, which had already been deteriorating steadily during 2009. The decline 
in fiscal revenues together with the fiscal stimulus implemented in late 2008 had 
led to a budget deficit of 11 per cent. Even though the European Commission had 
given Spain extra breathing room by granting it one more year, until 2013, to 
reach the 3 per cent deficit limit (Royo, 2013: 64), the government had been 
forced to adopt a first austerity plan amounting to savings of 5 billion euro to meet 
the revised target. In the first quarter of 2010 the economic situation improved 
slightly, with GDP growing 0.1 per cent, marking the official end of the recession 
but with only anaemic growth. Yet it was precisely at this time that contagion from 
the Greek crisis started to take its toll. Spain was starting to see the downside of 
euro membership. 
 
By 2010 it was also clear that the euro had not led to the convergence in 
fundamentals that many had predicted and the design problems in EMU were 
leading to negative externalities that were starting to have a detrimental effect on 
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Spain. This added to Spain´s existing woes. In particular, the state of its public 
finances and financial sector were the subject of ever-increasing concern to 
foreign investors (The Economist, 2010). Deteriorating confidence in Spain´s 
finances led to a first warning signal on 4 February, when the IBEX-35, the main 
index of the Madrid stock market, dropped almost 6 per cent in one day as a result 
of investors’ uncertainty about the state of the public finances and the risk of 
contagion from Greece and Portugal. The quickly deteriorating situation took a 
turn for the worse on 4 May when rumours started spreading that Spain would ask 
the EU and IMF for a 280-billion-euro bailout (Leon, 2010; Expansion, 2010). 
Although there was no truth in them, the event marked a turning point with respect 
to confidence in Spanish debt sustainability. From then on, for the remainder of 
the Socialist management of the crisis, Spain would live under the constant 
shadow of the possibility of a bailout. 
 
It was in the context of the convergence of these forces – Greek contagion, the 
ineffective European response to the Greek crisis, deficiencies in the euro 
architecture, Spain´s structural growth problems and increasing fiscal woes – that, 
on 12 May 2010, the President announced to the surprise of Parliament a series 
of austerity measures that constituted a dramatic U-turn in what hitherto had been 
a staunch defence of a social democratic platform substantiated by increases in 
social spending. It was this decision more than any other that would come to 
define the management of the crisis by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español [PSOE]) and which has more widely been 
presented as evidence of the trumping of domestic politics by external forces. 
 
 
4.2. The May 2010 U-turn 
 
The month of May had started with the European Council’s finally approving the 
First Economic Adjustment Programme and associated financial assistance 
package for Greece. The negative reaction of European stock and bond markets 
signalled, however, that bond investors already considered this too little too late. 
Following further weeks of tension in European markets, an emergency meeting of 
EU leaders was arranged on the weekend of 7 May to deal with the worsening 
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Greek crisis. It was clear that unless a more robust response by the EU as a 
whole was offered, the following Monday could prove to be a turning point in 
investors’ confidence in the resolve of EMU members to stand behind one another 
and guarantee the euro´s survival. 
 
At the informal meetings just before the summit, both President Sarkozy and 
Chancellor Merkel told Rodríguez Zapatero (2013: 86) that they considered the 
situation to be very serious and that, while an agreement to provide a more robust 
answer was possible, it would also be necessary for all states, and especially 
those about which investors were showing more doubts, to do more in order to 
restore confidence. Yet Zapatero did not expect to be asked for any specific 
measures beyond a generic commitment to deficit reduction (ibid.: 93). The 
summit ended with a general agreement to build a permanent response 
mechanism but left the details to the subsequent Eurogroup ministers meeting on 
Saturday 8 and Sunday 9 May. President Zapatero left the meeting with the 
conviction that, despite the recent drop in investors’ confidence, Spain´s position 
as a trusted euro zone member was safe. As he has himself recollected (ibid.: 93): 
 
My analysis until Sunday the 9th led me to think that we were not as a 
country in any real danger, given that the state of the financing of our 
sovereign debt (…) indicated that our point of departure was very solid and 
that, therefore, we would have the capacity to adapt to a more demanding 
environment. 
 
It was during the Eurogroup ministers’ meeting that agreement was reached to 
create the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to provide assistance to euro zone members in 
difficulty. In return Germany and its allies in the Council demanded measures from 
those states that were deemed to be facing more growth and fiscal difficulties, 
Spain among them, to ensure that their finances were set on a credible path. In 
particular, concrete and substantial deficit reduction commitments were called for. 
The move was also very much motivated by the need to show to their own 
domestic electorate that the financial assistance had significant strings attached 
and potential recipients would not be allowed to keep pursuing what were 
perceived, correctly or not, as fiscally irresponsible policies (Newman, 2015). The 
agreement involved a hectic and disorganised process, with Minister of Economy 
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and Finance Elena Salgado in Brussels consulting over the telephone with 
President Zapatero and a handful of other trusted advisors. In the end, Spain 
committed to reducing its public deficit by 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2010 and 2011. 
As a senior member of the President Economic Office who was involved in the 
discussion recalled, this was very much a political decision:3 
 
In our case at a political level the agreement was given by the President. 
Then Salgado stayed behind to work out the details. From that political 
decision then followed the technical work of whether the adjustment had to 
be 1.5 per cent or 2 per cent. But the decision was also political; I never 
saw a technical paper saying that the optimum was 1 or 2 per cent. 
 
Spain´s acquiescence in the deal, which implied serious spending cuts, was, 
according to those present, driven by President Zapatero´s resolve that Spain 
should be seen as playing its part in supporting the euro. As we shall shortly see, 
this absolute commitment to being a responsible and trusted member of the 
European project was a defining trait in the Spanish government´s management of 
the crisis. But there were other domestic political factors that played a vital role, as 
the following account shows. 
 
On the morning of Monday 10 May the President gathered with a small group of 
trusted advisors to decide which budget cuts would have to be implemented to 
reach the reduction of 15 billion euro in expenditure that Spain had agreed to, 5 
billion in 2010 and 10 billion in 2011. The measures represented a complete U-
turn on the policies, focused on increased public spending, that had until then 
constituted the hallmark of the Socialist government. The key measures that were 
finally agreed were an average reduction in the pay of civil servants of 5 per cent; 
a freezing of pensions in 2011, with the exception of minimum pensions; the 
scrapping of the 2,500 euro payment for each child born, introduced in 2008; a 
reduction in the price of medicines paid to suppliers; a 6 billion euro cut in public 
investment; a decrease of 600 million euro in foreign aid; doing away with the 
transitory regime for early retirement that had been introduced in 2007; and 
scrapping the retroactive application of social care subsidies under the recent Law 
																																																								3	Research	interview.	
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for the Care of Dependants (Ley de Dependencia) (Congreso de los Diputados, 
2010a). 
 
It is notable that, although the specific measures for adoption were hastily chosen, 
these and other possible policies had been designed, and their effect assessed by 
the technical staff at the Ministry of Economy and Finance during the preparatory 
work for the 2010 budget, as an official involved in preparing these measures 
confirms.4 In other words the financial and political implications of each were well 
understood. According to those present during the discussion and some of those 
that prepared the briefs,5 the decision as to what measures to adopt was certainly 
driven in part by the need to satisfy Spain´s EMU partners, with measures that 
would be quick to implement and leave no doubt as to their effect on deficit 
reduction, thereby regaining the trust of investors. But it was also very much 
driven by domestic political considerations. As a senior official in the President´s 
Office who was involved in the process recalled:6  
 
When Elena [Salgado, Minister of Economy and Finance] came back from 
Brussels we sat down and started to analyse all the possible measures. 
And we did so, to be honest, considering first and foremost what their 
domestic political impact would be, as well of course as the potential 
savings they could yield. For example, we considered the possibility of a 
small charge for medical treatment, but it was immediately ruled out 
because of the political impact it would have on our electorate.  
 
According to various other sources familiar with the process,7 a key driver in the 
decisions was the desire to concentrate the impact on as few sectors as possible, 
and thus try to minimise the political and electoral cost to the government. By 
concentrating the brunt of the costs on public servants and pensioners, the 
government managed to avoid measures that would most have burdened the 
population, such as the co-payment for health treatment in the National Health 
System referred to in the quote above.8  
 																																																								4	Research	interview.	5	Research	interview.	6	Research	interview.	7	Research	interviews.	8	Research	interview.	
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An important outcome of this strategy was the decision to freeze all except 
minimal pensions, probably the most controversial decision taken. According to 
President Rodríguez Zapatero (2013: 77), this decision was taken because he 
was aware that Chancellor Merkel would see it as a clear commitment to reduce 
the deficit and because Spanish bond-holders had repeatedly pointed to pension 
spending as one of their key concerns when it came to assessing the ability of the 
state to serve its debt. However, various members of the President´s political staff 
closely involved in the decision9 pointed out that, in deciding to include pensions in 
the spending cuts, an important factor was that pensioners were more likely to 
vote for the conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular [PP]) (Fernández-
Albertos, 2014). In fact, they had done so again in the previous elections in 2008 
even though the increase in pensions had been unprecedented in the previous 
four years. In other words, the assessment of President Zapatero and his aides 
was that the electoral cost of such a decision would be less than that of other 
alternatives because those affected were not among the groups of core PSOE 
voters. A member of President Zapatero´s inner decision-making circle at the 
Moncloa Presidential Palace recalled this episode well:10 
 
There was an interesting political phenomenon: during the first Zapatero 
term pensions were increased at the highest rate in modern Spanish 
history. And yet our voting intention among pensioners did not increase; it 
actually decreased slightly. This fact weighted heavily when taking the 
decision. We thought that we were not going to win anything politically by 
sheltering pensioners from the cut and that they were not going to punish 
us much more. And, socially, we thought it was much harder on pensioners 
to have to pay for health services than to have their pensions frozen. (…) 
We also wanted to minimise the number of collectives affected by the cuts. 
 
This shows that, even though Germany and its allies in the Council managed to 
impose fiscal adjustments, the specific form that these took was significantly 
shaped by domestic electoral cost calculations.  
 
The decision on which measures to adopt was driven not only by political cost 
considerations but also by ideology. The decision to protect the National Health 
System is a case in point. For most PSOE leaders universal free health-care was 																																																								9	Research	interview.	10	Research	interview.	
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sacrosanct, any measure that would imperil it anathema. Ideology may also have 
played a role in a different way. Although the request for Spain to take tough 
measures was always justified by its EMU partners in terms of the need to 
strengthen the credibility of the euro zone, there was also a sense among 
government members in Spain that the country was being especially punished 
because of its left-leaning government and the appeal that the social policies of 
Zapatero had awakened in Europe in the previous years. For example, a senior 
minister and close confidant of the President recalled:11 
 
I remember a summit we had at the beginning of the Spanish EU 
Presidency in early 2010 at which a senior German socialist figure told me 
to tell Zapatero that they were going after him [the German government] 
because he was the only charismatic progressive leader of one of the big 
European countries. 
 
Political stability was another key factor that motivated the government´s 
acceptance of such tough measures. According to high government officials,12 the 
President´s top team was clear that, if the measures were not adopted, it would 
have been almost inevitable to call a general election, faced with the real prospect 
of a bailout. However, under such market pressures, in the two months before the 
elections could have been held, the country would, in the words one of these 
officials,13 ‘have gone down the drain’. 
 
Finally, the high political cost the decision had for the government, which has 
helped shape the prevailing narrative of the measures of 12 May as a traumatic 
external ‘imposition’, had a lot to do also with the poor manner in which the 
decision was taken and communicated to the public that had become customary 
with the Zapatero administration. In the words of one the most senior members in 
his own staff:14 
 
He [President Zapatero] did not manage it properly at a political, internal 
level. A clear indication of the internal disarray is the fact that, I can tell you, 
of the 15 ministers probably 11 had no idea, had not been consulted or 																																																								11	Research	interview.	12	Research	interview.	13	Research	interview.	14	Research	interview.	
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even informed of the measures, and learnt about them listening to the 
President announce them in Parliament.  
 
A respected economic analyst at one of the nation´s main newspapers concurred 
with the view that the ill-planned manner in which the decision was communicated 
compounded the effect of the measures themselves:15  
 
The problem really was the way Zapatero communicated the decision. It is 
incredible he disposed of such a grave and momentous announcement just 
by monotonously reading two pages in Parliament. That was incompetent. 
In such a situation you have to go on TV, all stations, and explain it i more 
solemnly. But the way he did it, the way he staged it, was a disaster. 
 
Other government officials point to the poor decision-making process as a sign of 
a deeper problem: a lack of political insight. A senior Socialist official who had 
been part of Zapatero´s economic team for years was particularly damming of the 
President´s inability to see the clouds that were gathering in that month of May:16 
  
Zapatero, just as Rajoy later, was never really fully aware of the true 
dimension of the problem he was facing; they did not have the capacity 
really to analyse the problem until it was too late. 
 
Although the domestic political factors outlined above were significant in shaping 
why and how the measures were adopted, they could not neutralize the fact that 
the latter were perceived by the citizenry as imposed from outside, a view which, 
as Fernández-Albertos (2013) has explained, the government also had an interest 
in promoting, as it helped shift the blame for the crisis to external culprits and 
away from the government. As a minister with one of the social portfolios 
trenchantly expressed it:17 ‘They were imposed on us and, in my view, were a 
clear infringement on our sovereignty’.  
 
In large measure because of this perception, the political fallout from the decisions 
was dramatic. Although Spain had not yet been ‘invited’ to accept a bailout at this 
stage, President Zapatero was forced to frame this decision as a ‘sacrifice’ he and 
his party were willing to make for the sake of avoiding such a bailout as well as 																																																								15	Research	interview.	16	Research	interview.	17	Research	interview.	
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preserving Spain´s status as a responsible EU member. In what was probably the 
most remarkable statement to this effect, President Zapatero declared, during the 
debate on the State of the Nation on 14 July (Congreso de los Diputados, 2010b: 
20): 
 
I will take the decisions that Spain needs, even if they are difficult. I will 
follow that path no matter how costly it is and no matter how much it costs 
me…. If there is a contradiction between the interests of the PSOE and 
what Spain needs, I will opt: for what Spain needs. … We need to fulfil our 
commitments to Europe; we need it to strengthen confidence in our 
economy and maintain the trust of investors and of course to transmit an 
image of stability; we need it above everything else in order to continue 
strengthening our productive system and preserve our welfare state. It is 
not easy for a government to address Parliament and the citizenry in such a 
way, and even less so for a government that has persevered during the 
years of economic growth in trying to improve the state of all its citizens and 
especially of those less well off. 
 
This would become a recurring trend: an absolute commitment to membership of 
EMU and avoidance of a bailout, no matter what the consequences. As we shall 
see in the next section, a number of political factors shaped this attitude.  
 
In sum, the decision to adopt the May 2010 cuts was certainly driven to a very 
significant extent by a number of external forces. Firstly, there was the pressure 
exercised by investors, which had started increasing the risk premium on Spanish 
debt, as a result of the contagion of the Greek crisis. And secondly the pressure of 
Spain´s EMU partners, most notably Germany and its allies on this issue in the 
European Council, who demanded fiscal consolidation measures in return for 
creating a more robust mechanism that could send a firm signal of commitment to 
EMU and therefore stop the spread of the erosion of trust to Spain. It is on the 
basis of this decision that most of the existing literature on the management of the 
crisis has predicated the thesis, as shown in the literature review (Armingeon and 
Baccaro, 2012; Hopkins 2013, 2015; Royo, 2013, 2014; Torreblanca, 2014; 
Sanchez-Cuenca, 2014), that domestic political capabilities were rendered 
useless during this episode. However, as shown in the above account, domestic 
political factors played an essential role in both the government´s willingness to 
accept the fiscal adjustment and the form that this adjustment took.  
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Firstly, while it is true that the decision to adopt austerity measures of significant 
scale was forced upon the government and that, as discussed in Chapter 1, the 
bond spread has been shown (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013a, 2013b) to be more 
closely correlated with euro zone systemic risk than with national macroeconomic 
variables. Furthermore, the reason Spain had put itself in such a weak budgetary 
position as to make itself vulnerable to such impositions was mainly, if not almost 
exclusively, the outcome of domestic political factors, especially the failure to 
adopt a debt consolidation plan to accompany the fiscal stimulus announced in 
late 2008 which would have sent a signal to investors of commitment to 
sustainable public finances. In other words, when assessing the factors that forced 
the Spanish government to adopt these undeniably unpopular measures, it is 
important to analyse them not only at the time they were ‘imposed’ but also in a 
wider time period. As acknowledged by a minister in Zapatero´s cabinet, probably 
the best positioned to assess this process:18 
 
We entered the crisis in a relatively comfortable situation. Then things got 
worse because the crisis went further than we had expected, because we 
probably managed some things wrongly and because Europe managed the 
crisis poorly (…). But in 2008 our public debt was still around 40 per cent of 
GDP; we had a margin of 30 percentage points to get to the European 
average, so we were well prepared to face even a very serious fiscal crisis. 
The problem arises in 2009 when Zapatero unleashes a number of 
expenditure policies, driven by purely domestic political motives, which take 
the deficit up to 11 per cent. Even then you could have argued that you had 
6 or 7 deficit percentage points more than you are allowed because of the 
response to the crisis and the G20 Washington agreements. The problem 
is that it is not the same going from a public debt of 40 per cent to 50 per 
cent but providing a credible plan explaining how you are going to stabilise 
your fiscal position than going from 40 to 50 per cent and not saying 
anything. The message you are sending to the markets is that you are 
going to continue with an 11 per cent deficit and all of us who are in this 
business know that to go down from 11 to 3 per cent is very complicated 
and if you allow the 11 to remain, then it will become structural and will be 
extremely difficult to tackle later. 
 
This minister is clear. Even while the May 2010 austerity U-turn was certainly 
made in response to pressure from other euro zone members, the chief reason 
that caused it, concern at the state of public finances, was very much the outcome 
of domestic political decisions during the previous months that allowed the public 																																																								18	Research	interview.	
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finances to get out of control. In other words, when a dynamic rather than static 
analysis is conducted, the fact that Spain arrived at May 2010 with such 
precarious and worrying budgetary figures as to be vulnerable to demands form its 
euro zone partners and to the increase in the bond spread was to a very 
significant extent the result of domestic political decisions. Observing from 
Brussels, a senior European Commission official with long-established ties to 
Spain subscribed to this conclusion:19  
 
Pedro Solbes is in the last few months a weak minister. He is then replaced 
by Elena Salgado, who is seen as even weaker. Meanwhile, the Governor 
of the Bank of Spain is distracted with other things, talking about the need 
to reform the labour market instead of supervising effectively the financial 
system. So the whole situation is really out of synch. And it explodes with 
the public debt crisis and the decisions of May 2010. The reason is 
obvious. This is a country that comes from very low levels of public debt, 
the fiscal stimulus of 2009 increases substantially and puts it on an 
upwards trajectory, which adds to the already very high levels of private 
debt, the increasing bond spread, rating downgrades, increasing difficulties 
in accessing external financing at a reasonable cost, etc. So May 2010 is 
not just an external imposition; it is the first awakening to a set of domestic 
problems that had been brewing. 
 
Secondly, the choice of which measures to adopt was very much the outcome of 
considerations regarding political and electoral cost. The decision to concentrate 
the measures on as few segments of the Socialist electorate as possible is 
evidence of this. Thirdly, the decision was driven by the absolute priority to project 
Spain as a responsible euro zone partner that was prepared to do whatever it took 
to maintain the euro project alive, an attitude imbued by domestic political factors, 
from the desire to maintain the country’s prestige to recognition of the importance, 
as an anchor of stability, that euro membership has traditionally represented in 
Spanish society and among all political parties.20 As confirmed by one of the 
President´s closest economic advisors:21  
 
Zapatero never contemplated Spain doing anything that could lead to 
exiting the euro unilaterally. He did worry that as a result of Spain´s 
problems, and of other countries like Italy, the whole euro project would be 
put in danger. 																																																								19	Research	interview.	20	For	a	fuller	explanation	of	these	factors	see,	for	example,	Hopkins,	2013.	21	Research	interview.	
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And fourthly, the perception of the adjustment measures as a heavy burden 
externally imposed was very much shaped by an interest in blaming external 
scapegoats as well as by the poor manner in which the measures were decided 
and communicated. The pension adjustment was a case in point. The 
announcement was so unexpected and poorly explained that it left an initial but 
lasting impression among the public that it would involve a cut in pension benefits, 
when the reality was that the decision was to maintain the increase in basic 
pensions and only freeze the annual inflation adjustment for the rest, rather than 
reduce them. Yet, as one of the senior member of government directly responsible 
for the design of the austerity package acknowledged:22 
 
The pension reform was explained horribly wrongly. We used a very 
delicate word, probably in order to sell it effectively to the external 
audience, but which did not accurately reflect what we had adopted. 
 
Whether this ineffective communication was caused by the government´s 
customary chaotic decision-making process or actually reflected a lack of 
understanding and ability to deal with the problems it faced is open to question. 
But what is clear is that a difficult set of measures was made far more damaging 
for the government by the manner in which the communication was managed, one 
last instance of how political factors clearly determined the management of this 
phase of the crisis. 
 
 
4.3. The reform of the labour market 
 
Barely a month after the May 2010 U-turn the government took another major 
decision: to reform the labour market. If there was one reform, or lack thereof, that 
by mid 2010 had come to symbolise the slow response to the crisis, it was the 
labour reform. As explained in Chapter 2, and authors like Bentolila et al. (2012a, 
2012b) have analysed in detail, the Spanish labour market had for decades been 
highly inefficient. Even after fifty-two consecutive quarters of growth over two per 
cent up to 2008, unemployment never dropped below eight per cent. Yet the 																																																								22	Research	interview.	
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dramatic increase in employment that accompanied the housing bubble took away 
the pressure to undertake reform. However, by 2010 the recession and the bleak 
growth prospects made that pressure impossible to ignore. Unemployment was 
rocketing and the need to act had become paramount. The President had 
announced the government´s commitment to undertaking labour market reform in 
2008, but crucially he had publicly declared that he would only enact a reform if 
previously agreed upon by both unions and employers. He justified sticking to this 
commitment, even in the very changed circumstances of the crisis, stating that he 
wanted to give social dialogue a chance. But it did not work and after almost two 
years without an agreement, the government finally felt the need to act and 
introduced the reform on 16 June 2010. Adopted by emergency royal decree to 
send a signal of decisive action, it took effect immediately, although it would only 
be enacted in its final form by Parliament in September of that year, with some 
minor changes in exchange for the support, through their abstention, of the PNV 
and CiU, the Basque and Catalonian nationalist parties. 
 
The reform had three main components (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2010a). 
Firstly, it relaxed restrictions for the general applicability of a new type of contract 
with lower dismissal costs, reducing the latter from 45 to 33 days. Secondly, it 
made redundancies easier for employers by making economic losses a lawful 
reason for dismissal. And thirdly, it weakened collective bargaining, by extending 
the scenarios where firm-level agreements could trump sectorial. Although it was 
a far weaker reform than had been demanded of the government from many 
quarters, the unions were fundamentally opposed to it. They accused the 
government of weakening labour protection rights at a time in which the workforce 
was becoming increasingly vulnerable as a result of a crisis for which they had no 
responsibility, and saw the reform as opening the door to further job insecurity. 
This opposition led to a general strike in September 2010 that was not particularly 
successful. Unemployment kept increasing in the following months but the 
government resisted calls for further reform. By the time the PSOE left office in 
December 2011 labour market liberalisation was the most important and urgent 
reform expected of the new conservative government. 
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The failure to adopt a more substantial labour reform remains one of the big 
questions of the Socialist management of the crisis. There was certainly strong 
international pressure to act. Following its 2008 Article IV Consultation with Spain, 
published in April 2009, the IMF (2009: 1) stated clearly that Spain required 
‘vigorous labour market reforms to improve competitiveness, reduce the inflation 
differential with the euro area, and increase productivity’, and went into substantial 
detail on what measures were required: 
 
For instance, wage indexation is inconsistent with membership of a 
currency union. Reducing labour market segmentation, caused by the 
separation of workers into those in permanent versus fixed-term contracts, 
is also necessary to allow well-trained young workers to move into higher-
paid, permanent jobs. Finally, opt-out clauses in collective labour 
agreements should be invoked earlier than is now the case, so that 
companies have a better chance of surviving a downturn and protecting 
jobs. (ibid.) 
 
Within the EU institutions and other European capitals, especially Berlin, there 
was also an increasing wariness about the level of unemployment in Spain. These 
worries arose not just out of solidarity. In a context in which the average 
unemployment rate in the EU was 10 per cent (Statistical Office of the European 
Union, 2014), Spain, already close to 20 per cent, was clearly an outlier. While in 
the past Spain´s unemployment levels had been purely a domestic problem, the 
advent of EMU and the effect that unemployment could have on the Spanish 
financial system threatened to be a destabilising factor for the whole of the EU. 
This meant that the problem was no longer only domestic.  
 
Finally, as we have just seen, by June 2010 concerns about the sustainability of 
the public finances of the European periphery, including Spain, were increasing 
among bond investors. The significant increase in the bond spread, which reached 
its euro era historic high of 209 basic points in the days before the announcement 
of the reform (Expansión, 2015) is clear evidence of this. The concern of 
international investors had of course to do with the sudden increase in public 
expenditure, caused in part by the massive increase in unemployment benefit 
costs, which had led to a public deficit of almost 11 per cent in 2009, but also to 
concerns about the country´s growth potential to repay its debt and absence of 
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structural reforms to deal with the country´s imbalances. The labour market was 
the most often cited.23 Given Spain´s dire need of access to international credit 
markets it was obviously in its best interest to adopt substantial labour reform that 
could send a signal in the direction that investors were demanding. 
 
Yet the reality is that the reform adopted by the government was far less profound 
than international pressure had demanded. Had international pressure really been 
the driving factor, the reform would have taken a different shape. Firstly, it would 
have been completed sooner, as it was seen as key to redeeming Spain´s 
economic woes that were starting to have a destabilising effect in Europe. And 
secondly, and most importantly, and for the same reason as above, it would have 
been far more profound. The question therefore remains: if the government´s 
reforming credentials and confidence of international institutions and investors 
depended to a significant extent on undertaking substantial reform, why did the 
government not undertake it? A number of domestic political factors can help 
explain why, and go to show how, in the absence of a bailout, it was these 
domestic factors that were the key forces that shaped the government’s 
management of this aspect of the crisis. 
 
The first and most obvious was the self-imposed commitment, mentioned above, 
to undertake only a reform agreed upon by trade unions and employers’ 
representatives. It is quite remarkable that the President would make approval of 
such an important reform, which was likely to harm the interests of trade unions, 
conditional upon their prior acceptance of it. As a secretary of state at the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance said,24 ‘it handcuffed the government’. Paradoxical as it 
may seem, there were a number of reasons for this. Probably the most important 
was the ascendancy that trade unions had over the government in general and the 
President in particular, through various mechanisms. At one level, the President 
had close personal relations with trade union leaders, who significantly influenced 
his view of the labour market. In the words of a close ally of President Zapatero in 
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	 145	
his years of opposition and minister during the first Socialist term:25 ‘Zapatero was 
indeed very influenced by the trade unions, and in particular by Cándido Mendez’, 
Secretary General of the General Union of Workers (Unión General de 
Trabajadores [UGT]), the country´s second largest trade union. A secretary of 
state in the Ministry of Economy and Finance also referred to Mr Mendez as a 
‘Vice-President in the shadows’.26 
 
President Zapatero was also ideologically close to the trade unions. In the words 
of a senior member of the President´s Office27 ‘Zapatero certainly felt closer to the 
unions than to business, as he saw himself as a representative of the workers’, a 
point also made by one of the highest-ranking officials at the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance:28 
 
The great problem with Zapatero is that he saw himself as the defender of the 
unions’ interests, not least because he thought he was President thanks to 
them. My first big fight came when he announced that he would not agree to 
any labour reform the unions did not find acceptable. 
 
 
Many other government members were also, for historical and understandable 
reasons in a socialist party, closer to the trade union world than they were to 
business. In the words of a union member and later Minister of Labour:29 
 
Zapatero had good relations with the trade unions; we all had because of 
our political past. We had also put in place a lot of good social policies from 
2004 to 2008, so until then they looked upon the PSOE government with 
sympathy.  
 
Finally, there was a constant preoccupation with having the trade unions on the 
government´s side, or at least not provoking active opposition, as there was 
always the underlying menace of a general strike. This same minister ascribed 
Zapatero´s close relations with the unions less to personal or ideological reasons 
and more to these tactical considerations:30 																																																								25	Research	interview.	26	Research	interview.	27	Research	interview.	28	Research	interview.	29	Research	interview.	30	Research	interview.	
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I don´t think it is fair to say that Zapatero was hijacked by unions. The issue 
is that he was aware of the electoral cost of having the unions against you. 
We know from historical experience that when the unions call a general 
strike against a left-wing government it always leads to right-wing 
governments. So that is why Zapatero wanted to keep a level of agreement 
with the unions, but it is not true that they are responsible for the way the 
crisis was managed. 
 
This closeness to the unions is key to understanding why a more substantial 
reform was not adopted, as the unions were completely opposed to it. The first 
reason was, of course, ideological. Trade unions were against any measure that 
would diminish employment protection, as, in their analysis, the origins of Spain´s 
unemployment were to be found less in the protective legislation and more in the 
abuse of this legislation by business. Attempts to make the labour market more 
flexible by decreasing labour protection had been the source of previous 
confrontations with socialist governments. A former minister in the Socialist 
government in the 1980s who is still active in Spanish politics described how 
President Felipe González was forced to change his economic policies after the 
first general strike of the democratic period and adopt a much more expansionary 
fiscal policy than his economic team had recommended.31  
 
However, it is notable that this ideological opposition to reform was held not only 
by the trade unions. Ministry of Labour officials refused to accept the analysis 
extended among economists and international institutions that the labour 
legislation was one of the key causes for Spain´s employment woes. A Minister of 
Labour in Zapatero´s government said: ‘I am not one of those that thinks that in 
Spain there was a problem with the cost of firing’32. As evidence of this he cited 
the fact that three quarters of Spain´s unemployment during the crisis took place 
in the construction sector, which was obviously very vulnerable to a downturn:33 
 
The sector went from 800,000 jobs in 1984 to 2,700,000 in 2007, and by 
2015 it had gone down again to around 900,000. But, as I say, when the 
crisis struck, we had 2,700,000, and another half a million of indirect jobs, 																																																								31	Research	interview.	32	Research	interview.	33	Research	interview.	
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so we knew that if the crisis struck, as was probable, we would have a deep 
employment crisis. That much we certainly knew.  
 
Ideological doubts about the merits of some of the measures demanded by the 
business community, especially the lowering of dismissal costs, came not only 
from the Ministry of Labour. An official at the highest level of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance also expressed her doubts about views that placed Spain´s 
labour market´s dismal performance solely on the cost of dismissal:34 
 
No one can tell me that in this country it was not easy to dismiss when in the 
previous quarter 700,000 have lost their jobs. Therefore, dismissing can be 
neither expensive nor difficult. Because at the time the discussion was really 
about making dismissal cheaper; that what was people meant when they 
spoke of labour reform. 
 
The second reason for the unions’ opposition to the reform was that, in the words 
of a senior official at the Ministry of Labour,35 ‘the trade unions did not understand 
the gravity of the situation’. The unions underestimated the anxiety that was taking 
hold of public opinion and the increased calls on the government to do whatever it 
took to stem the dramatic rise in unemployment. 
 
The opposition of organised interests to the reform was not limited to the trade 
unions. Employer representatives also played a key role in placing obstacles. The 
main employers’ association, the Spanish Confederation of Business 
Organisations (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales 
[CEOE]) had a strategic interest in opposing an agreement, as it could help 
expedite the loss of power by the PSOE and the arrival of the PP, much more 
aligned with their interests. Furthermore, the personal circumstances of the people 
involved also proved to be crucial. The CEOE was headed by Gerardo Díaz 
Ferrán, who was at the time facing serious financial difficulty with his companies 
and accusations of corruption that would eventually lead to his conviction and 
imprisonment. According to various government officials36 Mr Díaz Ferrán´s tough 
stance in the labour reform negotiations was in no small part aimed at forcing the 																																																								34	Research	interview.	35	Research	interview.	36	Research	interviews.	
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government to assist him with his private difficulties. A senior member of the 
President´s Economic Office complained:37 ‘the head of the CEOE had his own 
personal problems with the law and he put this before the general interest by 
refusing to help with the labour reform’. Various government officials agree that it 
was an unfortunate coincidence, and one that certainly influenced events, that at 
that crucial time the CEOE was headed by someone who was not a trusted 
partner and had no interest in reaching an agreement. In the words of a senior 
official at the Ministry of Labour:38 ‘in order to persuade you need someone at the 
other end that is prepared to listen: you can´t persuade someone that has closed 
ears’. 
 
Trade unions and employer associations were therefore unified in their opposition 
to the reform. And beyond their particular interests and reasons for their position, 
there was another common thread: corporatism. As seen in Chapters 1 and 2, and 
analysed among others by Fishman (2013), Hopkins (2011, 2012) or Molinas 
(2013) the heritage of the francoist dictatorship has led to an economic structure in 
Spain in which, to this day, there is a deep enmeshing of the public and the 
private. Trade unions are not exempt from these dealings. For example, a well-
known practice has been for the different governments since the transition to 
democracy to allocate to the unions the funds for vocational training as an indirect 
way of financing the trade unions. One of Spain´s preeminent economic 
commentators subscribed this point:39 
 
Trade unions played a positive role through the transition to democracy by 
helping to keep wages contained when it was needed. The price to pay was 
maintaining corporatist structures that were a bit obsolete. 
 
Therefore, even if they had competing objectives, this corporatism led to a vested 
interest among trade unions and business representative organisations in 
maintaining the existing institutional structures, for example when it came to 
collective bargaining. As a senior economic policy-maker who has been at the 
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centre of Spanish politics since the 1980s and knows well the workings of the 
Spanish economy put it:40 
 
Unions and business organisation have the same origins, the dictatorship´s 
‘vertical unions’, so they share an interest in maintaining these structures.  
Social dialogue and collective bargaining are ways of their securing control 
of the system and it is always difficult to break. 
 
Opposition to the labour reform came not only from these organised interests but 
also from within the ranks of the PSOE itself. The labour reform had become 
associated with the ‘neoliberal’ agenda of the Spanish right and to many in the 
party agreeing to a reform that would undermine workers’ rights was not only 
going against principle but also political suicide. President Zapatero himself had 
said, not only in opposition but also in government, that workers’ rights would 
never be weakened under his presidency. His opposition and that of the party to 
fundamental reform were therefore firm and longstanding. As a minister in his 
government, who for years was also one of this closest economic advisor years 
and knew his thinking on the matter well, said:41 
 
Zapatero´s opposition to the labour reform was really political. He was open 
to other reforms that were politically costly, but not to this one. Even after 
2010, when he has paid the political price for change in his policies, he was 
still against it.  
 
Another senior member of the President´s economic team who was a key figure in 
the negotiations shared this view:42  
 
The weak reform of the labour market was clearly a political decision. 
Unlike the pension reform, when it came to labour reform the economic 
team was unable to persuade the President. The political cost he perceived 
was just too high.  
 
There was also a concern among party officials43 that structural reform could harm 
consumption, reinforcing the recession. This also suggested an ideological 
division. While technocratic staff tended to favour supply side reforms, the 																																																								40	Research	interview.	41	Research	interview.	42	Research	interview.	43	Research	interview.	
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pressure from the political quarters was always for demand-side measures that 
would, it was argued, increase economic activity and job creation. 
 
Beyond the role of organised interests, ideology or party preferences, another 
factor that is critical to understanding why the labour reform was managed as it 
was is the absence of a parliamentary majority. The PSOE now relied on the 
support of the PNV and CIU, the Basque and Catalonian nationalist parties, who 
demanded concessions of greater decentralization, which were politically very 
difficult for the government. Furthermore, these centre-right parties were generally 
in favour of greater labour market flexibility, so any agreement would have taken 
the government even farther away from the unions. In the view of one of the 
ministers involved in the negotiation:44 
 
Had the government had an absolute majority, the reform would have been 
different. It would have avoided a general strike, not because the reform would 
have been weaker but because we would have been able to compensate for it 
in other areas. 
 
One last factor that influenced the management of the labour reform was the 
divisions among government departments and the chaotic decision-making 
process this led to. As could be expected, the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
was more in favour of deeper reform than was the Ministry of Labour, traditionally 
the representative in government of the interests of the trade unions and with 
close ties to them. Disagreement was therefore to be expected. A Minister of 
Labour, for example, complained that the Ministry of Economy and Finance did 
not allow the necessary flexibility to reach an agreement:45 
 
They were too orthodox. They did not see, for example, the value of 
spending money on employment services. Spain has 7,500 civil servants 
devoted to it, France 35,000. Adding 3,000 cost 90 million euro, while we 
spend 30 billion euro in employment benefits. But it was very difficult to 
obtain. Why? Because of a serious lack of understanding of how the 
employment market works. They only cared about the cost of firing and of 
unemployment benefits. During a cabinet meeting we spent over one hour 
arguing whether to raise the minimum salary by 1.2 or 1.3 per cent. 
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What was more unusual and proved detrimental to the prospects of a more 
effective reform was the way in which these disagreements were managed. A 
senior member of the President´s political staff recalled46, for example, how the 
President would organise meetings with trade unions and the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance and side with the unions during discussion, weakening the position of 
his own minister. This idiosyncratic approach to the management of the reform 
was well illustrated by an episode recounted in similar terms by two senior 
members of the President´s economic team. 47  During internal government 
discussion on the key measures of the labour reform, the more reform-minded 
staff had been defending the idea of introducing a single contract of employment 
to replace the many existing. Trade unions had traditionally been against it as they 
saw in it a mechanism to lower dismissal costs for a large segment of the work 
force. The Ministry of Labour had also been adamantly against it, according to one 
of its senior officials.48 It cited doubts about its constitutionality, claiming that it 
undermined the principle of collective bargaining inscribed in the Constitution, 
although the real reason had more to do with an ideological stand. As has been 
described, the Ministry was imbued with an approach to labour relations heavily 
influenced by trade unions. Valeriano Gómez, the Ministry´s number two during 
the first term and who would go on to become Minister of Labour in the last years 
of the second term, was himself a member of UGT, the country´s second largest 
trade union. Celestino Corbacho, the minister at the time, was however not as 
greatly influenced by trade unions, and although publicly against the single 
contract, had privately expressed his willingness to consider it.49 The staff at the 
President´s Economic Office took a favourable view and intended to persuade the 
President to incorporate it in the labour reform. According to those closely involved 
in the process,50 the day prior to the reform text’s being taken to the council of 
ministers for approval and being publicly announced, the head of the President´s 
Economic Office asked a senior member of his staff to work with the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance to prepare a proposal for the inclusion of the single 																																																								46	Research	interviews.	47	Research	interviews.	48	Research	interviews.	49	Research	interview.	50	Research	interviews.	
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contract in the labour reform. A brief was presented to the President, who, 
according to these sources, was enthusiastic about it and ordered it to be included 
in the reform, unknown to the Minister of Labour. That night a meeting was 
convened, headed by the President´s Chief of Staff, to finalise the details of the 
labour reform. Once the officials of the Ministry of Labour had left the room, the 
issue of the single contract was raised. At that time Mr Campa, Secretary of State 
for the Economy, arrived at the meeting and was told about the proposal, of which 
he was unaware. He expressed some hesitation, the result as much of surprise as 
reluctance to support the idea without having had time to consider it. A senior 
member of the President´s political staff, who was known by the economic team to 
be sceptical of the idea, took advantage of the situation to express his own 
doubts. At the same time, according to these sources, Mr Corbacho was informed 
of the proposal. On learning of it, he threated to resign publicly the following day. 
The reason he offered was that such a measure was sure to lead to a general 
strike and he could not support such a policy. Yet, according to officials familiar 
with his decision,51 the reaction was driven just as much by his anger at the way 
the process had been managed and the need to defend his political authority 
against what he saw as the economic team´s attempt to act behind his back. The 
above is a good example both of how the pressure of organised interests, a 
chaotic decision-making process and personal considerations shape the content 
of the reform and led to its being far weaker than international institutions such as 
the IMF were demanding. 
 
One final factor for explaining the refusal of President Zapatero to impose a more 
aggressive reform was his consensus-oriented personality. According to a minister 
in his government:52 ‘Zapatero believed in social dialogue and he encouraged his 
ministers to practice it’. He believed in it even to the point of being naïve, 
according to more critical officials:53 ‘He had this naïve optimistic view that we 
could achieve anything we wanted’. 
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To summarise, the above account shows how, while external constraints, most 
notably the incipient euro zone sovereign crisis, clearly influenced the 
government´s timing in finally bringing about the labour market reform, the actual 
content and limited scope of the reform owes much to a number of domestic 
political factors. First and foremost was the influence of influence of organised 
interests, mainly the trade unions and the employers’ organisations. The 
opposition of the trade unions was for obviously corporatist reasons, but they also 
had a firm and long-established ideological view that the way to deal with 
unemployment and get a more effective labour market was not by making it more 
flexible. What is even more important is that many members of government, 
including the President and those that led the Ministry of Labour, shared this view, 
even if in a more qualified manner. The personal characteristics and judgement of 
the key protagonists were also important. President Zapatero was someone who 
clearly had a very consensus-orientated approach and this led to the loss of two 
precious years. For his part, the head of the CEOE at the time was, for the 
reasons explained above, an almost impossible partner with whom the 
government could have reached an agreement. Ideology was also clearly at play, 
conditioning the views not only of the trade unions but also of senior government 
members. Parliamentary dynamics were clearly also key. The absence of an 
absolute majority clearly conditioned the ability of the government to make the 
reform more palatable by creating a more integral reform that could have granted 
concessions in other areas. Finally, the often-chaotic decision-making process, 
while not in itself being an obstacle to the reform, did prevent it from being 
designed and planned in a more functional manner.  
 
 
4.4. The threat of a bailout 
 
The May 2010 decision had inaugurated a period of austerity for Spain, driven by 
an overarching aim: in the words of President Rodríguez Zapatero (2013: 107) 
himself, ‘after 12 May the big priority became to avoid a bailout of the country’. 
Such a scenario became increasingly likely as 2010 progressed, mainly as result 
of the troubles in the euro zone, paradoxically coinciding with the Spanish 
presidency of the EU. 
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By June the effect of the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) had disappeared and investors’ lack of confidence in Spain returned, 
compounded by the woes of the financial sector, which on 22 May had seen a 
second caja, Caja Sur, bailed out. The passing of the labour reform did nothing to 
stem the loss of confidence in Spain’s economic prospects. The Spanish risk 
premium kept rising and by 17 June it reached 211 points (Expansion, 2015), 
despite the labour reform’s having been announced the previous day.  
 
During the month of June rumours started to appear again in the international 
press regarding the supposed imminence of a bailout of Spain. Although such a 
request had not really been made at that stage, the first such unofficial suggestion 
did actually come just a few days later, during a private visit of the then IMF 
Managing Director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn to the Moncloa Presidential Palace 
after the meeting of the European Council on 17 June. According to President 
Zapatero (2013: 56), at that meeting Strauss-Kahn suggested for the first time that 
Spain accept a precautionary credit line, arguing that such a move would help 
ease tensions building up against the euro. President Zapatero firmly rejected this 
request. His argument was that Spain´s fundamentals were solid and that, if Spain 
were to accept a bailout now, it would imply that the sacrifices that had been 
asked of the nation in the measures announced the previous month were in vain. 
However, and according to a number of those involved in the decision, the 
reasons for the refusal even to contemplate a bailout were far more complex and 
often of a domestic political nature. 
 
Firstly, there was of course the issue of the social costs a bailout would entail. By 
then the government already had evidence of the impact bailouts had had in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal. As a senior figure in the government´s economic 
team who was intimately involved in this issue said:54 ‘the social cost for the 
country weighted heavily on all of us; we had the absolute conviction that it would 
take over 20 years to come out from such a bailout’. 
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Secondly, the government worried about the political cost that a bailout would 
entail for the government and for the PSOE. As one of the senior staff at the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance who played a leading role in negotiations with 
the European Commission noted:55  
 
All of the political parties that took part in a bailout (…) have been wiped 
out: in Ireland, Papandreou in Greece, and Socrates in Portugal. The 
political consequences, from the point of view of a political leader, have not 
only to do with the stigma; it is also about his or her death as a political 
leader and possibly of his party. 
 
That, in his assessment of the bailout, political and not only economic 
considerations weighed heavily on Zapatero, was corroborated by a senior 
socialist figure then out of the government but who knew the President well having 
been part of his close team for many years:56 
 
I have no doubt in my mind that the main reason why Zapatero opposed a 
bailout was one of prestige and power dynamics, and not the cost of the 
bailout. He, and Minister Salgado, sold their decision to impose the May 
2010 cuts with the argument that had they refused a bailout would have 
followed which would have eventually led to deeper cuts. I have my doubts, 
because it is evident that in the case of Greece, Portugal and Ireland the 
problem was a budgetary one but in the case of Spain the problem was a 
financial one, and that is why eventually we did have a financial bailout, 
among other things because there was not enough money to make a 
budgetary bailout of Spain. That is why I think the decision is driven more 
by a question of power, of how Zapatero saw a possible bailout by the 
Troika in terms as a threat to his persona and his position in history. (…).  
 
Thirdly, it is important to understand that, as already noted, Spanish membership 
of the European project has traditionally represented, for all parties, a symbol of 
Spain´s democratic normalisation after Franco´s dictatorship and been seen as an 
anchor of political stability and economic reformism and dynamism. As Hopkins 
(2015: 3) has explained, Spain joined the euro for the twin reasons of 
consolidating democracy and maintaining benefits from transfers. Consequently, 
remaining a model and respectable EU member has been a priority for Spanish 
governments of all colours. According to a socialist figure that has held senior 
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positions in both Spain and the EU, 57 the leading role that Felipe Gonzalez played 
in the construction of the EU also weighed heavily on the new generation of 
leaders like Zapatero. Because of this, doing whatever was necessary to be seen 
as a responsible EMU partner, capable of dealing with its own affairs without 
outside help, was a powerful driver of the absolute refusal to consider a bailout. In 
the words of a senior member of government at the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance:58	
 
For Spain it is an identity and historical issue. We have a national aspiration 
to be inside Europe that other countries don´t have. For Spain, I think, and 
for the current generation of leaders in this country, the weight of the past, 
of 98 [the regeneration movement of 1898], is a determinant motive to want 
to be part of Europe. 
 
A direct consequence of this ‘historical imperative’, of needing to be seen as a 
good European partner, was the strategy set by the government to distinguish 
itself from other southern European countries also in difficulty. This refusal to be 
grouped with the southern states was in part driven by the attempt to decouple 
itself from other economies with worse fundamentals. But it was also driven by the 
desire to remain a model EU partner which, according to some of his advisors,59 
blinded Zapatero to what could have been a more effective strategy:  joining Italy 
and other periphery countries to form a powerful southern block which would have 
had greater negotiating power, at least in the early stages of the crisis. In fact 
President Zapatero complains bitterly in his memoirs that even his own staff had 
fallen into the trap of framing Spain as part of this block when his office gave him a 
brief entitled ‘Why Spain is not Greece’ (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013: 69).  
 
A fourth consideration, closely related to the above, was the impact a bailout 
would have had in the self-confidence of the nation. President Rodríguez Zapatero 
(2013: 309) was adamant that ‘a bailout would have implied (…) stigmatisation 
both by ourselves and the world’. Other government officials were of the same 
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opinion, as described by a senior member of the policy planning staff at the 
President´s Office:60  
 
It was a decision driven by the need to maintain the trust of the country in 
itself. A bailout would have completely undermined the trust in the country 
of Spaniards themselves and also of those outside. It is a stigma that you 
would probably spend twenty years overcoming and would have had an 
enormous domestic political cost. That was key to the decision. 
 
As the above quote suggests, the stigma that acceptance of a bailout would have 
represented weighed heavily on decision-makers. Even a Secretary of State at the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, known for his pragmatic views, concurred:61  
 
The problem is that during the crisis the policy solutions were offered only 
to the ‘badly behaved countries’ and that had an intolerable component of 
stigma, which made it very difficult to accept. For example, the programme 
of debt acquisition in the secondary markets was only offered to the 
countries in difficulties while a program could have been designed to buy 
massively in the secondary market bonds of from all member countries. 
Conditionality was only imposed on the ‘bad countries’ and that goes 
completely against the spirit of the euro, which was a success at its 
creation precisely because it was led by the countries that were seen as 
‘good’, not only by those who would benefit the most. 
 
Related to the above were of course issues concerning what was perceived as an 
assault on state sovereignty and the importance of preserving it, often ignoring the 
consequences that membership of the euro zone implies. A Director General in 
the President´s Economic Office summarised well the view held throughout 
government when he asserted:62  
 
Of course a bailout was in the air, but there was common agreement, even 
without any economic estimates of the different alternatives, that that 
scenario was very negative, and not only in economic, but also in political 
and social terms. That is where the decision to avoid a bailout at all costs 
comes from; and from the desire of Spaniards to be able to choose freely in 
the elections a President rather than having one imposed as happened in 
Italy (…). Legitimacy is important: who are they, what legitimacy do they 
have, to take away our sovereignty? 
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Sixthly, the position was certainly also driven by issues of the personality of the 
President himself and his conception of power. According to a senior political 
advisor at the Moncloa Palace:63 
 
A bailout would have implied for Zapatero negating himself. For all the 
difficulties of imposing the cuts of May 2010, he chose which cuts to make, 
so they were still within his control. But a bailout would have implied ceding 
control, and it would have affected those things that were sacred to the 
PSOE and to himself, such as core public services like health and 
education. This is why one of the decisions he delayed as much as he 
could until it became impossible to avoid was the scrapping of the 2,500- 
euro baby-cheque, because it was something he himself had implemented 
and its scrapping meant negating himself. 
 
Closely connected to this issue was of course the lethal impact that accepting a 
bailout would have had on President Zapatero´s legacy. Many of those 
interviewed64 agreed that this factor weighed heavily on his absolute refusal to 
consider a bailout and that a certain ‘epic’ strand of resistance characterised his 
behaviour in this critical phase of the crisis. Like any senior politician, Zapatero 
refused to contemplate a decision that would certainly have involved his political 
death and a serious stain on his legacy. A minister during Zapatero´s first term, 
who knew him well, having been part of the team that gained power with him, was 
clear about this:65  
 
For Zapatero, not being removed from power was an absolute. He had 
decided early on that he would leave at the end of his second term. But for 
him, as for every president, how he left power and how he would be seen 
by history were very important. By May 2010 he has seen the collapse of 
his two great dreams, ending ETA´s [Basque terrorist group] terrorism and 
strengthening the unity of Spain on a new basis, and now he sees that his 
only lasting positive legacy, a good economic record, is also collapsing 
because the crisis is far worse than expected. He sees the real danger of 
being removed from power and going down in history as a failed president. 
And that is unacceptable to him. 
 
Seventhly, there was among the technical staff66 an honest perception that, for 
Spain, the bailout design was fundamentally flawed, as it was designed to 																																																								63	Research	interview.	64	Research	interviews.	65	Research	interview.	66	Research	interviews.	
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guarantee access to the markets to finance the public debt whereas in Spain the 
main problem was one of excessive private debt and external financing. And, even 
in the worst circumstances, there was still a conviction that Spanish fundamentals 
did not justify a bailout. A high-ranking official at the President´s Economic Office 
was adamant:67  
 
Our refusal to accept a bailout came from two considerations. Firstly, that 
we were convinced that our fundamentals were solid and did not merit 
being bailed out. And secondly, political considerations of the enormous 
cost it would have for the country and also for the government. 
 
Finally, it is indicative of how the factors driving the decision were much more 
domestic and political in nature than economic, that a senior source in the 
President´s Office confirms that never was any analysis conducted to estimate the 
potential cost of a bailout, even as a scenario exercise. This remarkable fact was 
confirmed by the two key members of Zapatero´s team that would have been at 
the centre of any such effort: a high official at the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance (‘No, the Ministry never did any scenario analysis to calculate the 
potential impact of a bailout’), and a senior member of the President´s Economic 
Office (‘It is true. We never made any estimate of the potential cost of leaving the 
euro. It is not an easy analysis to do but in any case it was never ever considered 
as an option’). 68 
 
In sum, the decision to avoid a bailout at all costs seems to have been driven, at 
least to a significant degree, by highly political considerations. This conclusion 
was well explained by a minister: 69 
 
Yes, it is true; Zapatero became obsessed with the fact that politically it 
would be very negative for the country. In my view it is debatable whether 
having accepted a precautionary credit line would actually have been that 
bad. I understand what Zapatero did, to fight against the bailout, but I don´t 
know if I would have become so obsessed as he about it. He did become 
very obsessed and afraid of the political consequences. I was not so afraid 
then, I was more afraid early on, when I saw the mistakes we were making 
that eventually led us to such a vulnerable position. He was the other way 																																																								67	Research	interview.	68	Research	interviews.	69	Research	interview.	
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around. He was not afraid at the beginning but he became much more 
afraid later on. It probably has to do with the fact that he is more political 
than I am and in the early stages, although the economic problems were 
brewing, they did not create any immediate political dangers. But by 2010 
and 2011 the political dangers were very real. I assume that is what he was 
afraid of, having a serious confrontation in the country if we accepted a 
bailout. 
 
 
4.5. Reform in a worsening euro crisis 
 
In any case, Spain´s refusal of the precautionary credit line offered by Mr Strauss-
Kahn was accepted and both the EU and the IMF came out in support of Spain 
and the adjustment measures it had adopted in May and its labour market reform. 
The pronouncements coincided with a reduction in the bond spread to 170 points 
by 20 June. In fact, Spain´s austerity drive was part of a larger trend. The G20 
Toronto meeting held on 26 June marked the end of the fiscal stimuli era and 
made austerity mainstream, with the governor of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, 
penning an op-ed in the Financial Times just a few weeks later, with the telling title 
of ‘Stimulate no more - it is not time for all to tighten’ (Trichet, 2010). 
 
It was an unfortunate coincidence that such fiscal tightening took place just as the 
Spanish economy was regaining strength, growing 0.1 per cent during the first 
quarter of 2010 and thus technically emerging from recession. In fact, the 
government devoted the following months, when it appeared the worse of the 
storm had passed, to the twin goals of controlling the deficit and completing the 
reform agenda. As we shall see in the following paragraphs, these reforms were 
shaped by external forces but also by domestic political factors. 
 
 
4.5.1. The second and third reforms of the financial sector 
The government turned its attention first to the financial sector. In July 2010 the 
government approved the Ley de Cajas de Ahorros (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 
2010b). The law was aimed at transforming the juridical nature of the cajas, 
allowing them to become public companies, raise their own capital in the open 
markets and compete freely with the banks without the legal and governance 
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restraints they had faced until then. In essence the reform´s goal was to put an 
end to the idiosyncratic cajas’ system and transform them into regular, market-
disciplined, financial institutions. 
 
The first ECB stress tests were conducted the same month. By then the worries 
about the state of the Spanish financial system were widespread and, in an 
attempt to use transparency as a way of calming international markets, the 
government and the Bank of Spain agreed to expose the practical totality of 
Spanish financial institutions to the stress tests. Only four small institutions were 
deemed to require recapitalisation, totalling 1.8 billion euro, a fact that reinforced 
the government´s complacent attitude. As one of the President´s senior political 
staff admitted:70  
 
The reform of the financial sector was not undertaken before because there 
was really not a realisation of the need to do it. The result of the stress tests 
was almost optimal. 
 
February 2011 saw the third and last significant reform conducted by the Socialist 
administration in the financial sector, with the Plan to Strengthen the Financial 
System (Plan de Reforzamiento del Sector Financiero) (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 
2011a). Its aim was to complement the 2009 reform, adequately recapitalise 
weakened financial institutions in line with the Basel III agreements finalised in 
December 2010 and try to put an end to the mistrust in the Spanish financial 
system. The following month the Bank of Spain published the results of its 
assessment in the application of the new capital rations established by the reform, 
identifying thirteen institutions requiring 17 billion euros and asking these 
institutions to submit capital raising strategies within a month, which they duly 
secured. 
 
All these measures led to a reform that the government and the Bank of Spain 
considered sufficient. Yet that would of course prove not to be the case. 
International investors continued to have doubts about the solvency of the system, 
in particular its exposure to the property sector, not only mortgages but also loans 
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to developers, and the value at which property assets were held in their balance 
sheets. In the first months of the PP government, a period that falls outside of the 
scope of this dissertation, the predicament of Spanish banks would significantly 
worsen. The bailout of Bankia, the third largest lender in the nation at the time, 
would be just the most dramatic signal in the path to a full bailout of the Spanish 
financial system in June 2012.  
 
The measures taken to restructure and recapitalise the Spanish financial sector 
during this phase of the crisis were undeniably driven by external constraints, 
most importantly the relentless pressure of international investors, the constant 
menace of a bailout and the need to keep earning the trust of investors and EU 
partners. However, as was discussed at length in the preceding chapter and 
Otero-Iglesias et al. (2016) have explored in detail, a number of domestic factors 
are crucial to explaining why Spain conducted the reform in such a piecemeal and 
unsatisfactory way as in the end to prove inadequate and force a bailout of the 
sector. From resistance from the politically governed cajas to their reform, to the 
lobbying pressure of the financial sector and the failings of the Bank of Spain and 
its governor, domestic political factors are essential to explaining how the reform 
was conducted. It is illustrative of this that, even four years later, a senior official at 
the highest level of the Bank of Spain still defended the manner in which this 
aspect of the crisis was managed, with reasonable arguments:71 
 
Zapatero did not act late on financial reform, at least compared with the 
others. True, we estimated housing prices would fall by 18 per cent and 
they fell by 50 per cent. But all were wrong, not only we. And, even so, if at 
the time we had said that prices were going to fall by 50 per cent and banks 
had to provision for that, all banks would have had to be nationalised, which 
would have been very damaging not only politically but also economically. 
Instead we slowly raised the necessary capital for the system, over 160 
billion euro, through a variety of mechanisms that had no cost for the 
taxpayer: emptying the Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos, getting capital 
from the cajas, and banks raising capital in the private markets. 
  
 
 
 																																																								71	Research	interview.	
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4.5.2. The 2011 budget 
 
Another key chapter in the management of the crisis was to take place during the 
autumn of 2010 when, in October, the government negotiated the 2011 budget. A 
clear conditioning factor in this process, as acknowledged by President Rodríguez 
Zapatero (2013: 205) and many of those interviewed,72 was the parliamentary 
arithmetic, reflecting the fact that Parliament was another key domestic arena 
where the management of the crisis played out. While the government had never 
enjoyed an absolute majority during its whole term, after the unpopular measures 
taken in May it had become much more toxic to support it. Having abandoned the 
social policies that had allowed the PSOE to count on the support of left-leaning 
parties in Parliament, the budget was the first occasion on which the government 
could fall. The most important partner was the PNV, the Basque Nationalist Party, 
as it was the only party with a significant number of votes that could support the 
government on specific issues and, with the support of other minor parties, build a 
sufficient majority for the rest of the term.  
 
In the end it was indeed with the support of the PNV that the government was able 
to pass the budget as well as other key pieces of legislation in the following 
months, a crucial period in the management of the crisis. This support had much 
more to do with domestic political factors than with the undeniable external 
pressure the country was under. According to what President Zapatero has 
himself acknowledged in his memoirs, and corroborated by sources interviewed 
that were close to the negotiations,73 the impulse that led the PNV –a centre-right 
party which in principle shared little ideological ground with the PSOE when it 
came to economic policy and which was actually the opposition to the PSOE 
government in the Basque country – to support the government was the shared 
view of the strategy necessary to bring to an end the terrorism of ETA. The PNV 
had an interest in the Zapatero government’s remaining in office for this purpose 
and the support of its key economic policies was a price worth paying. It was 
therefore a domestically political issue, and one unrelated to economic policy, 
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which allowed the government to keep on track its economic policy and the 
commitments given to its EMU partners in terms of budget consolidation. 
 
The passing of the budget gave the government room to manoeuvre and sent a 
message of confidence to international investors and EU partners at a difficult 
time, as the problems in Ireland were becoming more acute and would eventually 
lead to a bailout the following month. Yet the effect of the fiscal restraint measures 
started to show, leading to a decline in economic activity that made unemployment 
rise from 19 per cent in January 2010 to 20.3 in December 2010.  
 
 
4.5.3. The reform of the pension system 
 
The pension reform was the most substantial conducted by the Socialist 
administration during this period. Commitment to the reform was included in the 
Sustainable Economy Strategy as early as 2009 and by early 2010 the 
government, unions and employers started talks on the issue. An agreement was 
reached in January 2011 and the reform was finally enacted in August 2011 
(Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2011b). It raised the retirement age from 65 to 67 and 
established a minimum of thirty-seven years of contribution as a requirement to 
qualifying for a full pension, which was to be introduced gradually with full effect 
scheduled for 2027. The contribution period was increased from the last fifteen 
years of employment to the last twenty-five years, increasing incrementally with a 
one-year increase every year until 2022. 
 
The need for such a reform had been known for years, not least because of the 
demographic projections. The system had enjoyed a temporary reprieve by the 
12-year growth cycle and the positive impact of the construction bubble, both 
through the increase of the population thanks to immigration and the increase in 
tax revenues. Yet there was wide agreement among all political forces that the 
system was unsustainable in the long-term. 74  Reform was also a recurrent 
																																																								74	For	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	imbalances	affecting	Spain´s	pension	system	see	Conde-Ruiz,	2015.	
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recommendation of institutions such as the IMF (2010: 17) and the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2010b: 5). As with the rest 
of the reforms, pressure was not significant while Spain was experiencing its high 
growth cycle. But by 2009 questions were being asked about the capability of 
Spain to cut its deficit and service its debt. A senior member of the President´s 
Economic Office recounted75 a meeting at the Moncloa Presidential Palace with 
representatives of the IMF in mid 2009 at which serious concerns were expressed 
at the expenditure trajectory implied by pension commitments. The IMF made it 
clear that a reduction in committed pension expenditure would send a clear signal 
to the markets that Spain was reining in its expenditure. This pressure increased 
exponentially during 2010, when contagion from the Greek budget crisis was 
leading international investors to look more critically at Spanish public accounts. 
Undertaking the pension reform was thus a way of showing the markets and 
Spain’s EMU partners that the government was committed to budget stability in 
the long term, and that unions and businesses were on board. However, as we 
have seen, other reforms were also being demanded. The interesting question is 
why this reform proceeded while others stalled. 
 
In answer to that question there is agreement among the various sources 
interviewed 76  that the pension reform succeeded because it was, perhaps 
surprisingly, more politically feasible, as it carried a less immediate cost than 
others. Reforms that entailed immediate expenditure reduction or loss of labour 
protection rights were very hard politically. Reduction of future pensions, while 
hard, did not have short-term consequences and was therefore more palatable 
politically than other options, especially if it was phased in gradually. As the 
President´s Economic Office´s representative in the reform negotiations recalled:77 
 
The political sell of the pension reform was not difficult and the politicians 
understood quickly. The key to the decision was the realisation that it was 
necessary to cut expenditure, as this was based on revenue the country would 
no longer have after the bubble. The problem with cutting current expenditure 
was the impact on the recovery and also the political cost. The only two large 
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areas to cut were health and pensions and pensions was by far the politically 
easier as it was deferred to the future. 
 
Other domestic political factors were also crucial in explaining the process and 
success of a reform that in other countries had proved much more politically 
controversial. As with other reforms, the role of organised interests, especially that 
of the trade unions, was essential. The President had been adamant again that 
any pension reform would require the backing of the trade unions. But by 2011 the 
unions were under pressure to play a more flexible and constructive role than they 
had in the labour reform. With their political power substantially weakened by their 
failed general strike the previous year and the economy in a far worse state, trade 
unions felt forced to be seen as contributing to the management of the crisis. Their 
agreement was facilitated by the willingness of the government to weaken some of 
the original goals of the reform (Abellán and Gómez, 2011). The government 
agreed to lower to 38.5 from the original proposal of 41 the number of contribution 
years required for workers to maintain the right to retire at 65. This meant that the 
number of people that would have to retire at 67 to obtain the maximum pension 
was significantly reduced. It also, crucially, meant that the core constituency of 
trade union members, older workers, greatly benefitted, as they tended to join the 
work force at an earlier age and thus had contributed to the system for more years 
than younger workers. The unions also obtained, in return for their agreement, 
concessions in other fields, such a commitment from the government to maintain a 
temporary emergency subsidy that had been established earlier in the crisis to 
provide a basic income for the unemployed who had consumed all of their regular 
unemployment benefit. The agreement with the unions allowed the PSOE to mend 
its relations with them in time to try to capitalise on this in the elections that were 
due to take place in December 2011. The weakened position of the trade unions, 
and concessions from the government to make the reform more palatable, explain 
that measures that in other countries such as France faced enormous resistance, 
such as the raising of the retirement age, were not an obstacle to the adoption of 
the pension reform in Spain. 
 
The agreement was also due in no small part to the role of personalities. By late 
2010 Juan Rosell had replaced Gerardo Díaz Ferrán as head of the employers’ 
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association, the CEOE. As reported in the previous section, Mr Díaz Ferrán´s 
attitude had been one of open hostility to any agreement with the government and 
the unions. The Minister of Labour at the time confirmed78 that the arrival of Mr 
Rosell facilitated the agreement and was in his view evidence that the 
personalities of those involved in the negotiations ‘mattered a great deal’. The 
importance of the role played by Valeriano Gómez, the Minister of Labour, was 
also confirmed by other sources. For example, the representative of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance in the negotiations was clear that ‘without Valeriano Gómez 
it is likely the reform would not have been possible’.79 
 
In sum, while external pressures clearly accelerated the government´s resolve to 
undertake the reform of the pension system, resolution of domestic politics was 
essential to the government´s ability to undertake this reform and helps explain 
why this reform succeeded while others did not. The reform was back-loaded and 
did not entail any immediate financial or political cost to the government. The 
unions, in a weakened position and in need to show a more constructive image, 
benefited from being seen as having extracted valuable concessions from the 
government for its members. And the acquiescence of the political, union and 
business leaders involved was also essential to taking the reform to a successful 
outcome. 
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has chronicled the second phase of the management of the crisis 
after the initial stimulus-based response. In the process it has analysed the key 
factors that explain the government actions. Both external and domestic factors 
have been identified. The former were clearly significant, including the advent of 
the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone, the EU´s increasing concern at the lack 
of progress in correcting Spain´s structural economic weaknesses and the 
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pressure of the bond markets, which materialised in an increase in the Spanish 
bond spread throughout 2010.  
 
However, these external constraints provided a triggering context rather than 
shaping the content of the response itself. They explain the when but not the how. 
In other words, the content of the measures and how they were finally 
implemented were very much driven by domestic political factors. Considerations 
regarding political and electoral costs determined, for example, the measures 
chosen by the government to implement the austerity drive agreed at EMU level in 
2010. Ideology and party considerations were vital in various phases, not least in 
the lacklustre motivation with which the government undertook reforms with which 
many within its ranks did not agree, most notably the labour reform. The 
corporatist nature of Spain´s political economy institutions, which, despite 
undeniable improvements since the transition to democracy, still hampered 
competition in many Spanish product and service markets, as Estrada (2009) has 
shown, provided ample opportunity for organised interests, especially the trade 
unions and the employers’ associations, to condition reform, especially in the 
labour market, pensions and the financial sector. Parliamentary dynamics were 
also important and in particular the absence of a parliamentary majority which 
would have allowed the government to adopt a more comprehensive package of 
reforms to compensate the unions for the proposed liberalisation of the labour 
market. They also help explain how the government was able to pass critical 
legislation, such as the budget. Disagreement among government members led to 
ineffective decision-making throughout the crisis. The staunch opposition to a 
bailout was also driven by very domestic political factors, from the need, for 
electoral and historical reasons, to be seen as a model EMU member to 
Zapatero´s preoccupation with his legacy. In fact, the personal characteristics of 
the leaders involved in the negotiations were essential to understanding many 
other aspects of the management of the crisis in this period, such as the failure of 
the labour and the success of the pension reforms.  
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Chapter 5. The euro zone crisis (II): the reform of the Constitution 
 (April 2011 to December 2011) 
 
 
5.1. Introduction: the return of the crisis 
 
The relative calm that had prevailed in Europe since the Irish bailout in November 
2010 came to an end in early April 2011, when fresh concerns about the state of 
the public finances of the euro zone periphery and the sustainability of the euro 
led to renewed uncertainty. On 26 April Greece announced that its debt- to-GDP 
ratio had reached 142 per cent, pushing the bond spreads of the European 
periphery even higher. This added to Portugal´s increasing difficulties in accessing 
financing, which led it to request a 78-billion-euro assistance programme, signing 
a memorandum of understanding the following May. The contagion from Greece 
and Portugal´s woes spread to Spain, with the bond spread increasing 
dramatically, from 175 points on 4 April to 407 on 4 August, when it reached its 
highest level since the adoption of the euro. This was fed also by doubts about the 
health of the financial system, which, despite the reforms, was still a source of 
concern, much more so after Moody´s had downgraded the rating of the over thirty 
Spanish banks and cajas on 24 March. 
 
Despite Spain´s efforts since May 2010, the deteriorating situation in the euro 
zone was about to launch the country into another complicated phase. By May 
2011 there were open discussions on a second programme for Greece and on 17 
and 20 June the Eurogroup ministers met to consider this possible second 
package, a discussion that was eventually postponed until July. Yet, on the 
margins of the summit, Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy held a private 
meeting at which they agreed on the principle of forcing private creditors to 
assume part of the cost, a ‘bailing-in’, in this second Greek bailout. Markets 
reacted adversely to this possibility, as it opened the door to the restructuring of 
the debt of a euro state, which would set the precedent of the euro not being a 
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safe investment zone.1 The negative implications this would have for Spain were 
obvious and it is no surprise that President Zapatero vehemently opposed it, to 
little effect. By early July it was clear Greece could no longer face its debt 
repayments and a second bailout was required. Fears had extended to Spain and 
also Italy. On 30 June the Milan main stock market index fell by 5 per cent and the 
following day the Italian government announced a substantial adjustment plan. 
While Italy´s problems added to the turmoil in the euro zone, they were received 
with a certain relief in Spain, since the bailout of both states was clearly beyond 
the financial means of the European Union (EU) and this made a substantive 
political response to the crisis by Germany and its allies more likely.  
 
The euro zone problems contributed to Spain’s suffering a negative GDP growth 
rate in the second term of 2011, leading to a net negative growth in 2011 of 1 per 
cent. This double dip recession would last until the third term of 2013, making it 
the longest recession in recent Spanish history, with a loss of 5.1 per cent of GDP 
during nine terms of negative growth rates (Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 
2015). Unemployment rose to 20.7 by the end of the second quarter of 2011 and 
21.8 by the end of the third quarter and would be at almost 23 per cent by the end 
of the year. It was in this context of declining wages caused in part by the labour 
reform (Baratas 2015: 84), increasing unemployment and economic hardship that 
the indignados movement of social protest developed, which would constitute 
another source of increasing social and political pressure for the government.  
 
Under constant pressure to continue proving its reforming credentials to foreign 
investors and its European Monetary Union (EMU) partners, on 10 June the 
government implemented, unilaterally by decree, after four months of failed 
negotiation with unions and employers, a reform of collective bargaining that 
complemented the labour reform passed the year before. It (Boletín Oficial del 
Estado, 2011c) reduced the number of months required for renewal of agreements 
obliging arbitration and it allowed firm-based to supersede sectorial agreements 
on a number of key important issues, such as base salary, working hours, holiday 
																																																								1	Bastasín	(2012)	has	provided	a	detailed	account	of	this	period	and	of	the	manner	in	which	sovereign	crisis	and	the	financial	crisis	mutually	reinforced	each	other.	
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entitlement and others. The reform was driven by the need to give both Brussels 
and international bondholders guarantees that Spain was continuing with the 
necessary reforms to stimulate growth and generate sufficient income to repay its 
debt, as confirmed by a senior official in the Ministry of Labour involved in the 
reform:2 
 
Yes, there were always these technical reports coming out from all these 
international organisations that said that the Spanish labour market was too 
rigid, that it had to be made more flexible and especially make dismissal 
cheaper and weaken collective bargaining (…) even though there was the 
firm conviction within the government that the labour reform was not going 
to stop the destruction of jobs. 
 
This same official, however, was the first to acknowledge the limits of these 
external pressures and pointed to more domestic sources of pressure:3 
 
There were a number of converging pressures. Yes, there was pressure 
from the EU but after a certain time it really became an internal issue. The 
Spanish private sector was pushing hard for reforms and specifically for a 
further labour reform and eventually that sense of urgency starts to 
permeate society and there is a dynamic which is driven by business, the 
PP [Partido Popular], the media… the pressure by then was overwhelming. 
 
The tensions in Spain and the euro zone continued to worsen during the summer 
of 2011. In Spain the financial sector continued to be a source of concern, with the 
uncertain IPO of Bankia, the former Caja Madrid, the bailout of another small caja, 
the Caja del Mediterraneo, and the failure of five Spanish financial institutions in 
the stress tests results conducted by the newly created European Banking 
Authority, which required 1.5 billion euro to recapitalise them. In Europe the 
instability of the stock and bond markets forced a summit of Eurogroup leaders on 
21 July. Agreement was finally reached on a more flexible deployment of the 
European Stability Fund (ESF), and especially the possibility of its use to 
recapitalise troubled financial institutions, but only after Germany and its allies had 
secured an agreement for the bailing-in of the private sector, by which private 
holders of Greek bonds would assume a loss of around 40 per cent on the 
nominal value of the bonds held (Council of the European Union, 2011: 2-3). 																																																								2	Research	interview.	3	Research	interview.	
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Although this private sector bail-in was supposed to be ‘voluntary’ the political 
pressures made it clear to all private investors that they were expected to sign up 
to it (Wolf, 2011). President Zapatero again sided with President of the European 
Central Bank (ECB), Jean-Claude Trichet, in opposing this move, for fear of 
contagion to Spain. But in the end he accepted, in part motivated by his wish to 
avoid more instability in the markets (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013: 235), which 
would have in all likelihood affected Spain. 
 
The result of the summit did however little to address investors’ fears about 
Spain´s predicament. During the following ten days Spain´s bond spread 
increased 113 points. On 29 July, the day the President announced the 
forthcoming general election, the bond spread reached its highest historical level 
at 345 points. Fears were mounting that the spread would reach the dreaded 400 
points, where analysts placed the inevitability of a bailout. It was in this difficult 
context that President Zapatero and his government faced another dramatic 
moment that would lead to a response which would represent the climax of the 
management of the crisis: the reform of the Constitution to inscribe a fiscal 
sustainability rule. 
 
 
5.2. The reform of the Constitution 
 
The euro and Spanish crises reached a new climax in August. The doubts about 
the sustainability of public finances of the European periphery and the 
sustainability of the euro were now directly affecting Italy and Spain. On 5 August 
Italy´s bond spread rose higher than Spain´s for the first time in the crisis, 
reaching 400 basic points. The situation in Spain was not much better. The main 
stock index in the Madrid exchange dropped over 3 per cent on Monday 1 August. 
The following day the bond spread went over 400 basic points for the first time. A 
former Spanish minister with a senior position in the European Commission 
recalled 4  a meeting around this time with President Zapatero and business 
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leaders in which the latter complained bitterly about their financing difficulties, not 
just the very high interest rates but the near closure of the open credit markets. 
 
By now President Zapatero had decided that only ECB intervention to buy 
Spanish sovereign debt in the secondary market could stabilise the situation 
(Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013: 236). During the following three days the President 
went into a frantic round of calls to rally support for his call for ECB intervention 
and for the central bank to agree such a move at its 4 August governing council. 
However, the ECB did not act. On Friday 5 August the Spanish bond spread 
opened at 417 basic points, a level which was widely considered unsustainable. 
On that day President Rodríguez Zapatero (2013: 237) held various discussions 
with national and international leaders, but one in particular would prove crucial: 
his call with ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet. In his memoirs President 
Rodríguez Zapatero (2013: 238) has described the call in detail and the cryptic 
messages both men exchanged in order to preserve, at least formally, the 
independence of the ECB. During the call Zapatero described a number of 
savings measures the government was prepared to implement immediately to 
shore up confidence in the country, as well as further action on the labour market 
and measures to link salary increases to productivity. They were all substantial, 
although they did not reach the level of the May 2010 measures as, according to 
Zapatero himself ‘it was neither fair nor politically feasible, given the parliamentary 
situation we had’ (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013: 239). The President suggested that 
in return the ECB should take whatever measures were necessary to support 
Spain but President Trichet expressed the need for the government to reassure 
bond investors of its real commitment to reform. 
 
An agreement was reached privately to exchange letters. President Trichet and 
Governor Fernández Ordóñez addressed a joint letter to President Zapatero 
describing in substantial detail the reforms and adjustment that in their view Spain 
required and urging the Spanish government to act swiftly. A senior official at the 
Bank of Spain intimately involved in writing the letter recalled the difficult 
circumstances in which it was drafted:5 																																																								5	Research	interview.	
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Trichet had pressure from Germany not to buy sovereign debt but he 
understood something had to be done. Yet what he told me was that his 
concern was that if he did buy debt, then it would take away the pressure 
from Italy and Spain to undertake the necessary reforms. But he faced a 
very important issue: could the ECB take monetary policy decisions 
conditional on whether a country does so and so? Obviously not. So Trichet 
came up with this idea of sending a letter telling them what he thought 
should happen. (…). Trichet could not have that discussion because any 
lead would have risked accusation that he was subjecting monetary policy 
decisions to political discussion. We told the government: if you make a 
gesture, and we gave them advice as to what they should do, we can get 
the ECB to buy debt, which is on the limit of the ECB´s statue. But yes, had 
we not sent that letter and the Spanish government accepted in principle its 
conditions, the ECB would have never bought the debt, given the pressure 
from Germany, the Netherlands, etc. 
 
The letter, which was strictly confidential at the time but has since been published 
(Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013: 248), called for measures in three areas: further 
improvements in the functioning of the labour market, ensuring the sustainability of 
public finances and product market reforms, to be implemented by the end of 
August. It fell short, naturally, of offering any action by the ECB in return for the 
implementation of these reforms, referring only to the:  
 
Very high responsibility of the Spanish government “at the current juncture” 
and how their adoption “should lead to high benefits not only for the 
Spanish economy but also for the euro area as a whole”. (ibid.)  
 
However, Trichet was well aware that the quid pro quo would be a sustained 
buying of Spanish debt in the secondary markets to bring down the bond spread.  
As a senior official at the Bank of Spain who was personally involved in the 
process confirmed: 6  ‘of course there was a direct relationship between both 
issues, although if Trichet were to be asked he would deny it’. 
 
The ECB letter is also remarkable for the level of detail and degree of interference 
in domestic affairs to which the ECB was prepared to go. Nothing in the ECB 
mandate comes close to granting it authority to suggest, for example, the shape 
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collective bargaining should take in a country. A high-ranking government official 
who was at the centre of the correspondence was scathing in his criticism:7 
 
The letter by the ECB reflected an acute lack of political sensibility towards 
the government. Firstly, there is the question of what competence the ECB 
has to make demands in areas completely outside its realm of 
responsibility. And secondly, it lacks an awareness of the political economy 
situation. Of course we would have also liked to have advanced more on 
collective bargaining reform, but we had no majority in Parliament and not 
even the Basque or Catalonian nationalists, who had supported us in other 
economic reforms, were prepared to support us on such a move. 
 
Furthermore, none of the measures was neutral or casual; they had important 
ideological consequences. This was the case not only on the major measures 
such as the calls for further labour market liberalisation, but also for apparently 
minor reforms, such as the calls for the flexibilisation of the rental market. This 
measure, a long-standing request of organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), was symptomatic of this ideological bias, in the view of a 
Socialist policy-maker familiar with the issue:8 
 
Trichet does not come with the suggestion of the reform of the rental 
market by himself, it is actually suggested to him by those in favour of 
radical liberalisation in Spain. He says, “now that Spain is in its knees we 
can impose it”. 
 
In his response the following day to the ECB letter President Rodríguez Zapatero 
(2013: 252) detailed the additional savings to be introduced: a reduction of 2.4 
billion euro in medical prescription costs, 2.5 billion from increased efficiencies in 
the collection of corporate taxation and 2 billion euro from the sale of part of the 
radio electric spectre. With regard to the labour market, the most politically toxic 
issue domestically, it is significant that the President did not agree to any new 
measure, despite the enormous pressure he was under and how high the stakes 
were. He limited himself to reminding Mr Trichet of the wage bargaining reform the 
government had just passed and offered a general commitment that the 
government would keep studying changes to the labour legislation to secure its 																																																								7	Research	interview.	8	Research	interview.	
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greater flexibility. He also stressed that unions and employers had signed a 
commitment to decouple wages from inflation increases for the next three years 
and that the government would work to make this permanent. But going beyond 
this was out of the question, according to a high-ranking official at the Ministry of 
Labour:9 
 
The ECB and the Bank of Spain wanted us to pass reforms of the labour 
market that were constitutionally impossible, like an extraordinary contract 
independent of collective bargaining. We did go as far as we could, for 
example making it illegal to chain temporary contracts, in order to avoid 
doing things that would have certainly been ruled unconstitutional, like a 
labour market where basic tenets like the minimum salary and collective 
bargaining would have been de facto scrapped. Many of these reforms had 
been suggested to Trichet by Governor Fernández Ordóñez, who on many 
issues was more fundamentalist than Trichet. 
 
 
The unwillingness to undertake some of these reforms was also based on the 
government´s conviction that the issues that Spain was being asked to address 
had little to do with the euro crisis and were much more directly related to EMU´s 
flaws. Again, in the words of the same official:10 
 
The reforms we were being asked to pass were not related to what had 
caused the euro crisis, which had more do with the fragmentation of the 
euro zone and inadequate fiscal and monetary policies. 
 
Nevertheless, throughout the response letter there were vague commitments to 
further measures reaffirming the commitment of the Spanish government to fiscal 
sustainability. As we shall see shortly, the way in which the President provided 
these guarantees, besides the specific fiscal consolidation measures that had 
already been prepared, had little to do with what the ECB had asked, and the 
response would be driven mainly by domestic political considerations.  
 
Probably the most controversial part of the letter came at the end where the 
President openly requested the ECB to buy Spanish sovereign debt in the 
secondary markets, bordering on an infringement of the ECB´s right to 
independence. It stated that: 																																																								9	Research	interview.	10	Research	interview.	
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The Government of Spain considers that the European Central Bank can 
play a crucial role in the reduction of the tensions [in the markets] through 
the acquisition of Spanish public debt in sufficient volume to stabilise the 
markets and ensure the correct functioning of the transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policy. (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013: 257) 
 
President Zapatero acknowledged (ibid.) that his insistence was on the borderline 
of what was acceptable but was still determined to press his case: 
 
I thought I should make that explicit declaration (…). The ECB must be 
independent but it cannot be indifferent. A government with whom rests 
final responsibility for a nation must employ all the remedies within its 
reach, even more so if it operates within the limits of a monetary union. I 
don´t know if this contravenes the rules of independence of central banks. 
But I have no doubt that it does not contravene the rules of common sense 
and of democratic responsibility, that of my government in this case. 
  
The letter concluded by announcing that two extraordinary meetings of the Council 
of Ministers had been arranged for the month of August for the government to take 
further actions to instil confidence among investors. This was highly unusual in 
Spain as August is traditionally a holiday month, especially in politics, but the 
government was keen to impress upon Mr Trichet the message that the 
government was taking forceful action. 
 
The exchange of letters had the desired effect. The following day, Sunday 7 
August, the ECB´s Governing Body announced (ECB, 2011) that it would be 
implementing its Securities Market Programme, through which it would be 
acquiring in the secondary markets sovereign bonds of countries in difficulties, 
and the following day the ECB started buying Spanish and Italian public debt 
(Reuters, 2011). Although it could not be publicly acknowledged, a senior official 
at the Bank of Spain with a personal role in the process was unambiguous that:11 
 
It is evident there was a direct relationship between the Spanish 
government’s taking measures and the ECB’s buying or simply announcing 
it was going to buy Spanish debt. 
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But what was not known at the time was that the exchange of letters was to lead 
to a far more far-reaching development. On 19 August the government approved a 
decree to implement the saving measures it had committed to, which amounted to 
around 0.5 per cent of GDP (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2011d). On 23 August the 
decree was tabled in Parliament for its debate and vote. President Zapatero 
defended the motion personally and during the debate he announced the surprise 
measure that would come to define the last months of the management of the 
crisis (Congreso de los Diputados, 2011a): the reform of the Constitution to 
incorporate a fiscal sustainability rule.  
 
Unlike in other countries like Germany, reform of the Constitution has been rare in 
Spain. The reason for such caution is obvious. Spain´s turbulent history in the first 
half of the 20th century, culminating in the fascist coup d’etat, the civil war and forty 
years of dictatorship, had left a country profoundly divided. The Constitution of 
1978 was a fragile compromise, underpinned by weak democratic institutions. 
Some anchors of stability, namely the Constitution and the Monarchy, were 
essential. For this reason, reform of the former was made particularly 
burdensome, requiring a two-thirds majority in Congress and, for the core articles, 
the dissolution of Parliament and approval by referendum of the reform, prior to 
the constitution of a new government. In fact, since its enactment in 1978, the 
Constitution had only been reformed on one occasion, and then only to reflect a 
development for which there was almost universal consensus in the nation: 
Spain´s accession to the EU in 1986. The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español [PSOE]) had won the 2004 election with a 
pledge in its manifesto (PSOE, 2004) to reform the Constitution to accommodate 
the demands of Catalonia and the Basque Country for increased self-government.  
However, opposition of the Popular Party (Partido Popular [PP]) made it 
impossible and President Zapatero did not insist as, himself a professor of 
Constitutional Law, he was respectful of the ‘sacrosanct’ nature of the Constitution 
and understood it could only be reformed with ample consensus. 
 
It was against this background that President Zapatero´s decision, through an 
urgent procedure in Parliament, to reform Article 135 of the Constitution in order to 
incorporate a ‘golden rule’ of fiscal sustainability came as such a surprise. The 
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process by which the President reached this decision is remarkable, and offers an 
insight into how momentous policy changes can be the result of highly personal 
political decisions. According to officials intimately involved in the process,12 the 
ECB letter had been accompanied by oral discussions. These set very specific 
deadlines by which, if the agreed reforms had not taken place, the ECB would 
immediately stop buying debt. The first date was 16 August, and by that date the 
fiscal adjustment measures had to be implemented. An extraordinary meeting of 
the Council of Ministers had been set weeks before for the second week in 
August, a rare occurrence in the vacation month, motivated by the gravity of the 
economic situation. This gave the government the chance to approve the 
measures at that meeting. But the government was then left with the second 
deadline, 29 August, by which it was expected to implement the labour reform. A 
senior source recalls how, after the first meeting of the Council of Ministers, a few 
close aides stayed behind with the President, deliberating what would happen, 
because it was impossible for the government to do what the ECB had asked, 
since it represented a complete dismantling of Spain´s labour market relations. 
And yet if the government did not deliver by 29 August, the ECB would cut the 
country´s lifeline. The recollection of one of the highest-ranking officials at the 
President´s Office of what happened during the next few days was remarkable:13 
 
There followed a few days in which nothing happened and then, suddenly, 
Zapatero came up with his idea of reforming the Constitution. It was a very 
personal decision. I don´t know who he spoke to in those days and how he 
reached his decision, although I have my suspicions. I think he probably 
also drew some ‘inspiration’ from comments made by Merkel at a meeting 
she had with Sarkozy on 16 August at the end of which she made some 
comments about the importance of including in the law fiscal sustainability. 
But I can tell you that the decision to reform the Constitution was a very 
personal one, driven by political considerations and taken in a very 
idiosyncratic manner. It was most definitely a political manoeuvre, and a 
smart one, although poorly implemented. 
 
The decision sent shockwaves through the PSOE and its electorate, and was 
vehemently criticised, both for its form and the substance. On the latter the idea of 
limiting constitutionally the state´s scope for public spending was anathema to 
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many Socialist government and party members, and also to many in society. A 
senior economic figure in the Socialist party put it bluntly:14  
 
There is also an ideological issue here, or if you want, an absence of 
intellectual clout. Most of the people around him [President Zapatero] (…) 
don´t realise that what they have accepted is something socialists have 
been trying to fight against for thirty years. To limit the margin of action of 
the government, to the point of including limits in the Constitution, is 
unacceptable. 
 
Others, however, suggest that the reform did not represent a significant 
ideological shift for Zapatero, as he was part of a new generation of socialists 
who, until the crisis hit, had felt more comfortable with fiscal rectitude. As a 
Director General at the President´s Economic Office said:15 ‘Zapatero internalized 
it [the merits of fiscal sustainability] from the beginning and that was a significant 
step forward with respect to previous socialist governments’. 
 
However, even more damaging than the substance of the reform was the manner 
in which the Constitution was changed: in a matter of weeks, without any political 
discussion or public consultation and through the emergency legislative procedure 
in Parliament. The recollection of a close aide of the President, who played a key 
role in those days, was illustrative:16 
 
When he first called me to his office and told me we were going to reform 
the Constitution my initial reaction was to tell him it was a mistake, on many 
levels: with the substance, the timing, the manner. The political 
management was disastrous, and led, not only to immense discontent 
within the party, but to the refusal of any other party beyond the PP to 
support the motion in Parliament, including the PNV [Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party)], who had been the party that had 
supported us in Parliament throughout the last stages of the management 
of the crisis. 
 
This poor decision-making and implementation process had become more acute 
as the crisis progressed and affected the quality of the final policy solutions. But it 
probably reached its most dysfunctional level with the reform of the Constitution, 
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as shown by the account of how the actual draft of the new articles was put 
together, by a senior policy-maker at the Ministry of Economy and Finance who 
played a key role in the process:17 
  
In the first stages of the crisis, when we still had time to analyse things, we 
had many of the measures and their implications studied, but as the crisis 
progressed and we had more and more fires to respond to, we obviously 
had more problems. For example, when it came to the reform of the 
Constitution (…) we had been working on issues related to budget 
sustainability, like the draft of the Budget Stability Law where we were 
going to introduce some new measures, but we really had no warning that it 
would go as far as reforming the Constitution, not at all. In fact (…) when I 
was told and I had urgently to contact the commercial attaché of our 
Embassy in [confidential] and ask him to send us a translation of the 
relevant section [of the fiscal golden rule] in [that country´s] Constitution 
where this was specified and then, following from this and our technical 
briefs, I had, over the telephone, to work with those that were actually 
drafting the new article of the Constitution. 
 
Even more remarkably, unknown to his own ministers, members of parliament, 
and having consulted with only a handful of trusted advisors, Zapatero had 
actually reached out to the leader of the PP, the main opposition party, with his 
proposal just six days before. The reform could not have been more welcomed by 
the PP. It supported the position the party had been defending in favour of more 
fiscal prudence but, more importantly, the PP knew that it would drive a serious 
ideological wedge among socialist voters.  
 
The debate took place on 30 August and, having secured the support of the PP, 
the motion easily achieved the three fifths of favourable votes required on the final 
vote on 2 September. The provisions of the reform were profound. While the 
original Article 135 of the Constitution had just stated the right of the state to issue 
public debt (Constitución Española, 1978), the new article established some 
substantial new principles (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2011e). Firstly, it stated that 
all public administrations would govern their actions by the principle of budget 
stability. Secondly, it prohibited both central and regional governments from 
incurring in public deficit and debt larger than that established by the EU. Thirdly, it 
called for a law to establish the maximum annual structural public deficit allowed. 																																																								17	Research	interview.	
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The law, which would eventually be passed by the PP government in 2012, set 
that limit at 0.4 per cent of GDP. Fourthly, it established that interest payments for 
issued debt should be included in all budgets and should be given priority over 
any other expenditure. And fifthly, it stipulated that both public deficit and debt 
limits could only be exceeded in the event of natural catastrophe, economic 
recession or emergency, and would require the approval of an absolute majority in 
Congress. 
 
The prevailing understanding at the time, and then enduring, was that the reform 
of the Constitution was the result of external pressures, most notably the ECB´s. 
In fact, prompted by the secrecy of the letter exchanges between the ECB and the 
government, there were widespread accusations of having reformed the 
Constitution directly at the request of the ECB. A headline in a national newspaper 
at the time read: ‘The government admits that it changed the Constitution at the 
request of the ECB’ (Santos, 2011). Even the PSOE´s own parliamentary party, in 
trying to find culprits behind whom to shelter from the chorus of criticism, sought to 
blame external forces. In defending the motion for the constitutional reform in 
Parliament, the PSOE speaker, José Antonio Alonso, blamed market pressures: ‘I 
tell you that the tensions in the markets have reached such a level that they put at 
risk the social policies we have implemented. That is the reality’ (Congreso de los 
Diputados, 2011b). 
 
The reality was, however, very different. While, as we have seen above, it is 
undeniable that the government was under strong external pressure to act, the 
reform of the Constitution had never been an explicit or even implicit demand of 
the ECB, the European Commission nor any other EMU partner, including 
Germany, as President Zapatero himself was later to acknowledge (2013: 260): 
 
The reform was not the outcome of an imposition, not even a suggestion, of 
any European authority (…) Neither in the [ECB] letter nor any other written 
or verbal communication was the government of Spain asked to reform the 
Constitution to incorporate ‘the golden fiscal rule’ (…). It was an 
autonomous decision. 
 
In fact, as shown above, the measures that the ECB requested were very 
different, and called most importantly for further reforms of the labour market. As 
	 183	
President Zapatero himself has confessed, and other officials have confirmed,18 
the decision to reform the Constitution was personal and the reason chiefly to find 
a reform that would have as limited a political cost in the short term as possible. In 
his memoirs the President admits (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013: 261) that he 
decided on the reform of the Constitution because, of the available options 
available to send a firm message to the ECB and to recover the trust of the 
international investors, this was the one risking least political damage: 
 
I thought the constitutional reform was one of the few that I could use to 
have the desired effect: to reduce significantly that risk [of a bailout], with 
the least cost or additional sacrifice for our country.  
 
In other words, while the motive was certainly external pressure, the choice of 
instrument with which to respond was autonomous and driven by domestic 
political considerations. This account is confirmed by a number of sources 
interviewed for this dissertation. A privileged observer of these events, with a 
senior position at the Bank of Spain that allowed him direct participation in the 
discussion, was unambiguous:19 
 
The reform of the Constitution was neither in the letter nor ever discussed. 
It was something the President came up with by himself, and I think 
incorrectly. You can´t introduce a reform of the Constitution like that, in just 
a few days and without a wide-ranging consensus. But I think by then 
President Zapatero was just in full swing and wanted to show that he was 
as reformist, but, of course, with something that was politically far easier 
than labour reform. 
 
Similarly, a senior member of the President´s Economic Office remarked that:20  
 
It was impossible to pass a labour reform at that moment; we did not have 
enough time (…). Regardless of its electoral cost, it could not be done. On 
the other hand, the reform of the Constitution seemed more politically 
feasible.  
 
In fact, some even cast doubt on whether external pressures were really as great 
an influence on President Zapatero as has been claimed. A close aide of the 
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President, who worked closely with him at the Moncloa Palace during this period, 
while acknowledging that the Spanish government was forced by the ECB to act, 
was clear that the President felt he still had a significant degree of autonomy in 
choosing how to react to that pressure:21 
 
The ECB letter certainly asked the government to take a series of 
measures in order to buy Spanish debt, especially asking for a fiscal 
adjustment and a new labour reform. But what I saw was that Spain acted 
autonomously in a context in which, it is true, you are not altogether free, 
but you do have a degree of freedom of action, and the President decided 
not to respond to that request for an additional fiscal adjustment or a new 
labour reform but pulled out of the hat the reform of the Constitution, a 
reform which had a zero immediate social cost, unlike the other two 
alternatives. 
 
In sum, while it is true that the need to act was the result of pressure of the 
markets, the ECB and the EU´s Fiscal Stability Treaty (or fiscal compact), the 
particular form the response took was very much driven by domestic political 
considerations. The aim was to adopt the solution that, while sufficient for the ECB 
(and Germany), would have the least immediate political and electoral cost to the 
government in the forthcoming elections. While the fiscal compact had indeed 
established budgetary constrains on EU members, there was nothing in it that 
forced such guarantees to be provided through their inclusion in the Constitution. 
The choice of such a radical measure was, as shown above, far more the result of 
opportunistic domestic political considerations. 
 
Eventually President´s Zapatero´s gamble paid off. President Trichet and 
Chancellor Merkel accepted the reform of the Constitution, together with the rest 
of reforms, as a sign of Spain´s real commitment to reform. In the case of the 
former, what tilted the balance was probably the realisation that it was unrealistic 
to expect a second labour reform barely a year after a previous one that had 
caused a general strike and just a few months away from a general election. And 
in the case of Chancellor Merkel, it was probably decisive that the ‘fiscal golden 
rule’ that Zapatero enacted was one which Germany had itself enshrined in its 
Constitution and which the Chancellor had called for other European partners to 
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adopt. The willingness of President Zapatero to comply was obviously well 
received and the support of the ECB and the EU was forthcoming. 
 
 
5.3.  Epilogue: the G20 Cannes summit 
 
Following the ECB´s action, the pressure on Spain abated during the remainder of 
the month of August. Yet from September onward the bond spread started to 
climb, reaching a maximum of 359 basic points on 20 October. Spain was again 
suffering contagion from a troubled international situation. Firstly, there were 
lingering doubts about the political commitment and availability of the necessary 
fiscal and institutional infrastructure at EU level to deal with the ongoing euro 
crisis. And secondly, the global economy, and the European periphery in 
particular, were suffering from a second economic downturn. 
 
Spain was again the focus of renewed attention and concern over the state of its 
financial system and its public debt, both intimately connected. This was for good 
reason, as the troubles in the financial sector continued. On 30 September the 
Bank of Spain announced the bailout and nationalisation of three more former 
cajas, Catalunya Caixa, Novacaixagalicia and Unnim, and an injection of almost 
five billion euro. The pressure continued to build when on 19 October Moody’s 
downgraded the debt of ten Spanish regions. 
 
Worries concerning the euro zone increased considerably a few days later when 
Greek Prime Minister Papandreou announced he would be submitting to 
referendum the second EU assistance programme agreed on 26 October, which 
asked for substantial savings from the Greek government and, for the first time, 
had called for the ‘voluntary’ contribution of the private sector, in return for the 
increase in the European Stability Mechanism funds to one billion Euro. It was in 
this context of renewed pressure on the European periphery that the last 
substantial chapter of the Socialist government’s management of the crisis would 
be written, with Zapatero´s attendance at the G20 Cannes summit on 3-4 
November.  
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The Cannes summit took place, as described, amid serious concerns about the 
European periphery. Yet, unlike the previous August, this time it was Italy that was 
the main focus of attention. The decisive actions taken by the Spanish 
government in August, and especially the reform of the Constitution, had sent a 
signal of determination to act that investors, analysts and EU officials found 
lacking in Berlusconi’s government. However, this did not prevent German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s unexpectedly confronting President Zapatero in the 
preliminary fringes of the formal meeting and, according to Rodríguez Zapatero´s 
account (2013: 290), directly asking him whether he would be prepared to accept 
an IMF precautionary credit line of 50 billion euro, with Italy also accepting one for 
85 billion euro. The suggestion was firmly rejected by Zapatero, on the familiar 
grounds that Spain had already adopted ample reform that had led to recovery of 
trust by investors, that Spanish financial institutions had been appropriately 
recapitalised and that the Treasury was having no difficulties in financing itself. 
Zapatero also added a brazenly domestic political argument, namely that since 
Spain was immersed in the campaign for a general election, it was unthinkable 
that the government could accept a bailout. Chancellor Merkel was understanding 
of the arguments, at least according to the account of President Rodríguez 
Zapatero (2013: 291), and accepted his refusal to accept the credit line.  
 
This veiled request was the third and last time in just over a year that Spain had 
been asked to accept a bailout. At a private dinner organised the following night to 
try to offer an image of action in the face of renewed uncertainty in the markets by 
the members of the Eurogroup, EU officials and President Obama, the main focus 
of attention would be Italy, which resisted strong pressure to accept a bailout 
(Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013: 292). Prime Minister Berlusconi succeeded in 
avoiding it but had to accept oversight by the troika of his government´s reforms, a 
sign of loss of trust in his administration that would shortly after lead to his 
resignation and his replacement by a technocratic government led by Mario Monti. 
 
The contrast between events in Italy and Spain is informative for the argument this 
dissertation has pursued. Both President Zapatero and Primer Minister Berlusconi 
faced similar demands from the ECB, and ultimately from Chancellor Merkel, to 
undertake important reforms in return for ECB support. Zapatero responded 
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constructively to the ECB´s August 2011 letter, even if he did not concede further 
labour market deregulation, by offering a serious set of reforms, including that of 
the Constitution, in the same spirit he had shown in undertaking the necessary 
measures since the May 2010 austerity U-turn. By contrast, while the Italian Prime 
Minister also accepted many of the reforms suggested in the ECB letter, 
Berlusconi´s refusal to give in to ECB pressure to undertake pension reform, 
together with what was perceived as lack of serious commitment to undertake 
serious reforms, is likely to have been behind the ECB´s sluggish purchase of 
Italian bonds and Chancellor Merkel´s stronger pressure on Berlusconi, which 
eventually led to his downfall. In other words, the ECB and Chancellor Merkel 
responded very differently to the domestic political judgement of Zapatero and 
Berlusconi, accommodating the former but not the latter. That two states faced 
with similar external pressures ended up with different outcomes must therefore 
warrant a more exact analysis than the claim that external constraints rendered 
national responses irrelevant. While the episode does show the importance of 
external pressures, it also shows that divergent domestic political responses, in 
this case the determination observed in President Zapatero, were correlated with 
the different outcomes and might have played a significant role in them. 
 
On 20 November the conservative Partido Popular would win the general election, 
giving way to a new chapter in the management of the crisis that falls outside the 
scope of this dissertation. That the PSOE came to the end of its tenure without 
suffering a forced replacement of its government, as in Greece and Italy, or a 
bailout, like Greece, Portugal or Ireland, was, in the eyes of President Zapatero, a 
sign of its partial success (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013: 126). It can also be seen as 
evidence that, despite enormous external pressures, domestic political decisions 
did matter. 
 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
Analysis of the management of the crisis in the crucial last year of the Socialist 
government has shown that the interaction of external and domestic factors during 
this period is a contentious issue. Yet what emerges is not a picture of harsh 
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measures imposed from the outside, but a decision-making process shaped by a 
complex set of factors, both external and domestic. It is certainly true that many of 
the measures were adopted in response to external market and political 
pressures. However, it is also true that domestic factors were determinant in 
shaping those responses. 
 
The influence of these domestic political factors was clearly at play in the two 
defining moments of the management of the crisis in this crucial last year: the 
refusal to accept a bailout and reform of the Constitution. As a senior economic 
advisor to the President acknowledged:22  
 
The reforms and the austerity measures were clearly influenced by the 
pressure from outside, but the ambition and the way in which they were 
conducted was very much the outcome of domestic politics. 
 
A senior official on the political staff of the President´s Office, a privileged platform 
from which to observe these events, shared this view:23  
 
The decisions were often very personal, driven by personal values and 
biases, for which support was then sought from the technical staff, and not 
the other way around. 
 
A subtle but important conclusion of this account is that even in the most pressing 
circumstances the Spanish government retained a degree of autonomy, or at least 
a capacity to reject the proposals most detrimental to its interests and to choose 
the manner of response to external pressures for fiscal adjustment and reform. It 
is a view shared not only by all government officials interviewed,24 but also by a 
senior official at the European Commission:25 
 
The pressure from Berlin or Brussels exists but a democratic government, 
unless it is in a desperate situation such as that of Greece, Ireland or 
Portugal, (…) always has some margin of action. Spain has never been in 
such a desperate situation to say “I give up, tell me what I have to do and I 
will sign (…)”. It is true that if you are in a monetary union, no one is 
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markets to finance your sovereign debt, you do have a hand tied behind 
your back. But you still have your other hand. Yes, there were some very 
delicate moments, for example in June 2011, in which Spain needed help 
so as to not to have to pay impossible debt prices, but Spain is a country 
with more resources and negotiating power than Ireland, Greece or 
Portugal, so it can enter into a negotiation whereby maybe you ask me to 
do X to buy debt but I say that I am prepared to do Y instead, or where you 
ask me to introduce a new labour reform but I decide against it. You have 
to remember also that in 2011 everyone was looking at Spain and there 
was awareness in Brussels that if Spain went under, the whole euro project 
would be in danger, because then Italy could go and then France. 
 
It must be admitted, however, that there is an alternative interpretation to Spain´s 
avoidance of a bailout. This would find the key explanatory variable in the 
incentive of the euro zone states and the ECB to find a solution for Spain and Italy 
that did not involve euro zone level funding – rather than the IMF´s –, given the 
cost of bailouts for these two states and the scale of exposure of French banks in 
Italy and German banks in Spain. It is probably no coincidence that most of the 
Securities Market Programme (SMP) went on purchasing Spanish and Italian 
bonds rather than any one else’s (Bastasín 2012: 304). 
 
In any case, another important conclusion of the analysis of this last episode of 
the crisis managed by the Socialist government is that the role of external 
institutions was less decisive than the existing literature has suggested 
(Armingeon and Baccaro, 2013; Hopkins, 2013, 2015; Royo, 2013, 2014; 
Sanchez-Cuenca, 2014). The ECB was by far the most influential institution and it 
exercised its ability to buy sovereign debt in securing reform in August 2011. 
However, it was the Spanish government that decided the content of these 
reforms, and the most important request, for a further labour market reform, was 
ignored. The influence of other international organisations, like the OECD or the 
IMF, was significantly less. These institutions had some influence, often shaping 
the views of Spanish officials, as a senior political aide to Zapatero complained:26 
 
Our technical staff used the arguments of these institutions as a source of 
legitimacy and to exercise pressure on us, on the President and the political 
staff. But the President was well aware that it was just one side of the story. 
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to such level the messages and demands of the international financial 
institutions and the European Commission that, when they communicated 
them back at home, they exaggerated them. It was almost like a 
psychological mechanism by which they are conditioned, developing 
certain complicity. 
 
 
However, from the account given above, it is obvious that, rather than changing 
the outcome, the recommendations of these institutions were used by the 
technical staff to push for measures they themselves espoused. Even those 
officials who were supposed to have been ‘conditioned’ are sceptical of the real 
influence these institutions exercised in the government´s decisions. The Director 
General in the President´s Economic Office who was often charged with meeting 
officials from the IMF and the European Commission was clear in this respect:27 
 
It is true that the influence of international financial Institutions like the IMF 
has been overestimated. Most of the time they would be telling us things 
we already knew. The moments when, in my experience, they really did 
have leverage were when our bond spread went through the roof. 
 
In fact, a top official at the Ministry of Economy and Finance went further, 
suggesting that even among the more technocratic staff there were doubts as to 
how much these institutions were helping their case:28 
 
The role of international financial institutions has been positive, but not very 
helpful, just ‘positive descriptive’. What I mean is that at the end of the day 
they said aloud what we already knew and in that sense we would have 
taken those measures anyhow because we knew those problems existed, 
but we would have done so at a different rhythm, and I am not so sure that 
their bluntness and their raising these issues publicly was very helpful, 
because the perception that it was being imposed from outside, even if it 
was not true, created resistance from the public. 
 
A further conclusion drawn from the episodes recounted in this chapter is that the 
unpopularity of many measures was often aggravated by a very defective 
decision-making and communication process. According to a high government 
official who was at the centre of many of these decisions:29 
 																																																								27	Research	interview.	28	Research	interview.	29	Research	interview.	
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It is true that in those days events moved amazingly quickly and it was 
difficult to control them but in any case Zapatero is, personally and 
politically, a person who likes to do away with the established procedures 
when it comes to decision-making. It was not like this all the time, but it 
certainly was during the key moments and when extraordinary decisions 
were taken, like in May 2010 or in the summer of 2011 with the reform of 
the Constitution. My biggest conflicts with him came, not from having 
different criteria, because I understood my duty was to offer him my view 
but the final say had to be his, but from his whimsical disregard of proper 
procedure, to do whatever it was his fancy to do. It was most inefficient. It is 
my belief that if Zapatero had managed the crisis better, if instead of taking 
the decision so secretly, with just a few people and hijacking the 
information from his own government, he had gone out and spoken to the 
nation and explained the situation, saying that it was necessary to take 
those measures for the country´s sake, then the outcome would have been 
different. 
 
Probably no one has summarised better the complex interaction of domestic and 
external factors during this time than President Zapatero himself. In his memoirs 
he first complains bitterly (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013: 287) about the alleged 
trumping of politics by international financial markets and investors:  
 
In those forty-eight hours [during the Cannes summit] I was able to see, 
probably more clearly than at any other time, the limitations that political 
power has in the contemporary world when it comes to responding to the 
threats of the international financial system, the fears of investors, the state 
of opinion on the analysis or the ratings of the rating agencies. 
 
Yet just a few pages later (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013: 298) he admits that political 
agents and institutions are capable of overcoming external pressure of investors 
and financial markets: 
 
Politics cannot in any case elude its responsibility. Especially when, in my 
experience, the decisions taken by institutions can and did overcome the 
immense capacity of markets to determine the evolution of the financial 
world and the situation of countries and companies. [Institutions] could 
impose their will, of course, but only when these decisions were marked by 
their immediate and effective application, when they were not doubtful, 
when they were firm, when they were the expression of strength and 
authority. When political decisions are firm, markets quieten and lose their 
capacity to destabilise. 
 
But it is telling that, despite the enormous pressures to which the Spanish 
government was subject during this period, all government officials interviewed for 
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this project, without exception, hold the general opinion that if political agents act 
with determination, they are able to counter the forces of markets and investors. A 
senior minister who was at the centre of the management of the crisis and knows 
well its intricacies spoke for many when she said:30 
 
I don´t share the view that markets trumped politics during the management 
of the euro crisis. I think the problem had more to do with us politicians’ 
doing too little too late. If in 2010 we had taken more decisive action on 
Greece, we would probably have saved ourselves a lot of trouble. And the 
proof is that the European debt crisis is solved when a gentleman comes 
along [Mario Draghi] and says that whatever has to be done will be done. 
So what we saw was not a case of political incapacity against the markets 
but just a political failure per se. I am absolutely convinced that institutions 
and political power can face down the financial markets if they really want 
to. 
 
While the fact that Mr Draghi could successfully challenge (at least temporarily) 
bond investors and ‘the markets’ is of course very different from saying that 
national government can do the same and tells little about the capacity of the latter 
to do so, it is noteworthy that, even among the senior officials who were more 
heavily exposed to the external constraints during the latter period of the crisis, 
there was a widespread conviction31 that politics matter, that it is political decisions 
and actions that, at the end of the day, shape events.  
																																																								30	Research	interview.	31	Research	interviews.	
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The research question the dissertation has sought to answer is: what role did 
domestic political factors play in the PSOE government´s management of the 
crisis in Spain and in its immediate origins?  Thus the dissertation has aimed not 
only to determine whether domestic politics influenced policy outcomes, which is 
hard to contest, but why and how. To do so it has analysed in detail, through in-
depth interviews with the key decision-makers, the most relevant episodes and 
issues of the management of the crisis and its immediate origins. 
 
This effort is framed within the scholarly debate on the autonomy of states in an 
age of global and European economic integration. As we have seen, criticisms of 
globalisation and European Union (EU) integration are often predicated on the 
claim that these processes have rendered states powerless and domestic political 
factors almost irrelevant in the response to the domestic economic and political 
impact of global forces. Examining the role that domestic political factors have 
played in the recent crisis in an important member of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) such as Spain, and whether they played a significant role in defining 
the outcomes, can constitute a timely and relevant contribution to this debate.  
 
The present chapter presents the final conclusions of the research. Section 7.2 
provides a summary of the main findings. Section 7.3 considers the theoretical 
implications of these findings, in particular with respect to the predictive 
assumptions of the different international and comparative political economy 
research agendas outlined in Chapter 1. As with all research projects, this 
dissertation has its limitations and these are identified in Section 7.3. Some of 
these form the basis of recommendations for further research, which are 
discussed in Section 7.4, before Section 7.5 concludes the chapter and the 
dissertation with a brief restatement of the main conclusion and its potential 
significance. 
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6.2. Summary of findings 
 
The detailed analysis conducted in this dissertation´s has shown first and foremost 
that the management of the crisis in Spain between 2007 and late 2011 and its 
immediate origins was a nuanced affair, shaped by both external constraints and 
domestic political issues. External factors were clearly relevant: global financial 
markets unleashed a credit crunch that not only led to a recession but precipitated 
the collapse of an unsustainable growth model. EMU membership and in 
particular its institutional design limitations, such as the absence of a lender of last 
resort, were critical in transforming an economic recession into a sovereign debt 
crisis and the advent of austerity policies. International investors exercised 
tremendous pressure on Spanish sovereign debt, creating the constant threat of a 
default. Some EMU partners, most noticeably Germany, imposed on Spain its 
diagnosis of the crisis as one caused by excessive profligacy in the European 
periphery, necessitating austerity policies and structural reform. And the European 
Central Bank (ECB) exercised significant influence in nudging the Spanish 
government towards fiscal discipline through its ability to acquire Spanish 
sovereign debt. In sum, these and other external constraints that have been 
highlighted during the dissertation significantly shaped the government´s 
response.  
 
Yet what the research has also shown conclusively is that domestic political 
factors were also crucial in shaping the government´s	management of the crisis, 
most notably in determining the specific measures that were adopted and their 
content. Systematic analysis of the evidence points to seven domestic political 
factors that were particularly influential and which were closely interrelated: i) 
electoral and political cost considerations, ii) party and partisanship, iii) ideological 
preferences iv) the influence of organised interests, v) domestic institutions, vi) 
ineffective decision-making, and vii) the judgement and personal characteristics of 
decision-makers. 
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Electoral and political cost considerations 
 
Considerations of electoral and political cost of the measures adopted were the 
most influential domestic political factor that shaped the government´s response to 
the crisis. The electoral impact of the measures considered was ever present. 
Opinion surveys show that the state of the economy was a key factor in voters’ 
decisions in the three elections (local, European and general) held during the 
period studied (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), 2008, 2009, 2011). 
It is therefore not surprising that the failure to acknowledge difficulties or 
undertake much needed reforms can be traced directly to the Spanish Socialist 
Workers´ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español [PSOE]) government’s 
concerns about the unpopularity of such decisions in the face of these various 
elections. For example, electoral considerations were clearly at play in President 
Zapatero´s refusal to accept the gravity of the crisis before the 2008 general 
election, a refusal that clearly conditioned the continued underplaying of its effect 
until the May 2010 austerity U-turn. Unwillingness to address the financial sector´s 
solvency problems, which were only acted upon with the first financial reform in 
June 2009 and not really tackled head-on until the Plan to Strengthen the 
Financial System (Plan de Reforzamiento Financiero) was put in place in February 
2011, can also be explained in terms of concern about the unpopularity of using 
public funds to rescue financial institutions as well as the fact that the President 
had publicly asserted in 2008 that the Spanish financial system was in a good 
state, and acknowledging otherwise would undoubtedly have carried a significant 
credibility cost. Concerns about the political cost were sometimes obvious, such 
as the strong resistance to labour market liberalisation within large segments of 
the work-force that would have been harmed and the threat of a general strike 
until its materialisation in September 2010, and others more nuanced, such as the 
impact that reforms aimed at stemming the housing bubble would have had on the 
perceived stock of wealth of homeowners. 
 
The pressure of the electorate explains not only why some measures and reforms 
were not adopted, but also why some were in fact undertaken. The May 2010 
austerity measures, which carried significant political cost, can only be understood 
as a strategy to avoid the even larger political cost that a bailout, and de-facto loss 
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of economic sovereignty, would have represented for the government, the PSOE 
and President Zapatero himself. The reform of the pension system can to a 
significant extent also be explained by the fact that, unlike some of the other 
reforms, it did not have an immediate impact in terms of loss of benefits and that 
the electorate it most immediately affected was not inclined to vote for the PSOE 
in any case.  
 
Political cost considerations not only determined whether measures were 
undertaken but also drove the content of many of those adopted. The fiscal 
stimulus adopted in October 2008 was designed with a view to reducing 
unemployment and addressing the immediate political fallout of the crisis rather 
than with any strategic intent to address the structural weaknesses of the Spanish 
economy, such as low research and development investment. Calls for a budget 
consolidation plan to accompany this October 2008 stimulus plan that could 
reassure sovereign bond investors worried about future budgetary imbalances 
went unaddressed due to the political cost that even the mere announcement of 
such plans would have carried. Similarly, the decision to reform the Constitution in 
August 2011 as opposed to agreeing to further reforms of the labour market as the 
ECB demanded, was clearly driven by recognition that the former carried far less 
immediate political cost than the latter and that further liberalisation of the labour 
market would have been electorally lethal to the PSOE just a few months before a 
general election. 
 
Finally, electoral considerations were also important in the constant efforts by the 
government, and in particular President Zapatero, to defend Spain´s international 
prestige and be seen as a responsible EMU member. These actions were clearly 
undertaken with the electorate in mind and with a view to strengthening the 
PSOE´s re-election prospects. This attitude was clearly influential in the 
government´s efforts to be a member of the G20, which in turn can be seen as the 
reason, at least in part, for three important decisions: firstly, the swift and large 
fiscal stimulus, which was intended to project an image of Spain as a leader in the 
response to the call by the October 2008 Washington G20 for a global fiscal 
stimulus to offset the effects of the crisis; secondly, the refusal to admit the 
vulnerabilities of the Spanish financial system at least until mid 2009, since its 
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purported strength was a constant claim leveraged by President Zapatero to call 
for Spain´s admission to the G20; and thirdly, the government´s refusal to accept 
a bailout, as this would obviously have run counter to Spain´s efforts to be seen as 
a model EMU member. 
 
 
Party and partisanship 
 
Closely related to electoral considerations was the manner in which the response 
was shaped by party and partisanship considerations. The views of the party, 
channelled through senior government officials who were also senior party 
members, shaped the response at different stages. For example, party pressure 
was at play in an unwillingness, during the years leading up to the crisis, to take 
measures to cool the housing market that would have compromised the tax 
revenues that the housing bubble generated and which paid for the social services 
upon which, to a significant degree, the party and government´s popularity rested.  
 
Of particular importance was the influence of regional and local PSOE politicians, 
a direct outcome of the decentralised organization that characterises the party. 
This was critical in allowing the construction and housing bubbles to develop, as 
construction became an increasingly important source of tax revenue and party 
funding, and local party officials had the legal authority to grant building permits, 
developing a perverse incentive to keep feeding the bubble. Furthermore, the 
influence of regional and local politicians in the governance of the cajas, and the 
many benefits the regional chapters of the PSOE obtained from presence on their 
boards, was a crucial obstacle to the reform of the governance of these financial 
institutions. The failure to reform the cajas not only contributed to the housing 
bubble in the run-up the crisis, since the cajas were responsible for a substantial 
part of the irresponsible lending that fuelled it, but was also a defining trait of the 
lacklustre reform of the financial sector that did so much to undermine the 
government´s efforts as the crisis progressed, and which also fuelled the 
sovereign debt crisis from 2010 onwards. 
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The footprint of the party can also be clearly seen in the design of many of the 
policies pursued in response to the crisis. A number of fiscally irresponsible 
measures, such as the 400 Euro tax rebate taken during the 2008 electoral 
campaign, were very much driven by a partisan claim. The design of the fiscal 
stimulus package was heavily influenced by the party apparatus and was much 
more closely aligned with party priorities than with economic or strategic 
considerations. Furthermore, that it was designed to be disbursed through local 
authorities, where the PSOE had a strong presence, as opposed to regional 
governments, most of which were in the hands of the conservative PP, also 
responded also to partisan interest. 
 
Finally, the influence of the PSOE was probably most forceful in internal 
opposition to the labour market reform. A number of senior figures in the 
government, including the Minister of Labour Valeriano Gómez, had actually been 
senior union members and their diagnosis of the ills of the labour market and the 
reforms needed differed markedly from the liberalisation and flexibilisation agenda 
that the business community, the European Commission and the IMF advocated. 
The influence of the trade unions was also significant on other senior party figures, 
including President Zapatero himself. As a result, the party exercised an important 
role in delaying the labour market reform and, even when it took place, ensuring it 
was never as far-reaching as the business community or most economic experts 
advocated.  
 
 
Ideological preferences 
 
Party attitudes were driven of course in part by ideological preferences. These 
were probably most evident again in the opposition to further liberalisation of the 
labour market that dominated socialist thinking and which presented a significant 
obstacle to the necessary labour reform. There was a clear political commitment 
by the President and his two Ministers of Labour during this period to protection of 
workers´ rights against the liberalising reform demanded by the business 
community and international institutions. This commitment was grounded in strong 
ideological preferences. It is symptomatic that doubts about claims for the need of 
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further liberalisation were held not only by the President and Ministry of Labour 
officials, closer to the trade unions, but also by senior members in the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. 
 
The large fiscal stimulus with which the government responded to the G20´s call 
for fiscal stimuli is another example of a measure very much driven by an 
ideological predisposition, in this case in favour of a Keynesian response. 
Furthermore, while the May 2010 austerity measures clearly clashed with the 
ideological preferences of the Socialist government, their design was clearly 
influenced by them, exemplified by the protection of healthcare and most other 
social services.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that it was not only the government´s left-leaning 
ideology that shaped the response to the crisis. The dominance of a market-
orientated ideology within the President’s Economic Office and the Bank of Spain, 
the hegemonic source of economic analysis in the country, gave intellectual cover 
to some of the key reforms, such as the liberalisation, even if limited, of the labour 
market, the increase in the retirement age and future reduction of pension benefits 
brought about by the pension reform or the enshrining in the Constitution of a 
fiscal golden rule limiting the government´s ability to generate public deficits in the 
future.  
 
 
Organised interests 
 
These different ideological perspectives, together with the impact on their material 
interests, motivated the pressure exercised on the government by various 
organised interests, another key domestic political factor that shaped the 
management of the crisis. Various interest-based coalitions influenced 
government decisions. For example, the financial sector successfully lobbied the 
government and the Bank of Spain against more stringent regulation or an 
increase in provisions that could have slowed the pace of the credit boom that 
fuelled the housing and construction bubble in the run-up to the crisis. The 
government was also regularly warned by financial executives of the impact on the 
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economy of actions that could weaken banks’ balance sheets, such as forcing 
them to value property at market prices once the bubble pricked.  And it was of 
course the lobbying by the financial sector executives that explains to a significant 
extent why the Bank of Spain was blinded to the sector´s solvency problems and 
why the sector´s reform involved such a protracted effort. 
 
Banking was not the only sector that influenced government´s policy. Construction 
was also a source of pressure, constantly warning government members of the 
impact on jobs any efforts to curb the housing bubble would have. The sector 
clearly benefitted from the government´s decision to deploy the brunt of the 2008 
fiscal stimulus to infrastructure spending. The influence in the policy decision-
making process by other sectors that would have been affected by structural 
reforms, such as energy or many professional services, was also key in explaining 
why the much needed change in growth model that the Sustainable Economy Law 
of 2009 attempted did not take place. The role of the Spanish Confederation of 
Business Organisations (Confederación Española de Organizaciones 
Empresariales [CEOE]), the main business representative organisation, was also 
influential, not least in blocking the labour market reform, as it adopted a clearly 
confrontational attitude towards the government, but also in passing the pension 
reform when, under new leadership, it developed a far more conciliatory tone. 
 
Finally, the trade unions were also a constant source of pressure on the 
government. Their influence was instrumental in ensuring that increasing labour 
market flexibility was not a priority of the Socialist government either in the years 
leading up to the crisis or in its early stages. Trade unions were also important in 
allowing the pension reform to advance, since by the time the reform was 
negotiated they had been significantly weakened by an unsuccessful general 
strike and concessions had been offered to them in return for their support. 
 
 
Domestic institutions 
 
The influence of these organised interests, as well as that of the party, was 
facilitated by the character of some Spanish domestic institutions. For example, 
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the decentralised Spanish state and its administrative structure conditioned the 
response in various ways. Firstly, the high degree of economic management that 
decentralisation had bestowed upon regional governments was key in feeding the 
excessive investment in infrastructure as opposed to research and development 
or other more productive means, both before the crisis and in its early stages 
when the government put in place a fiscal stimulus. In fact, it was only this 
decentralised structure that allowed the government effectively to disburse the 
stimulus largely through local authorities. Decentralisation also enabled the 
institutional development of the cajas system. With their highly political 
governance, and serving as the source of finance for the local and regional 
chapters of the political parties, the cajas presented a significant obstacle to the 
much-needed reform of the financial sector. 
 
The nature of Spain´s parliamentary system also limited the policies that the 
government was able to carry through Parliament. Zapatero´s minority 
government was the direct consequence of a proportional representation system 
that does not easily generate absolute majorities. This vulnerability in Parliament 
made it very difficult for the government to implement politically difficult measures. 
For example, the all-important austerity package enacted in May 2010 was 
approved with a majority of just one vote, even though failure to enact it would 
most likely have led to a sovereign debt default. Furthermore, the electoral system 
over-represents, for historical reasons, nationalist regions such as Catalonia and 
the Basque Country. That the two main Catalonian nationalist parties drifted 
towards an aggressive nationalist stance, which was incompatible with the 
government´s responsibility as holder of central authority, and demanded 
concessions on the nationalist front which were politically unpalatable to the 
Socialists, left the PSOE with only the Basque nationalist party as a reliable 
partner, exacerbating its weakness. 
 
The role of other institutions such as the Bank of Spain was also crucial. Both 
before and during the crisis its diagnostic errors concerning the health of the 
financial sector and its failure to act accordingly were critical in delaying measures 
to reform the cajas and to force financial institutions to strengthen their capital 
bases. This in turn significantly conditioned the government´s ability to manage 
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the crisis, as the risk of a financial bailout fed doubts about the sustainability of 
Spain´s sovereign debt, debilitating Spain´s negotiating position with its EMU 
partners.  
 
Finally, the institutional arrangements that governed relations between the 
government and the private sector, such as the labour market legislation, 
corporate governance rules and vocational training regimes determined parts of 
the context within which the government acted in response to the crisis. For 
example, collective bargaining is enshrined in the Spanish Constitution, something 
which made it almost politically impossible, given the majority required in 
Parliament to amend the Constitution, to eliminate this mechanism as part of the 
deep liberalisation of the labour market that many economic experts and even the 
ECB demanded in 2011. This institutional mechanism became a channel through 
which the trade unions were able to condition the ability of the government to 
increase Spain´s deteriorating competitiveness in the run-up to the crisis or 
implement flexibility measures to keep companies from dismissing employees 
once the crisis hit in earnest.  
 
 
Judgement and personal characteristics of decision-makers 
 
For all the impact of the structural reasons highlighted above, agency was also a 
key explanatory variable and the judgement and personal characteristics of the 
senior decision-makers were an important determinant of how the crisis was 
managed. As Sprout and Sprout (1968: 33-34) have argued, the personal 
characteristics through which political leaders perceive and interpret reality can 
substantially shape the economic policy decisions for which they are responsible. 
The case of Pedro Solbes, Vice-President and Minister of Economy and Finance, 
is a good example. Renowned for his conservative character, he was a career civil 
servant always in favour of gradual change and not radical reform. He was also at 
the end of his career, which might have made him more inclined to a comfortable 
than a combative tenure. These traits made him resistant to the bold reforms, 
often also unpopular and politically costly, that Spain would have needed to deal 
with the imbalances in the run-up to the crisis, such as measures to curtail credit 
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growth, the scrapping of the popular mortgage tax credit, the strengthening of 
competition regulators to foster competition and reduce inflation or a reform of the 
cajas. 
 
The lack of appropriate expertise of the Governor of the Bank of Spain, Miguel 
Ángel Fernández Ordóñez, a renowned micro-economist but with little experience 
in the financial sector before being appointed, also played a key role in the central 
bank’s underestimating the vulnerabilities of the Spanish financial system. The 
personal circumstances of other key actors were also important. For example, the 
hard-core resistance of the President of the CEOE, the business representative 
organisation, during the early part of the crisis, Gerardo Díaz Ferrán, to the labour 
market reform proposed by the government was driven to a significant extent by 
his attempt to use his negotiating power as a bargaining chip to persuade the 
government to drop the corruption charges against him for which he was later 
imprisoned.  
 
But it was of course the judgement and personal characteristics of President 
Zapatero that most significantly shaped the management of the crisis. His 
perennial optimism underpinned his refusal to accept the gravity of the crisis in its 
early stages, not even uttering the word ‘crisis’ until the summer of 2008 when his 
unwillingness to do so had led to much criticism, and to ignore the early signs of 
crisis, from the unsustainability of the housing bubble, to the worsening job figures 
or to the problems in the cajas. His personal closeness to trade union leaders 
played a very significant role in his unwillingness to take more determined action 
on the reform of the labour market. His lack of action on this and other issues was 
also the outcome of his consensus-orientated disposition. Other aspects of his 
personality that influenced his management of the crisis were the tactical and 
short-term approach with which he often confronted complex problems, at least 
until the wake-up call that the need to adopt the May 2010 austerity U-turn 
represented; his tendency to affirm his power by controlling information and not 
sufficiently empowering his ministers, often to the detriment of the necessary 
economic reforms; the concern with his legacy, with respect to both the party and 
the nation; or his lack of knowledge of economics, which played a significant role 
in his not understanding the gravity of the situation sufficiently early. Finally, as 
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with most political leaders, President Zapatero´s concerns about the legacy of his 
term in office weighed heavily in his decisions, not least in his refusal to accept a 
bailout. 
 
 
Ineffective decision-making 
 
These personal characteristics of the key decision-makers were behind one final 
domestic political factor of relevance: the ineffective decision-making process that 
was a hallmark of the Zapatero administration throughout the management of the 
crisis. The interviews conducted have painted a picture of a disorganised decision-
making process where decisions were often taken by the President on the basis of 
anecdotal evidence or by consulting a small number of confidants, often 
bypassing the appropriate government procedures and departments. The chaotic 
way the fiscal stimulus was designed is a clear example of this, as was the fiasco 
surrounding the failed adoption of a single type of contract during the labour 
market reform discussions. Furthermore, the very defective communication 
process often worsened the unpopularity of many measures. The poor manner in 
which the May 2010 austerity measures were explained to the public is a clear 
example, since the government allowed the opposition´s message that pensions 
had been cut to take hold of public opinion, when the reality was that they had 
been frozen, after years of significant increases, and the minimum pensions had 
still been guaranteed a rise.  
 
This inefficient decision-making was both cause and consequence of the 
disagreements within the cabinet, which certainly conditioned the management of 
the crisis, both in the assessment of its gravity and in the measures adopted to 
confront it. The different views within the cabinet regarding the likely length and 
depth of the crisis or the likelihood of a hard landing prevented more forceful 
action that could have helped stem the credit boom and associated housing 
bubble prior to the crisis. In the origin of this disagreement was a failure by 
Spanish policymakers to understand the implications of EMU. In fact, the 
management of the crisis was also characterised by serious diagnostic errors, 
often reflective of this poor decision-making process, from the initial denial of the 
	 205	
gravity of the crisis and the vulnerabilities of the financial sector to the 
misunderstanding of EMU´s implications. The labour market reform was another 
area where these divisions played out between the officials at the Ministry of 
Labour, closer to the position of the trade unions, and that of the Ministry of the 
Economy and Finance and the President´s Economic Office.  
 
In sum, the seven domestic political factors outlined above all significantly shaped 
the management of the crisis and of its immediate origins but did so in different 
manner, influencing different areas and to varying degree. The electoral and 
political cost implications were arguably the most important and were ever-present 
in the considerations of President Zapatero and his government, both in the 
downplaying of the crisis in its early stages and in modulating the austerity 
measures and reforms that followed. The manner in which these political and 
electoral costs were determined did, however, vary. The voice of the party was not 
always heeded, not least because of the total control that the President and his 
close allies had of the party apparatus, and as a result partisanship and party 
considerations did not always directly define the President´s calculations, as was 
clearly evidenced by the reform of the Constitution, taken with absolute disregard 
and at the expense of the PSOE’s electoral interests. However, partisanship did 
directly influence the government´s actions on many occasions, for example 
through the influence of regional PSOE leaders on the cajas. And party 
preferences were in any case almost always embedded in the electoral and 
political calculations made by the President and government. Ideology often 
played a mediating role in this respect as, irrespective of the influence of the party, 
a shared ideological outlook meant that the political costs estimated by the 
President and members of his government were often aligned with party 
considerations. Some of the key responses adopted, such as resistance to 
liberalisation of the labour market or eagerness to respond to the G20´s call for a 
fiscal stimulus, were undoubtedly shaped by the left-wing ideological preferences 
of the President and other government members.  
 
Other responses to the crisis can best be understood in terms of the role played 
by organised interests and domestic institutions. The influence of the former was 
particularly evident in areas where these material interests were affected and the 
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representatives of the sectors had access and ability to influence the President or 
key ministers. The most obvious case was that of the financial sector, although the 
pressure exerted by energy, utility and construction firms was also intense. In a 
number of key developments, not least the reform of the labour market, the trade 
unions were highly influential, both through the institutional mechanisms that 
granted them leverage such as collective bargaining and through the strong 
connections they had to the Ministry of Labour and President Zapatero himself. 
The particular nature of some domestic institutions played an important role in 
providing the means by which these organised interests exerted pressure on the 
government, for example the political economy of institutions that drove industrial 
relations and which allowed both trade unions and business representatives to 
block the labour reform for a substantial period, each for obviously different 
reasons. Other institutional features, such as the role of the Bank of Spain in 
Spain, the decentralised Spanish administration or parliamentary system, were 
also important.  
 
There were other responses to the crisis that interests, institutions and ideas 
cannot account for and that can be best explained by reference to the personal 
characteristics and judgement of key policymakers, most notably President 
Zapatero and Vice-President Solbes, but also figures like the Governor of the 
Bank of Spain. Although always difficult to measure, one of the findings of the 
dissertation is that this factor influenced the government´s response more than 
most theoretical frameworks which, as we have seen, focus on ideas, interests or 
institutions, allow for. Whether it was Mr Solbes´ conservative attitudes blocking 
necessary reforms, Governor Fernández-Ordóñez´s lack of banking experience 
contributing to the financial sector´s problems going unaddressed or President 
Zapatero´s perennial optimism nudging him to a denial of the gravity of the crisis 
in its early stages, personal characteristics were not at all insignificant in the 
management of the crisis. In fact, it was another of President Zapatero´s well 
known personal traits, his relatively chaotic approach to management, that 
partially explains the dysfunctional decision- making process, a factor that played 
a role in various key episodes, from the way in which the 2008 fiscal stimulus or 
2010 austerity packages were put together, to the remarkable manner in which the 
President went about reforming the Constitution in late 2011. 
	 207	
6.3. Theoretical implications 
 
The evidence uncovered in this research provides useful material in light of which 
to consider, in the Spanish context, the usefulness of the different Comparative 
Political Economy (CPE) research agendas considered in Chapter 1: institutional, 
interest-based, partisanship-based and ideational. It also provides valuable 
evidence to assess what the Spanish case can tell us about the economic 
discretion of states in an age of European and global economic integration. 
 
 
Institutional political economy 
 
Theories that privilege the role of institutions in shaping economic outcomes are 
consistent with the important role played by some key institutional arrangements 
in the management of the crisis in Spain. As seen in the previous section, 
institutional factors defined key drivers of the response to the crisis such as the 
role played by decentralisation, whether in the failure of the cajas system or the 
disbursement of the fiscal stimulus, the weak parliamentary support that the 
government could count on or failures in the supervision of the financial system by 
a key institution such as the Bank of Spain. 
 
An institutional approach is of particular relevance to explaining how the 
corporatist nature of Spain´s political economy institutions was behind many of the 
imbalances that led to the crisis and conditioned its management. As argued by 
Molinas (2013), the political and institutional arrangements that came out of the 
transition to democracy were characterised by the collusion of political and 
economic elites, which led to the development of a rent-seeking and corporatist 
mode of capitalism. This was evident in the deep enmeshing of the public and 
private sphere that characterised corporate governance structures, with little 
accountability and weak competition regulators, and which allowed very imperfect 
competition in many important product and market services. This system allowed 
for a disproportionate amount of the growth to be syphoned to economic elites 
through mechanisms such as high prices due to lack of competition, vast 
overinvestment in infrastructure to the benefit of certain corporate sectors or 
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corruption. The latter was in part facilitated by the system of blocked party lists, 
which was designed to strengthen political parties as a way to guarantee the 
stability of a then young democracy, but prevented party elites from being 
accountable to the electorate. The impact of these corporatist institutional 
arrangements was clear, as the evidence presented in this dissertation shows, in 
various dimensions of the crisis: the housing bubble, the outcome to a great extent 
of collusion between political elites which controlled the boards of the cajas and 
used their financing prowess to serve the interests of specific parties or firms; the 
effective resistance to reform of various sectors, including the construction, utilities 
and in particular the financial sector; and the manner in which the control that 
unions and business representatives had of industrial relations allowed for the 
labour market reform to be stalled, since it was in the interest of all parties, for 
different reasons, that it should not progress. In so far as these corporatist 
arrangements were set up by public and private elites for their benefit and to the 
detriment of the population at large, the Spanish case gives credence to 
Acemoglu and Robinson´s (2012) claims concerning the corrosive role of 
extractive institutions.  
 
But it is the varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach that is, as we have seen, the 
most important research agenda when considering the role of institutions in CPE. 
According to the VoC literature (Royo, 2008), Spanish socio-economic agents had 
achieved a high degree of coordination despite the absence of formal coordination 
mechanisms that characterise coordination in coordinated market economies 
(CMEs). This was so because successful coordination is dependant not only on 
the coordinating mechanism but also on the actors´ interests and strategies, which 
in the Spanish case were conducive to coordination (ibid.). Even in the field of 
labour relations, where Spain certainly lacks the formal coordinating mechanisms 
of the kind found in CMEs, the tradition of social dialogue between government, 
industry and unions that has defined Spain´s political economy since the transition 
to democracy and the collective bargaining system that is enshrined in the 
Constitution, led to a significant degree of coordination. Because of these traits, 
the VoC literature identifies Spain as of a Mediterranean model (Royo, 2008), 
which combines some elements of both liberal market economies (LMEs) and 
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CMEs, but one that was not converging towards an LME prior to the crisis but 
rather retained important elements of coordination.  
 
A VoC approach would have expected the response to the crisis to be consistent 
and shaped by Spain´s political economy institutional arrangements. And, in fact, 
to some degree it was. The initial fiscal stimulus was intended to promote 
investment in infrastructure and promote short-term hire, which reinforced the 
existing growth and employment models, based on low skills and productivity 
sectors and jobs (Royo, 2013: 240). In the banking sector, the initial response 
involved extensive regulatory intervention, which was in line with, and in fact 
strengthened, the model of strategic coordination between the state and the sector 
that had been in place prior to the crisis. 
 
Yet, as Royo, who has probably been at the forefront of the application of the VoC 
model to Spain, admits, there are problems with this supposed fit. The response to 
the crisis, in particular through the increased liberalisation of the labour market 
despite strong opposition from the trade unions, seems to have taken the country 
precisely in the direction of LMEs, rather than reinforcing the Mediterranean 
model. Similarly, the restructuring of the Spanish financial sector, and in particular 
the disappearance of the cajas, weakened the strong coordination between state 
and private firms in the financial sector, undoing the highly bankarised Spanish 
financial sector, a key trait of its strategic coordination model. 
 
In conclusion, the early response to the crisis was consistent with the assumption 
of the VoC approach, but not so much later developments. Furthermore, for all the 
ways in which these institutions might have constrained or conditioned the 
response, the Spanish case shows how the VoC model significantly 
underestimates the role of agency and the interests of the key actors. As Royo 
himself admits (2013: 241): 
 
The analysis of the Spanish experience with the crisis confirms the thesis 
that coordination is a political process and that strategic actors with their 
own interests design institutions (Thelen 2004). Institutional change is a 
political matter because institutions are generated by conflict, they are the 
result of politics of distribution, and, hence, they are politically and 
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ideologically construed and depend on power relations (Becker 2006: 9) 
(…). In other words, institutional change is driven by politics (…). The crisis 
has had a profound effect on power relations and the interests of actors. 
 
 
Interest-based political economy 
 
There appears then to be a clear connection between institution-based and 
interest-based CPE approaches, which is clearly at play in the Spanish case. 
Many of the actors who were protagonists in the institutional analysis sketched 
above had strong material interests in shaping the policy response in their favour 
and interest-based approaches capture well how they shaped the origins and 
management of the crisis in Spain. The adoption of the euro created clearly 
defined winners and losers in Spain´s political economy and the defence of these 
interests is key to understanding interest-based dynamics in the run-up to the 
crisis. As Hopkins (2015: 11) has explained:  
 
The big winners from the resulting boom [of the adoption of the euro] were 
to be found in the sheltered sectors of the economy: construction, the 
services sector (…), and, of course, the banks. These sectors had every 
interest in blocking the kind of reforms that were necessary for the southern 
European economies to function within the single currency (…) Politically, 
the housing boom empowered the real estate and construction industries 
and deepened their often corrupt connections to political representatives, 
particularly local councillors who had control over planning and zoning 
decisions, and political nominees in regional banks. 
 
It was these material interests that were behind the interest coalitions that shaped 
Spain´s political economy in the run-up to the crisis. As would have been 
predicted by the work of Gourevitch (1978, 1986), the arrival of the crisis fractured 
these coalitions. For example, the construction and financial sectors had mutually 
benefited from the housing boom, but once the bubble burst and the banks were 
left with a large number of toxic property assets on their balance sheets, the 
interests of the two sectors diverged. The setting up of a bad bank, which was 
discussed by the government in the early days of the crisis, would have been 
partially in the interest of the financial sector but certainly not of the construction 
companies, since it would have seen housing prices plunge. 
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The opportunity seen by business representatives to use the crisis and spiralling 
unemployment to pressure the government to liberalise the labour market also 
broke the tacit coalition of business representatives and trade unions that, despite 
its ups and downs, had characterised Spanish industrial relations since the 
transition. The unions and the CEOE had a common interest in maintaining the 
labour market regulation structure, especially collective bargaining, as they both 
benefited by it in so far as it gave them power and leverage. As explained earlier, 
this coalition can be traced to the francoist seeds of the corporatist model of 
capitalism that developed in Spain and which, through the social concertation 
model, was a hallmark of Spanish political economy. Consequently, while Spain´s 
formal institutional framework as per its VoC did not predetermine that 
coordination in industrial relations would take place, it was the interest of the key 
players that drove them in that direction. Once these interests markedly diverged, 
so did the coordination that had resulted from them. In sum, the interests of the 
private sector pressuring for labour market reform, overcame the tradition of 
strategic coordination that, with the exception of a brief period in the early 90s, 
had characterised Spanish industrial relations. 
 
These material interests were also behind the strong influence exercised by the 
financial, construction or utilities sectors in attempting to neutralise efforts that 
they regarded as contrary to their interests and which partially explain the absence 
of reforms in the run-up to the crisis and the imbalances that led to Spain´s 
difficulties. In fact, the manner in which reform of the financial sector finally took 
place is also consistent with an interest-based template. Otero et al. (2016: 38) 
have applied Alesina and Drazen´s (1991) war of attrition model, discussed in 
Chapter 1, to explain the evolution of the financial sector reform during the crisis. 
According to this interpretation, the reform was delayed because of the divergent 
interests of the key actors involved – banks, cajas, the government and the Bank 
of Spain – with each of them attempting to shift to the other the burden of 
adjustment in a ‘war of attrition’ which only ended, in this case, with the 
intervention of an external actor, the EU, which forced the reform of the sector.  
 
In sum, interest-based approaches are helpful to explain certain developments in 
the management of the crisis but fall short in others. On the one hand the interest 
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of key stakeholders influenced the government in directions that would not have 
not been obvious given the country´s institutional set-up. While the latter often 
provided the means, it was the former that provided the motive. Furthermore, the 
predictions of interest-based approaches seem to be warranted by the Spanish 
experience, not least Gourevitch´s assumption of the relevance of interest-based 
coalitions and how crises change them.  
 
However, it is clear that approaches that suggest that material interests are the 
key explanatory variables are not sufficient to explain fully the Spanish 
experience. The influence of organised interests was constrained by the 
institutions within which actors operated and by other domestic factors. For all of 
their opposition to them by organised interests, various key reforms, such as in the 
financial sector, the labour market or the end of the generous subsidies for 
renewables in the energy sector, did end up taking place. Similarly, a bailout might 
have been in the interest of many influential organised interests, not least the 
financial and construction sectors which would have seen their finance cost 
significantly reduced, yet other political factors led the government vehemently to 
oppose any bailout, such as the electoral cost it would have implied. 
 
 
Partisanship-based political economy 
 
The actors and interests driving the management of the crisis were not only 
material but also political and as such partisanship-based approaches can also be 
said to have been partially correct in their predictive assumptions. Party 
preferences and pressures can explain a number of key decisions, from the large 
fiscal stimulus to the lukewarm labour market reform. As suggested by Nordhaus’ 
(1975) work on political business cycles, the electoral cycle was a key explanatory 
variable in the response to the crisis, most certainly in the underplaying of its 
gravity in the run-up to the 2008 election and the refusal to accept a second labour 
reform when demanded by the ECB in 2011 in return for the acquisition of 
Spanish sovereign bonds. Many of the decisions privileged the importance of 
employment over fiscal or inflation considerations, at least until the May 2010 U-
turn, confirming the validity of Hibbs´(1977) hypothesis in this respect. Although 
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not as important as other domestic factors, party pressure did, as shown in the 
previous section, play a role in some episodes of the crisis, in a way that is 
consistent with the work of Boix (1998). The management of the crisis is also 
consistent with what would have been predicted by approaches that, while 
maintaining the centrality of partisanship, see it conditioned by other factors such 
as the international economic context (Alt, 1985) or trade unions (Garret, 1998). 
As seen in the summary of findings, both of these factors significantly determined 
the management of the crisis, the former for example in how contagion from the 
Greek crisis led to the May 2010 austerity measures and the latter in the 
reluctance of the government to undertake a more profound reform of the labour 
market. Finally, approaches such as that of Galasso (2014) rightly predicted that, 
in times of crisis, left wing governments are more prone to undertake structural 
reforms. That was certainly the case with the PSOE in the management of the 
crisis in Spain as, despite serious reluctance, it did end up adopting some 
significant reforms, such as that of the pensions, the financial system or the fiscal 
sustainability golden rule in the Constitution. 
 
As with material interests, partisanship approaches cannot however properly 
account for some of the most important measures taken by the government, and 
which were clearly against the political interests of the PSOE. The most 
remarkable example was of course the austerity measures adopted in 2010, which 
represented a departure from the commitment to social spending increases that 
had characterised the Zapatero administration until then and which ran counter to 
attempts to increase employment with expansionary policies which partisanship 
approaches would have expected a left-wing government to privilege. Another 
measure which does not tie well with a partisanship approach was the reform of 
the Constitution to enshrine a limit to public spending, something which had been 
anathema until then for the Spanish Socialists. Finally, the de-facto abolition of the 
cajas system took away a valuable source of power and income for the Socialists, 
as well as the rest of the parties, which explanations based on partisanship 
preferences would struggle to account for.  
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Ideational political economy 
 
A first approach in this research agenda locates most explanatory power in how 
ideas are used to realise interests. Such a view fits various instances of the 
management of the crisis in Spain and its immediate origins. For example, an 
ideological commitment to economic redistribution through high levels of social 
expenditure served to realise the partisan interests of the PSOE and of President 
Zapatero in the years leading up to the crisis. Privileging social equality and 
investment in public services helped the government to push policies in response 
to the crisis, such as the fiscal stimulus of 2008, which satisfied its electoral 
interests. In other words, ideas became the means by which partisan interests 
could be legitimised.  
 
In this utilitarian interpretation of ideational motives, epistemic communities play a 
key role and the dominant ideas within a given professional group are key in 
explaining the choice of policies. Such an approach is useful to interpret, for 
example, the role played by the Bank of Spain in the management of the crisis. As 
the hegemonic source of economic analysis in Spain, its market-orientated views 
provided intellectual cover for liberalising structural reforms beyond the financial 
sector. This is distinct from the interests defended by the financial sector, as in the 
case of the staff of the Bank of Spain it was driven more by an ideational 
framework than for advancing particular economic interests. Furthermore, the 
groupthink that dominated the institution is key in understanding its supervisory 
failures of the financial sector and other macroeconomic diagnostic mistakes that 
shaped the management of the crisis. Conversely, and as Fishman (2012) has 
argued, the absence of any distinct economic ideological foundation on the 
Spanish left can go a long way in explaining why the Socialist government 
adopted some of the orthodox policies that were being demanded by the troika. 
 
Ideational frameworks that go beyond the instrumental use of ideas and point to 
ideology and culture as the primary cause of economic outcomes (Johnson, 1994; 
Sabel, 1995; Ziegler, 1997) also find relative confirmation in the Spanish crisis. 
For example, Spain´s past as a dictatorship has made the idea of the EU, in the 
eyes of the political and business class, the anchor of democracy and economic 
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development. There was thus intense pressure on policy-makers, and especially 
on President Zapatero, to do whatever it took to remain a model EU member, 
which can help explain the government´s willingness to accept difficult measures 
such as the austerity policies implemented in 2010, even if it apparently went 
against the PSOE’s electoral interests and ideological tenets. 
 
Yet the role of ideas is insufficient to explain significant episodes in the 
management of the crisis when they were often trumped by the influence of 
interests or institutions. For example, approaches privileging the explanatory 
power of ideology cannot explain the many measures that ran directly against the 
government´s centre-left ideology, from the austerity policies established in 2010 
to reform of the labour market or pension system, or the reform of the Constitution 
to establish limits to public expenditure. 
 
In sum, the Spanish crisis has provided a useful illustration of how the different 
factors privileged by alternative CPE research agendas – institutions, interests, 
partisanship and ideology – were all present in the management of the crisis by 
the Spanish government and in fact reinforced each other. Such a dynamic points, 
at least in the particular Spanish case, to the futility of trying to find the key 
explanatory driver of political economy outcomes in one particular domestic 
political factor. While the different CPE approaches are all partially useful in 
explaining the management of the crisis in Spain, they are all insufficient in so far 
as they privilege a certain single factor to the exclusion of others that, in the 
Spanish crisis, were also important. The different CPE approaches are, in sum, all 
partially sound and related to each other. Institutions are shaped by confrontation 
in defence of material and political interests, which are in turn shaped by ideas.  
 
 
Economic discretion of states in the age of globalisation  
 
The discussion above has offered ample evidence of the relevance of domestic 
political factors when analysing the management of the crisis in Spain. The 
salience of the domestic dimension, and the defining role that the actions of the 
government had in defining the response to the crisis, point to the answer to the 
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second theoretical debate introduced in the Introduction, namely that on 
globalisation´s impact on states’ economic discretion. This dissertation´s findings 
indeed appear to indicate that, in the case of Spain, the state maintained a 
significant degree of discretion. As we have seen throughout the dissertation, 
while external constraints were ever-present in the management of the crisis, the 
PSOE government always had a significant margin of action, if not always on the 
timing and the necessity to act, certainly on the measures it adopted and their 
specific content. In other words, external constraints might have shaped the when, 
but not so much the what and the how. And even when external constraints 
influenced the content of the reforms, the final shape of many of the measures 
adopted was almost always significantly conditioned by domestic considerations. 
 
This dynamic was evident in most of the key episodes of the management of the 
crisis. The first major decision adopted, the fiscal stimulus agreed in October 
2008, was in its content and the way it was disbursed very much the outcome of 
the government´s domestic priorities. These were driven by the government´s 
electoral and partisanship interests, such as responding to the pressure of 
organised interests to devote a significant part of the stimulus to construction 
projects or for the funds to be disbursed through local authorities, where the 
PSOE had a strong presence and therefore much to gain politically. Following on 
this initial response, the government proved how relatively impermeable it was to 
external pressure to act as it continuously downplayed the gravity of the crisis and 
delayed taking substantial measures, despite increasing calls to do so. Those 
measures adopted, like the Sustainable Economy Law, were brought about much 
more by the domestic political pressure to be seen to be responding in some way 
to the crisis than by any external constraints. The measures taken to ensure bank 
lending and the bailout of various cajas showed how, despite the process of 
financial globalisation, actions to address the difficulties of financial institutions fell 
in Spain, as in most other EMU members, at least initially, on the shoulders of the 
state, exposing, as Thompson (2010:137) has argued:  
 
The limitations of much of the argument that globalisation has reduced the 
economic agency of states, and vindicated those who insisted that states 
were still crucial economic actors. 
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Even in the decision that could offer the more persuasive evidence that financial 
market pressure and EMU membership had come to trump the government´s 
ability to act, namely the austerity measures of May 2010, government´s discretion 
was ample, as was shown in Chapter 4. The choice of measures to adopt was 
very much the decision of the government and it was driven to a significant extent 
by domestic political considerations, such as protecting key social services like 
health-care that were crucial to the PSOE´s electorate. Another of the unpopular 
measures adopted, the labour reform, was, again, on close observation, less a 
radical reform imposed upon the government by external forces beyond its control 
than a relatively limited reform shaped by ideological factors and domestic 
organised interests that stopped well short of what would have been implemented 
had external pressures been inescapable. While it is true that, even if necessary, 
the reform might not have taken place had it not been for the external pressure, it 
is also true that, had the government been defenceless against these external 
forces, it would have been far more profound. Yet one more episode that shows 
that the Spanish government preserved its discretion to act was the refusal to 
accept a bailout. As discussed, Spain was asked on at least three different 
occasions to accept a bailout during a period of intense pressure on its sovereign 
bonds. The government resisted such calls driven, as we have seen, almost 
exclusively by domestic considerations.  	
Even in the reforms undertaken in 2011, in the midst of the most intense pressure 
from the euro crisis, the final measures were very much at the discretion of the 
government. The further reform of the financial sector was of course catalysed by 
the global financial crisis but, as explored in Chapters 3 and 4, the decisive factor 
that determined the content of the reform was the government´s reaction to 
domestic factors such as the unsustainability of the cajas system or the exposure 
of the banks to bad debts from the housing bubble. The pension reform was, far 
from an external imposition, the government´s autonomous response to deal with 
an unsustainable system for demographic and financial reasons. 
 
Finally, the reform of the Constitution in mid 2011 offers another clear illustration 
of how the Spanish government retained its discretion to act in the most 
fundamental way, even when appearances would suggest otherwise. The letter 
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sent by ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet in which, in a veiled manner, he 
suggested that ECB acquisition of Spanish debt was conditional on Spain’s 
undertaking a number of key reforms would on paper appear to be the clearest 
example of loss of national economic sovereignty as a result of EMU membership. 
Yet the reality was, as explained in Chapter 5, quite different. While the reform to 
which the ECB attached more importance, and which it directly asked the 
government to undertake, was that of the labour market, the Spanish government 
opted for an alternative measure which had not even been mentioned by the ECB: 
the reform of the Constitution to incorporate a deficit limit. Such a measure was 
not only taken autonomously by the Spanish government, but was in fact driven 
mainly by domestic consideration, namely that such a reform did not entail any 
financial short-term cost and was deemed to be far less politically toxic than the 
labour market reform requested by the ECB. 
 
In sum, this study of the Spanish management of the crisis suggests two main 
conclusions concerning the theoretical debates previously outlined. With regard to 
the globalisation versus state autonomy debate, it provides evidence in favour of 
frameworks that seek to highlight the persistence of a significant degree of 
economic discretion for states. As far as the alternative CPE frameworks is 
concerned, the dissertation provides evidence from which to argue in favour of a 
more integrated approach that gives causal force to each of institutional, material 
interest, partisanship and ideational factors, even while recognising that these 
approaches are insufficient, as they do not give sufficient credence to other 
important domestic factors such as the personal characteristics and judgement of 
decision-makers. While it is of course impossible to generalise these conclusions 
to other cases, if domestic factors have a key role in shaping economic outcomes, 
as this dissertation has shown to be the case in Spain, it is analytically 
impoverishing, if not flawed, to pretend that international economic dynamics, 
such as the euro crisis, can be understood without reference to domestic political 
factors. As Ravenhill (2010: 165) has argued: 
 
The significance of the interaction between the domestic and the 
international (…), between work in comparative and international political 
economy, has been reemphasised by the recession. 
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6.4. Limitations of the research 
 
As is the case with all research, this dissertation has limitations. Firstly, it is limited 
to Spain, so its findings cannot be of general application. It may be that its 
conclusion regarding the salience of domestic political factors applies to the case 
of other states that have faced similar circumstances in the current crisis, but such 
a claim cannot be predicated on the basis of this research. In other words, it has 
neither probabilistic value nor capacity to explain what happened in EMU´s 
periphery, but rather illustrative value and analytical pertinence only for the 
Spanish context.  
 
Secondly, the time period specified has left out some important episodes, such as 
the bailout of the financial sector that took place in the summer of 2012. The 
reasons for limiting the research to the period of the PSOE administration were 
explained in Chapter 1. Yet an extension of the investigation to the years of the 
PP administration would make it possible to explore whether the conclusions of 
the dissertation also apply during this period, especially in relation to the 
interaction between the Spanish government on the one hand and the ECB and 
Germany on the other. 
 
Thirdly, the dissertation´s empirical conclusions are derived from qualitative in-
depth interviews with senior policy-makers and are thus subject to the limitations 
that qualitative research of this type may suffer. The findings are the result of the 
observation of causal processes rather than observations of data. Furthermore, it 
is inevitable that the views of the actors interviewed are subjective and, the crisis 
being a particularly difficult period for most of them, it is to be expected that they 
would be biased. Nevertheless, significant effort has been made to control for 
such problems by cross checking against other sources particularly contentious or 
generic claims. 
 
Finally, as with any research of this type, the conclusions cannot be final. The 
relationship between endogenous and exogenous factors in the management of 
the crisis was complex and does not lend itself to simple conclusions. The aim has 
been not so much to claim that external constraints were of no importance, which 
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was certainly not the case, or to offer probabilistic certainty of the salience of 
domestic political factors in the management of the crisis, but rather to describe 
the general process of what was going in the black box of the decision-making 
process and to provide evidence to show that domestic political factors were 
crucial, offering some insight into how they were so.  
 
 
6.5. Recommendations for future research 
 
The limitations described above suggest areas where future research would be 
useful to complement the findings of this dissertation. Extending the research 
period to the first term of the Partido Popular (PP) conservative government, or at 
least until the financial sector bailout in June 2012, would allow us to test whether 
the same conclusions still applied. Similar studies of the management of the crisis 
in other EMU periphery states could help assess whether the claim to the salience 
of domestic political factors is generalisable in the context of the euro crisis. This 
would also make a useful contribution to debates on the globalisation versus state 
discretion and the sustainability of EMU. On the first topic the findings of the 
dissertation would be useful to test theoretical models on the tension between 
economic integration, democracy and sovereignty, such as Dani Rodrik´s 
globalisation trilemma (Rodrik, 2012). In relation to discussions on EMU´s 
sustainability, further corroboration in other EMU periphery states of the 
dissertation´s findings would be particularly useful, since the difficulties facing the 
monetary union have been predicated to some extent on the social and political 
discontent in EMU´s periphery with what is seen as external imposition of 
unpopular policies. This dissertation may assist comparative studies to identify 
mechanisms through which domestic political factors might have been more 
important than previously considered. 
 
Finally, the results of the dissertation may be of interest to advance the research 
agenda in the field of political country risk analysis. Established country risk 
frameworks tend to be static but this research has shown that domestic political 
factors build risks over time, such as that of postponing structural reforms that can 
imperil the future growth prospects of a nation or delays in fiscal consolidation that 
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make a country vulnerable to the doubts of sovereign bond investors. The results 
of the dissertation could help define risk analysis frameworks that go beyond 
narrow time frames, looking into how the different components of risk accumulate 
and help integrate different component blocks of national risk. 
 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
If there is one overall judgement that this research project has drawn it is that 
blaming external constraints for the predicament that Spain has found itself in 
must be treated with scepticism. Even in the most pressing circumstances, the 
Spanish government retained a degree of autonomy, if not on the timing or 
discretion to act, certainly on the content and shape of the response. External 
constraints mattered, but so did domestic political factors, and the most important 
contribution of the dissertation to the scholarly debate has been to provide 
evidence to this effect. 
 
In the sombre era that the crisis has inaugurated in Europe and beyond, such a 
result may be a source of optimism. Fears that economic integration neutralises 
the autonomy of states are fuelling an increasingly pervasive dissatisfaction with 
the current socioeconomic system in developed economies, and certainly in 
Europe. If such a claim can be shown to be exaggerated, if states can be said still 
to hold significant leeway in defining their own political and economic destiny and 
addressing their citizens´ problems, then it is conceivable that a more gradual and 
effective ceding of sovereignty, this time through more democratic means and with 
states perceived by their citizens as voluntarily surrendering this autonomy 
through democratic processes rather than being forced to do so, could pave the 
way to a more sustainable age of economic integration, prosperity and socio-
political contentment. 
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